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Chapter 1
Preface
This dissertation belongs to the field of normative public economics. It is
concerned with the characterization of schemes of taxation and public good
provision that are optimal from a welfare perspective.
More precisely, optimal tax systems and optimal rules for public good pro-
vision are analyzed based on the assumption that individuals are privately
informed about their valuation of the public good and that an optimal rule
for public good provision reflects this information; e.g. a larger average valu-
ation of the public good among individuals in the economy implies that the
quantity of the public good that is provided under an optimal rule goes up.
As a consequence, an optimal provision rule has to be based on some proce-
dure of information aggregation that allows this information to be acquired.
The tax system is a key determinant for the task of information aggregation.
If individuals are asked to communicate their valuation of the public good to
“the system”, they compare the utility gain from a larger level of public good
provision to the utility burden that results from the need to generate larger
tax revenues to cover the costs of public good provision. Individuals will
hence communicate their “true” valuation of the public good only if these
1
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two forces are commensurate.
To illustrate this, consider a tax system that exempts individuals with a very
low level of income from any tax payment. For these individuals an increased
tax revenue requirement does not cause any utility burden. Hence those indi-
viduals welcome any increase in the quantity of the public good and are thus
inclined to exaggerate when asked about their valuation of the public good.
Alternatively, suppose that tax revenues are used not only to cover the cost
of public good provision but also to finance direct income transfers to poor
individuals. In this case, individuals with a rather high level of income might
claim an excessive taste for public good provision just in order to ensure that
the fraction of tax revenues that is dedicated to the transfer system does not
become too large.
These considerations demonstrate that the problem of finding an optimal
tax system is intertwined with the problem of finding an optimal rule for
an informed decision on public good provision. An analysis based on the
presumption that information on public goods preferences just happens to
be available is too naive. Individuals might refuse to reveal this information
because a higher level of public spending affects their personal tax bill. This
concern is the topic of this dissertation. Each chapter contains a character-
ization of optimal tax schemes and provision rules under the premise that
information on public goods preferences needs to be acquired.
A theory of optimal taxation and public good provision in the presence of
uncertainty about public goods preferences is of value for two reasons. First,
it is desirable to have a more complete theory, and below I will argue that
such a theory has not yet been developed. Second, and more substantively,
the use of tax revenues to cover the cost of public good provision and the
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need to assess the desirability of a public project prior to the final spend-
ing decision are real-world phenomena. A normative theory thus provides
a benchmark that allows judgement about how real-world institutions deal
with this problem.
The theory identifies outcomes that take specific constraints into account
and are optimal under a given welfare function. Institutional constraints
determine the set of tax instruments used for public goods finance. Tech-
nological constraints enter the analysis via the cost of public good provision
that determines the tax revenue requirement in the public sector budget con-
straint. Finally, there are informational constraints. Individuals are privately
informed about their public goods preferences. Hence, an optimal policy can
use only those pieces of information that individuals are indeed willing to
reveal to the system. Considerations of political feasibility enter the analysis
via this latter set of constraints. Information can be acquired only if it is
used in a way that is in line with the interests of individuals. These interests
in turn are shaped by the tax system and the provision rule for public goods.
The derivation of a normative benchmark that takes all these constraints
into account is of limited use when it comes to recommendations for actual
public policy. However, it provides a better understanding of their interplay
and of the restrictions that become effective even under an ideal tax system.
For instance, chapter 4 of this dissertation identifies a tradeoff between the
desire to have an optimal redistributive tax system for a given level of public
good provision and the problem of acquiring the information that is needed
to determine the optimal quantity of the public good. It is shown that these
two tasks can not be achieved simultaneously; that is, even the best policy-
maker is not able to escape this problem.
In more abstract terms, a theory of optimal taxation, public good provision
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and information acquisition yields a characterization of constrained efficient
allocations. In addition, with a given welfare assessment, optimal constrained
efficient allocations can be studied. As an example, it is shown in chapter 4
that a constrained efficient utilitarian tax system displays a complementarity
between the extent of redistribution and the decision on public good provi-
sion – relative to a situation where informational constraints are not taken
into account.
1.1 Related Literature
The topics of optimal taxation and public good provision, on the one hand,
and the elicitation of preferences for public goods, on the other hand, have so
far been treated in separate branches of economic theory. For brevity, I will
henceforth refer to the first branch of the literature as the theory of optimal
taxation and to the second branch as the theory of mechanism design.
The setup in the theory of optimal taxation is as follows. A benevolent plan-
ner chooses several policy variables on the basis of some welfare function.
The policy variables include various direct or indirect tax instruments and
provision levels of public goods. The planner takes into account that individ-
ual consumption choices and labour supply decisions respond to the chosen
policy and that a public sector budget constraint has to be satisfied.
In this theory the optimal quantity of a public good is determined according
to a modified Samuelson rule, after Samuelson (1954). The optimal quantity
is such that the sum of marginal valuations of the public good is equal to
the marginal cost of public funds under the given tax system.1 Obviously,
1There are numerous contributions to this literature, which differ according to the tax
instruments that are used for public goods finance. Examples include Atkinson and Stern
(1974), Wilson (1991), Boadway and Keen (1993), Nava et al. (1996), Sandmo (1998),
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an application of the modified Samuelson rule requires the assumption that
the sum of marginal valuations of the public good is commonly known.
The theory of mechanism design, by contrast, studies the problem of how
to acquire this information.2 In this theory, uncertainty about the sum of
marginal valuations arises in the following way: individuals have private in-
formation on their own valuation of the public good and, as a consequence,
the sum of all individual valuations or, equivalently, the average valuation of
the public good is an unknown variable. In order to acquire this information,
a mechanism designer asks all individuals to report their valuation.
The main question for the mechanism design approach is to what extent the
classical free rider problem in public good provision may be resolved, i.e. it is
concerned with the welfare costs of having to finance public good provision in
such a way that any individual is willing to reveal her valuation of the public
good.3 In this framework an optimal payment scheme has a Pigouvian spirit
in the sense that it forces each individual to internalize the consequences of
her own preference announcement on the well-being of all other individuals
in the economy.
Mechanism design theory differs from the theory of optimal taxation not only
because it incorporates a problem of information aggregation. Further differ-
ences are the following. Mechanism design problems are typically based on
Hellwig (2005b, 2004) and Gaube (2000, 2005).
2This line of research starts with the invention of Clarke-Groves mechanisms by Clarke
(1971) and Groves (1973).
3The focus of the early literature is the question whether one may have simultaneously
ex-post efficiency and incentive compatibility. It has been addressed with two different
solution concepts. Green and Laffont (1977) establish the impossibility of implementation
in dominant strategies, while Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979)
establish the possibility of implementing an efficient allocation as a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium.
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environments in which all individuals have quasi-linear preferences, i.e. the
marginal disutility of having to pay for the public good is constant for all
individuals. This implies that taxation is not distortionary, in the sense of
driving a wedge between marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates
of transformation. Moreover, the direct or indirect tax instruments on which
the theory of optimal taxation is based do not enter the analysis. Finally,
the recent literature in this field incorporates participation constraints.4 The
literature on optimal taxation typically does not include such a restriction
and takes the state’s authority to rely on coercion as given.
This brief overview of the existing literature can be summarized as follows:
There exists a normative theory that studies optimal tax systems and op-
timal decisions on public good provision under the premise that these two
policy variables are linked through a public sector budget constraint. It does
not, however, include a problem of preference elicitation. This concern is
treated in a different branch of the literature, which does not consider the
use of direct and indirect tax instruments for the purpose of public goods
finance.
At a conceptual level the main objective of this dissertation is to provide a
link between these two approaches that allows the study of the problems of
optimal taxation, public good provision and information aggregation simul-
taneously.
4It starts out from the observation that ex-post efficiency, Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility and voluntary participation are incompatible; see Gu¨th and Hellwig (1986) and
Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). The properties of second best allocations under incentive
as well as participation constraints are analyzed by Schmitz (1997), Hellwig (2003) and
Norman (2004).
Preface 7
1.2 Conceptual Issues
The attempt to introduce a problem of information aggregation into the the-
ory of optimal taxation faces a conceptual problem. It is due to the fact that
this theory typically analyzes a large economy with a continuum of individ-
uals.5 To see this, suppose that a large number of individuals is involved in
a process of information aggregation that is used to determine the average
valuation of the public good in the economy. The fact that the economy is
large implies that no single individual has a direct impact on the outcome of
this procedure. Hence, no individual has a motive for hiding his true valua-
tion of the public good.
This reasoning is based on the notion of individual incentive compatibility
that is typically used in the theory of mechanism design. Incentives are only
needed for individuals who have some chance of being pivotal for the decision
on public good provision. If the probability of being pivotal vanishes as one
moves to a large economy, so does the need to specify appropriate incentives.
This yields the conclusion that, in a large economy, information aggregation
is not an incentive problem.
The work presented in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation takes a
different view. It is based on the observation that the tax system shapes in-
dividual interests with respect to the decision on public good provision and
that individuals who act according to these interests may refuse to reveal
5See Dierker and Haller (1990) for a discussion. A main reason for the consideration of
a large economy in the theory of optimal income taxation is the critique of Piketty (1993)
and Hamilton and Slutsky (2005). Accordingly, in a finite economy with a known cross-
section distribution of characteristics, first best utilitarian redistribution can be achieved
if one does not rely on an income tax but uses a more sophisticated game form. In a
continuum economy, however, this problem does not arise if an appropriate version of the
law of large numbers for large economies is assumed to hold, Guesnerie (1995).
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their private information.
To make this more precise, suppose that a tax setting planner collects indi-
vidual statements on public goods preferences in order to learn the average
valuation. For the sake of concreteness, consider an individual with a modest
valuation of the public good but a rather high tax bill. Suppose that this
individual hopes that the average valuation of the public good turns out to
be very low and that, as a consequence, the public good is not installed.
The individual in question is thus inclined to understate her valuation of the
public good and to contribute thereby contribute to the perception that the
average valuation is lower than it actually is.
This perspective yields the conclusion that appropriate incentives are needed
to prevent a misrepresentation of public goods preferences. Below I discuss
two different approaches with which it is possible to tackle this conceptual
problem. They both take the specific interests of individuals under a tax sys-
tem into account and treat information aggregation as an incentive problem,
even in a large economy.
Chapter 2 draws on literature in the field of political economy that dis-
cusses voting mechanisms as an instrument for information aggregation in
the tradition of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.6 This literature is based on
the idea that sincere voting behavior – in which each individual votes for his
preferred alternative – implies that the distribution of votes contains infor-
mation about the distribution of preferences in the economy. Consequently,
the outcome of a voting decision reflects this information. Chapter 2 draws
an analogy to this literature. Incentive constraints are introduced into the
6See, for instance, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). Piketty (1999) provides a survey
of related literature.
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analysis which ensure that it is in each individual’s interest to behave sin-
cerely. This allows the study of the properties of an optimal rule for public
good provision under the constraint that individuals are willing to engage in
informative voting about the level of public good provision.
Chapter 2 has no axiomatic foundation but is based on an analogy to a bran-
chof the literature in political economics. Chapter 3 follows a more rigorous
approach and introduces the notion of a collectively incentive-compatible tax
system. Chapters 4 and 5 contain applications of this solution concept to the
problem of optimal income taxation.
Collective incentive considerations are based on the idea that individuals may
form coalitions in order to manipulate the perception of the average valua-
tion of the public good and thereby the decision on public good provision.
This circumvents the problem that, in a large economy, no single individual
has a reason to behave strategically. Via coalition formation individuals can
affect the outcome of a revelation mechanism even in a large economy. Con-
sequently, an implementable rule for the use both of tax instruments and the
level of public good provision has to be such that no coalition of individuals
has an incentive to engage in a collective misrepresentation of public goods
preferences. A tax system with this property is said to be collectively incen-
tive compatible.7
The remaining part of this introduction makes this more concrete and gives
an overview of the specific models and the results that are derived in the
subsequent chapters.
7This definition of collective incentive compatibility is inspired by the notion of a
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium introduced by Bernheim et al. (1986).
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1.3 Chapter 2: Informative Voting and the
Samuelson Rule
Chapter 2 is based on a joint research project with Marco Sahm from the
Ludwigs-Maximilian University in Munich. It studies an environment with
the following properties. The economy is large and each individual has a
quasi-linear utility function that depends on the level of public good provi-
sion and the individual’s contribution to the cost of public good provision. In
this model equal cost sharing is the only budgetary feasible and individually
incentive-compatible scheme of public goods finance.8
An individual’s willingness to pay for the public good depends on two pa-
rameters, a binary taste parameter which indicates either a high or a low
taste and, in addition, an ability parameter. Ceteris paribus, an individual’s
willingness to pay is an increasing function of the taste parameter and a de-
creasing function of the ability level. The latter effect reflects the idea that
less able individuals suffer from a larger utility loss if forced to generate the
income that is needed in order to meet a given payment obligation.9
The problem of information aggregation results from the assumption that
there is uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. This
uncertainty is induced via the share of individuals with a high taste parame-
ter, which is taken to be a random quantity. Its actual realization has to be
deduced from the collection of individual statements on taste parameters in
8This follows from the assumptions that individuals possess private information on their
personal characteristics and that the final decision on public good provision must depend
only on the empirical distribution of characteristics, not on the personal characteristics of
specific individuals. As a consequence, the payment scheme cannot differentiate between
individuals with different characteristics.
9This idea is familiar from the theory of optimal income taxation.
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a revelation game.
If a rule for public good provision only has to meet the requirements of feasi-
bility and individual incentive compatibility, then the optimal rule for public
good provision is a version of the Samuelson rule that equates the average
willingness to pay for the public good when costs are shared equally with the
marginal cost of the public good.
However, under this version of the Samuelson rule information on individual
characteristics may be used in a way that runs counter to the interests of
those individuals. To see this, consider an individual with a high taste real-
ization but a very low skill level and, for the sake of concreteness, suppose
this individual expects the state of the economy to be such that his own
willingness to pay is below the average. Consequently, under the Samuelson
rule, this individual expects the level of the public good to be too large. If
the individual chooses his taste announcement while taking his preferred out-
come of the revelation game into account, she should announce a low taste
realization and thereby “contribute” indirectly to a more preferred percep-
tion of the state of the economy.
The notion of informative voting is introduced into the analysis to avoid out-
comes with this property. It is borrowed from the field of political economy
that analyzes how voting mechanisms incorporate information on the distri-
bution of preferences. To make use of these ideas, any taste announcement
is interpreted as a vote, i.e. a high (low) taste announcement is regarded as
a vote in favor of a high (low) level of public good provision. It is assumed
that individuals vote sincerely; that is, an individuals votes in favor of a
high level of public good provision only if he indeed benefits from such an
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outcome.10 This assumption imposes a constraint on the task of information
aggregation. Information on the average taste level becomes available only
if the public good is provided in such a way that all individuals with a high
(low) taste realization prefer a high (low) provision level over a low (high)
provision level.
The main result of the analysis in Chapter 2 is a characterization of the op-
timal utilitarian provision rule which satisfies these constraints. It is shown
that the optimal extent of information aggregation is inversely related to a
specific measure of preference polarization in the economy.11 To construct
this measure, the economy is divided into two groups: those individuals with
a high taste parameter and those individuals with a low taste parameter.
Heterogeneity with respect to ability levels implies that there is within-group
polarization: an individual with low skills and a high taste parameter has a
willingness to pay for the public good that is small relative to the one of an
individual with high skills and a high taste parameter.
The analysis shows that the larger the degree of within-group polarization,
the smaller the sensitivity of an optimal provision rule to changes in the aver-
age willingness to pay for the public good. Put differently, more polarization
implies that an optimal provision rule uses less information on public goods
preferences.
10The term sincere voting is used in the field of political economy. Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996) discuss this terminology more extensively.
11These observations are similar in spirit to classical results from the signalling literature.
See e.g. Crawford and Sobel (1982), Schultz (1996), Grossman and Helpman (2001, Ch.
4).
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1.4 Chapter 3: Collectively Incentive Com-
patible Tax Systems
Chapter 3 introduces a more general framework for the joint study of optimal
tax systems and the revelation of preferences for public goods. Preferences
are not assumed to be quasi-linear as in Chapter 2. However, the quasi-linear
environment is a special case of the setup in Chapter 3.
More precisely, Chapter 3 introduces a problem of information aggregation
into the model that is typically used in the theory of optimal income taxation:
Individuals have private information on their earning ability. Simultaneously
it is assumed that the empirical cross-section distribution of earning ability is
commonly known; i.e. with respect to earning ability there is no uncertainty
at the aggregate level. The new assumptions introduced in Chapter 3 are
that, in addition, individuals have private information on their valuation of
a public good. Moreover, this uncertainty about individual valuations does
not wash out in the aggregate. There is aggregate uncertainty because the
joint cross-section distribution of earning ability and valuations of the public
good is not commonly known.
The characterization of admissible tax systems and provision rules for pub-
lic goods is treated as a problem of mechanism design. For this purpose,
tax systems are identified with the set of decentralizable allocations that has
been defined by Hammond (1979). For such an allocation, there exists a tax
system such that the commodity bundle of each individual is the solution of
a standard consumer choice problem. For instance, if individuals care only
about consumption and leisure and there is no issue of information aggre-
gation, then the problem of finding an optimal decentralizable allocation is
equivalent to the problem of finding in optimal income tax, in the sense of
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Mirrlees (1971).
The notion of a collective incentive-compatible tax system addresses the in-
centive issues that come into play with the elicitation of public goods prefer-
ences. As has been explained above, these incentive constraints ensure that a
planner who decides on the use of tax instruments and on public good provi-
sion does not rely on the availability of private information that individuals
are not willing to reveal once they are given the opportunity to engage in
manipulative collective action.
The main formal result in this chapter demonstrates that considerations of
individual incentive compatibility and collective incentive compatibility can
be analyzed separately if the preferences of individuals have a certain struc-
ture. If the utility contribution of the public good is additively separable
from the utility contribution of private goods, the following can be estab-
lished: Collective incentive compatibility holds if no coalition of individuals
benefits from a manipulation of public goods preferences, taking as given
that these individuals reveal their earning ability. The revelation of earning
ability is ensured by individual incentive compatibility constraints. Conse-
quently, there is no need to worry about coalitions that manipulate the profile
of earning abilities.
While this is per se not a deep insight, it proves convenient for a more explicit
characterization of implementable allocations in more specific environments.
To illustrate this, the quasi-linear economy of Chapter 2 is once again ad-
dressed. In this environment, an application of the separability result shows
that – under certain assumptions concerning the process of information ag-
gregation – the set of allocations that are collectively incentive compatible
coincides with the set of allocations that are admissible under the require-
ment of informative voting in Chapter 2. This is notable for two reasons.
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First, it shows, for a specific environment, that the set of collectively incen-
tive compatible allocations can be explicitly characterized. Second, it implies
that the requirement of informative voting can be equivalently interpreted
as a condition that precludes the formation of coalitions by individuals with
the same taste realization.
1.5 Chapter 4: Optimal Income Taxation and
Public Good Provision in a Two-Class
Economy
In Chapter 4 the problem of preference elicitation is introduced into a model
of optimal utilitarian income taxation. This literature is concerned with
the equity-efficiency tradeoff that arises in the following way. Heterogene-
ity with respect to ability levels generates a utilitarian desire to redistribute
consumption from “the rich” class of individuals to the “poor” class. First
best utilitarian welfare, however, is out of reach because individual ability
levels are private information. An optimal tax system distorts labour supply
decisions in order to realize welfare gains from redistribution. These distor-
tions are the source of the equity-efficiency tradeoff.
Chapter 4 studies a two-class economy in which individuals either have a
high or a low level of earning ability.12 Uncertainty about public goods pref-
erences is introduced in the following way: Valuations of the public good are
either high or low. Moreover, these public goods preferences are assumed
to be perfectly correlated with earning ability; that is, all individuals with
12This environment has received some attention in the literature on optimal taxation;
see e.g. Mirrlees (1975), Stiglitz (1982, 1987), Boadway and Keen (1993), Nava et al. (1996)
or Gaube (2005).
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the same level of earning ability also have the same valuation of the public
good. With this specific information structure, the problem of information
aggregation is concerned with the elicitation of the public goods preferences
of individuals with high and low ability, respectively.13
The solution concept used to address these two problems is the collectively
incentive compatible tax-system introduced in Chapter 3. In the two-class
economy collective incentive compatibility holds if individuals with same
level of ability – i.e. those individuals who belong to same class – do not
benefit from a joint collective lie on their taste parameter. Introducing these
additional constraints into the problem of optimal utilitarian income taxa-
tion allows the study of how the problem of preference elicitation interacts
with the equity-efficiency tradeoff.
The interaction arises because of the fact that an optimal utilitarian income
tax creates conflicting views of the desirability of public good provision. It is
shown in Chapter 4 that the need to generate tax revenues for the public good
affects more able and less able individuals differently. It is a consequence of
the equity-efficiency tradeoff that the utility burden from the cost of public
good provision is larger for the less productive individuals. Whenever re-
sources are needed for the public good, incentive compatibility constraints
prevent the planner from extracting larger tax payments from the more able
class.14
Now suppose that individuals of either class are asked to reveal their true
13The information structure is such that taste realizations and ability levels are binary
variables. This implies a similarity to the two-dimensional screening models of Armstrong
and Rochet (1999) and Cremer et al. (2001).
14These properties are established by Weymark (1986, 1987) for an optimal income tax
model with a finite number of different classes and preferences that are quasi-linear in
leisure.
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taste realization. The fact that the utility burden of the larger tax revenue
requirement is felt more by the less able class creates the following pattern
of collective incentive problems. More able individuals tend to claim an ex-
cessive desire for public good provision, and less able individuals are inclined
to understate the desirability of provision.
A decision on provision that reflects the “true” aggregate valuation of the
public good necessitates an adjustment of the transfer system that corrects
these biases. It is shown in Chapter 4 that an optimal elimination of these
collective incentive problems is characterized by a complementarity between
the level of redistribution and the decision on public good provision, relative
to an equity-efficiency tradeoff, without a problem of information aggrega-
tion. To prevent the more productive class from exaggerating, public good
provision has to be accompanied by an increased level of redistribution. Sim-
ilarly, the less productive are prevented from understating their valuation of
the public good by a reduced level of redistribution if there is no public good
provision.
1.6 Chapter 5: Distortionary Taxation and
the Free-Rider Problem
Chapter 5 is based on the same environment as Chapter 4; that is, there is
a two-class economy with uncertainty about the public goods preferences of
more able and less able individuals, respectively.
The difference from Chapter 4 lies in the tax instrument that is used for
the purpose of public goods finance. Chapter 5 assumes that a linear tax
on income is raised solely to cover the cost of public good provision. This
specification excludes the interaction between the transfer system and the
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problem of preference elicitation that arises under non-linear income taxa-
tion.15
This simplistic tax system is of interest for a variety of reasons. First, the
use of linear tax instruments to finance public expenditures is conceivable
in reality. Second, some models in the field of political economy are based
on this assumption.16 A normative model based on this tax structure allows
the assessment of the welfare properties of the outcomes predicted by these
studies. Finally, it turns out that the pattern of collective incentive prob-
lems that has been derived under a non-linear income tax is reversed under
a linear tax on income. This proves the claim that the tax system itself is
an essential determinant for an individual’s assessment of public goods.
More precisely, the analysis is based on the assumption that individuals work
less in response to an increased income tax rate. This assumption is shown
to imply that individuals with a high level of earning ability suffer ceteris
paribus from a larger utility loss if additional taxes are raised. Consequently
the burden of taxation for a public good that is enjoyed by individuals of both
classes is felt more intensively by the “rich”.17 This generates the following
pattern of incentive problems: More able individuals tend to understate their
willingness to pay for the public good because they suffer more intensively
from an increase of the tax revenue requirement. Analogously, less able indi-
viduals exaggerate when asked about their valuation because they don’t feel
a large utility burden from higher taxes.
15A model in which a linear income tax is used to finance a public good and lump sum
transfers as in Sheshinski (1972) and Hellwig (1986) would yield the same conclusions as
the analysis in Chapter 4.
16See Polo (1998), Svensson (2000) or Persson and Tabellini (2000).
17Recall that the analysis of an optimal non-linear income tax in Chapter 4 yields the
opposite effect.
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As a consequence, collective incentive compatibility constraints require the
use of excessive taxes, i.e. of taxes which are larger than actually needed to
cover the cost of public good provision. Either they serve to make public
good provision artificially expensive in order to prevent less able individuals
from exaggerating their valuation of the public good; or, analogously, if more
able individuals tend to understate their preferences, then excessive taxes
are used to make non-provision of the public good less attractive. If these
excessive taxes become very high, then an optimal provision rule does not
incorporate all the information. Suppose for instance, that one needs to ac-
company public good provision with very high taxes in order to ensure that
less able individuals reveal their valuation of the public good. Then, an opti-
mal provision rule does not acquire information from them. Put differently,
information that is too costly to obtain, is neglected by an optimal provision
rule for public goods.
Chapter 2
Informative Voting and the
Samuelson Rule
2.1 Introduction
We study a problem of optimal utilitarian public good provision in a contin-
uum economy in which individuals have private information on their valua-
tion of the public good and with uncertainty about the average valuation. An
optimal rule reflects the average valuation. The higher this valuation, the
higher should be the quantity that is provided. Consequently, an optimal
provision rule relies on a procedure of information aggregation, i.e. prior to
the final decision on public good provision, information on individual valua-
tions has to be collected and to be aggregated.
Private information on public goods preferences gives rise to the classical
free-rider problem in public good provision. This paper revisits the classical
result of Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) that, in a
quasi-linear economy with finitely many individuals, ex post efficiency, incen-
tive compatibility and budget balance are simultaneously achievable; i.e. as
20
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long as individuals can be forced to contribute to the costs of public good
provision the free-rider problem can be solved without a welfare burden, due
to private information on public goods preferences.1
We argue that, in a limit economy with an infinite number of individuals,
this result loses much of its appeal. In a finite economy with N individu-
als, incentive compatibility requires that individual contributions to the cost
of public good provision are commensurate to the individual’s impact on
the quantity decision. In the limit case as N → ∞, no single individual
has a direct impact on public good provision. This implies that there is no
possibility to make individual payment obligations dependent on announced
preferences. Put differently, in the limit case, equal cost sharing is the only
incentive compatible and feasible scheme of public goods finance. As a con-
sequence, incentive requirements in the limit economy imply that there are
multiple equilibria: all individuals pay equally for the public good and no
single preference announcement has an effect on the chosen quantity, hence
individuals are willing to make any conceivable announcement.
Our main concern, however, is not this multiplicity as such. Instead we ask
what provision rules should be considered “implementable” in a large econ-
omy with uncertainty about the distribution of preferences. The multiplicity
implies that any criterion of “implementability” in a large economy requires
an assumption on how individuals break their indifference. Moreover, requir-
ing only that individuals should be willing to reveal their preferences may
yield an outcome that relies on the possibility to break individual indiffer-
ence in a way that is in contrast with the individuals’ interests concerning
1The more recent literature in this field has been concerned with the characterization
of optimal allocations which are incentive compatible, budgetary feasible and, in addition,
respect participation constraints. Recent contributions to this line of research are Hellwig
(2003) or Norman (2004).
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the outcome of the revelation game.
This point is most easily illustrated within the model that we investigate.
Individuals have a quasi-linear utility function and possess private informa-
tion on their effective valuation of the public good, which results from the
interaction of a skill parameter and a taste parameter. Ceteris paribus, the
effective valuation increases in the taste parameter and decreases in the skill
parameter. The latter effect reflects that less skilled individuals suffer from a
larger utility loss if forced to contribute to the cost of public good provision.
The taste parameter is taken to be a binary variable; that is, individuals
either have a low or a high taste parameter. Uncertainty about the average
valuation of the public good results from the assumption that the percentage
of individuals with a high taste realization is a random variable. An elic-
itation of the true state of the economy requires that individuals be asked
about their actual taste parameters.
If, in this environments, one takes the view that equal cost sharing is a suf-
ficient condition for “implementability”, then the optimal utilitarian rule for
public good provision is a version of the Samuelson rule which equates, in
every state of the economy, the effective utilitarian valuation of the public
good and the marginal cost of public good provision. Now consider an indi-
vidual with a high taste parameter but a very low skill level and, for the sake
of concreteness, suppose this individual expects the state of the economy to
be such that his own effective valuation of the public good is smaller than
the effective utilitarian valuation. Consequently, under the Samuelson rule,
this individual expects the level of the public good to be too large. If the
individual takes his preferred outcome of the revelation game into account he
should announce a low taste parameter and thereby “contribute” indirectly
to a more preferred perception of the state of the economy. More generally,
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these considerations demonstrate that the Samuelson rule is implementable
only if individuals reveal their preferences even though it would be in their
interest to support a different outcome.
The aim of this paper is to propose a framework that takes account of these
incentive issues and then to analyze the implications for the design of optimal
mechanisms. To this end, we use an idea from the field of political economy,
namely that voting mechanisms can be used for the purpose of information
aggregation.
More precisely, the rule that we use to break individual indifference in the
continuum economy is the following. We assume that an individual an-
nounces a high (low) taste parameter only if she prefers a rather large (small)
level of the public good to be provided. Put differently, any announcement
of a taste parameter is interpreted as a vote: a high taste parameter as a
vote in favour of a large level of the public good and a low taste parameter
as a vote in favour of a small level of the public good.
The assumption that individuals vote in favor of a large or small provision
level only if this is their most preferred outcome of the revelation game trans-
lates into an additional incentive constraint. The average valuation of the
public good can be inferred from the distribution of votes only if the public
good is indeed provided in such a way that all individuals with a high taste
parameter prefer a large provision level over a small level and all individuals
with a low taste realization prefer a small level over a large level. We call
these constraints the informative voting (IV) constraints.2
We characterize the optimal utilitarian provision rule which satisfies these
2These constraints resemble the notion of informative voting which is used in the field
of political economy, see e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
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IV constraints. The main result is that the optimal extent of information
aggregation is inversely related to a specific measure for the polarization of
effective valuations of the public good in the economy.3 To construct this
measure, the economy is divided into two groups: those individuals with a
high taste parameter and those individuals with a low taste parameter. Skill
heterogeneity implies that there is within group polarization of effective val-
uations for the public good. E.g. an individual with low skills and a high
taste parameter has a low effective valuation relative to an individual with
high skills and a high taste parameter.
As soon as there is some degree of within-group polarization, an optimal pro-
vision rule exhibits pooling ; i.e. the same provision level is chosen for a whole
range of possible states of the economy. In an extreme case of within-group
polarization, one finds that an optimal provision rule under IV constraints is
such that the same quantity of the public good is provided in every state of
the economy. In this sense, there is no use of information under an optimal
mechanism.
Finally, to provide a theoretical foundation of the informative voting con-
straints we consider so called sampling mechanisms. A finite subset of N
randomly drawn individuals is asked to report their taste parameters. Based
on these taste announcements the mechanism designer, estimates the effective
utilitarian valuation of the public good and decides on public good provision.
Finally, the cost of provision is shared equally among all individuals in the
economy.
We investigate the properties of an optimal mechanism as the sample size N
3These observations are similar in spirit to classical results from the signalling literature.
See e.g. Crawford and Sobel (1982), Schultz (1996), Grossman and Helpman (2001, Ch.
4).
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grows and individual influence on the level of public good provision disap-
pears. We show that as N → ∞ the optimal provision rule under sampling
converges to the optimal provision rule in the original mechanism design
problem under IV constraints. We interpret this result as providing a foun-
dation for the IV requirement, which results from a simple, but somewhat
arbitrary, rule for breaking indifference in a revelation game with a contin-
uum of individuals.
As a corollary of this analysis, we show that the optimal provision rule un-
der IV constraints provides an upper bound to the welfare levels which are
achievable under sampling, for any finite sample size N . Put differently, we
show that an optimal sample size does not exist. We interpret this observa-
tion as a version of the famous Condorcet Jury Theorem.4
The initial motivation of this paper was to study more generally, optimal
rules for income taxation and public good provision in an economy where in-
dividuals have differing levels of ability and differing tastes for public goods.5
Even though this paper focusses on the conceptual issues that arise in a large
economy with private information on public goods preferences, it still pro-
vides a link between these two branches of the literature. It characterizes
the optimal rule for public good provision in the following environment: In-
dividuals derive utility from a public good, a private consumption good and
leisure. Moreover, the utility function is additively separable and quasilinear
4A discussion of this theorem and of related results can be found in Piketty (1999).
5Heterogeneity with respect to earning abilities underlies the equity-efficiency trade-
off studied in the theory of optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971).
Heterogeneity with respect to public goods preferences has been driving the literature on
the free-rider problem in public goods provision (at least) since Clarke (1971) and Groves
(1973).
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in leisure.6 The final allocation is determined sequentially. First, the level of
public good provision is determined. This generates a revenue requirement
in the public sector budget constraint. Second, the income tax schedule is
chosen optimally subject to this predetermined revenue requirement.
The optimal provision for public goods rule derived in section 2.3 of this
paper is also optimal in this extended model under the assumption that once
the level of public good provision is fixed, tax authorities choose an optimal
non-linear income tax in order to finance these expenditures.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we derive
the mechanism design problem under IV constraints. In Section 2.3 the so-
lution to this problem is characterized. Section 2.4 contains the discussion
of sampling mechanisms and the derivation of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
The last section contains concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the
appendix.
6An optimal income tax in this setting has been characterized by Weymark (1986,
1987).
7In particular, tax authorities do not distort the optimal income tax in order to mitigate
the welfare burden of the incentive constraints that are relevant for the decision on public
good provision; that is, tax authorities cannot commit not to use an optimal income tax
once the revenue requirement has been determined. However, as shown in Chapters 4
and 5, if such a commitment was possible it would, in general, lead to welfare superior
outcomes.
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2.2 The Model
2.2.1 The Environment
Individual Characteristics
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals i ∈ I := [0, 1]. Individu-
als differ with respect to their skill level wi, and their valuation of the public
good, also referred to as their taste θi. The taste parameter may take two
different values:
θi ∈ Θ := {θL, θH} with 0 ≤ θL < θH ,
where θL indicates a low taste for the public good and θH indicates a high
taste. The skill parameter belongs to the compact interval
wi ∈ W := [w
¯
, w¯] with 0 < w
¯
≤ w¯ .
Individuals derive utility from the consumption of a public good, but don’t
like to contribute to the cost of provision. Agent i’s utility function is given
by
U i = θiQ−
ti
wi
.
Q denotes the quantity of a non-excludable public good and ti captures i’s
contribution to the cost of public good provision. Note that a lower skill level
implies a larger utility loss from a given payment obligation. The underlying
idea is that, for less able individuals, it is harder to generate the income
needed to meet a given payment obligation.
The function U i is the cardinal representation of preferences which is rele-
vant for welfare assessments. An individual’s ranking of alternatives can be
equivalently expressed by the monotone transformation
wiU i = θiwiQ− ti .
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We refer to the product θiwi as individual i’s effective valuation of the public
good.
Informational Structure
The parameters wi and θi are both private information of individual i and
taken to be the realizations of the stochastically independent random vari-
ables w˜i and θ˜i, respectively. The random variables {w˜i}i∈I are independently
and identically distributed (iid). Their probability distribution is represented
by a cumulative distribution function F : W → [0, 1] with density f . The
random variables {θ˜i}i∈I are as well iid. We denote by p the individual
probability of a high taste realization,
p := Prob{θi = θH} .
In addition, we assume that a law of large numbers (LLN) applies;8 that is,
almost surely, after the realization of randomness at the individual level, the
cross-section distribution of characteristics in the economy coincides with the
ex ante probability distribution that governs the randomness at the individual
level. Accordingly, the value F (w) and the probability p are interpreted as
the fractions of individuals with earning ability wi ≤ w and a high taste
for the public good in the population, respectively. The LLN also implies
that the empirical skill distribution and the empirical taste distribution are
independent; that is, on every subinterval [w′, w′′] ⊂ W of the support of
the skill distribution, the share of individuals with a high taste realization is
equal to p.
8Postulating a LLN for a continuum of iid random variables creates a measurability
problem, as has been noted by Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985). There is
however a recent literature on modeling approaches which circumvent this measurability
problem, see Alo`s-Ferrer (2002) or Al-Najjar (2004).
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We assume that the distribution F is common knowledge. Consequently, at
the aggregate level, there is no uncertainty about the skill distribution. By
contrast, the share of individuals with a high taste realization p is taken to
be a random quantity; i.e. there is uncertainty with respect to the average
valuation of the public good.
To sum up, the information structure has a known skill distribution and
aggregate uncertainty with respect to the taste parameters. The unknown
parameter p is henceforth also referred to as the state of the economy. It is
the relevant object for the process of information aggregation.
Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules in a Continuum Economy
We limit attention to anonymous and incentive compatible allocation rules.
An anonymous allocation rule (Q, t) consists of a provision rule for the public
good and a payment scheme to cover the cost of provision.
The provision rule Q assigns to alternative values of p a quantity of the public
good,
Q : [0, 1]→ R+, p 7→ Q(p).
This provision rule is anonymous in the sense that the level of provision Q(p)
depends only on the distribution of characteristics in the economy. I.e. it
does not depend on the skill and taste realizations of specific individuals.9
The payment scheme t specifies for each individual i a payment obligation
as a function of the distribution of characteristics in the economy p and in-
dividual i’s characteristics (θi, wi). The payment scheme is anonymous in
the sense that individuals with the same characteristics have the same pay-
ment obligation, in every state p of the economy. Put differently, individual
payments do not depend on the index i. Formally the payment scheme is
9Guesnerie (1995) calls this property anonymity in influence.
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described as a function
t : [0, 1]×Θ×W → R, (p, θ, w) 7→ t(p, θ, w).
Individuals have private information on their skill and their taste parameter.
This gives rise to the following incentive compatibility constraints.
Definition 2.1 An anonymous allocation rule is called incentive compatible
(IC) if ∀p ∈ [0, 1], ∀(θ, w) ∈ Θ×W , and ∀(θˆ, wˆ) ∈ Θ×W ,
θwQ(p)− t(p, θ, w) ≥ θwQ(p)− t(p, θˆ, wˆ).
These incentive constraints are to be read as follows: Suppose that a mech-
anism designer wants to implement an allocation rule (Q, t). In a revelation
game, he collects data from all individuals on their skill and on their taste
parameter. The collection of these announcements is then used for two pur-
poses: first, the profile of all taste announcements (θˆi)i∈I is used to deduce the
actual value of p, second, for given p, the individual announcement (θˆi, wˆi) is
used to determine the payment obligation of individual i. The requirement of
incentive compatibility deals with this second step only. It ensures that, for a
given state p, an individual is indeed willing to make the payment prescribed
by the payment scheme t. Put differently, an individual has no reason to
hide the own characteristics in order to achieve a preferred treatment by the
payment scheme.
These IC constraints have to be satisfied for each possible value of p. Put
differently, whatever the “announced state of the world” which arises un-
der the first step, any individual is willing to reveal the own characteristics
truthfully. Hence, the underlying solution concept is one of implementation
in dominant strategies.
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As we consider a continuum economy, no single individual has a direct impact
on the “announced state of the world”. This is reflected in the fact that the
same level of p appears on the left hand side and the right hand side of the
IC constraint. As a consequence, no single individual has a direct impact
on the level of public good provision. Individuals are concerned only with
a minimization of their payment obligation. This gives rise to the classical
free-rider problem. As access to the public good is free, no one is willing
to pay more than he is forced to.10 These observations yield the following
characterization of incentive compatible allocation rules.
Lemma 2.1 The following statements are equivalent.
1. (Q, t) is IC.
2. (Q, t) satisfies ∀p, ∀(θ, w) and ∀(θˆ, wˆ), t(p, θ, w) = t(p, θˆ, wˆ).
Consequently, any IC payment scheme is constant, in the sense that, for
given p, all individuals are treated equally. The converse statement is also
true. That is, any anonymous provision rule Q : p 7→ Q(p) gives rise to an IC
allocation rule if accompanied by constant payments, i.e. a payment scheme
that does only depend on p.
Remark 2.1 An alternative characterization of incentive compatible allo-
cation rules has been provided by Hammond (1979). He shows that an
10Note that if budget balance has to be achieved and there are limits to coercion due
to participation constraints as in Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) or in Hellwig (2003) and
there are individuals who do not value the public good at all – i.e. with effective valuation
of 0 – one will end up with Q ≡ 0 under any admissible, incentive compatible allocation
rule.
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allocation rule is IC in the above sense, if and only if it is decentralizable
by a suitably chosen tax policy. In the present setting, this tax system is,
however, degenerate because it prescribes equal payments for all individuals.
Still, at the conceptual level, this so called taxation principle has motivated
the notion of incentive compatibility that we employ. It links our work to
the field of public finance.
Budget Balance and Incentive Compatibility
The cost of public good provision is given by a twice continuously differen-
tiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function K : R+ → R+,
which satisfies K(0) = 0 as well as the boundary conditions
lim
x→0
K ′(x) = 0 and lim
x→∞
K ′(x) =∞.
The payment scheme has to be such that the costs of public good provision are
covered, i.e. such that aggregate payments are equal to the cost of provision.
Combining this requirement of budget balance with the requirement of IC
yields the following observation.
Lemma 2.2 An anonymous allocation rule (Q, t) satisfies IC and budget
balance if and only if the payment scheme is such that,
∀p ∈ [0, 1], ∀(θ, w) ∈ Θ×W : t(p, θ, w) = K(Q(p)).
Lemma 2.2 allows to represent an individual’s assessment of an allocation rule
(Q, t), which is budgetary feasible and incentive compatible, in the following
reduced form, which depends only on the provision rule Q,
U(p, θi, wi) := θiQ(p)−
K(Q(p))
wi
. (2.1)
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Expected utilitarian welfare
In what follows, we consider mechanism design problems of a benevolent
utilitarian planner. A budgetary feasible and incentive compatible allocation
is evaluated from an ex ante perspective, i.e. before the actual value of p is
known. For simplicity, we assume that the planner takes the actual state
of the economy p to be the realization of a random variable, p˜, which is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0, 1].11
Assumption 2.1 The mechanism designer takes p to be the realization of
a random variable which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Under Assumption 2.1 and the LLN, ex ante expected utilitarian welfare
becomes
EW :=
1∫
0
{[
pθH + (1− p)θL
]
Q(p)−
[∫ w¯
w
¯
f(w)
w
dw
]
K(Q(p))
}
dp
= λ
1∫
0
{v¯(p)Q(p)−K(Q(p))} dp ,
where λ :=
∫
(1/w)f(w)dw is an index of the marginal welfare effects of the
cost of public good provision under equal cost sharing and
v¯(p) :=
pθH + (1− p)θL
λ
is the effective utilitarian valuation of the public good.
2.2.2 The Problem of Information Aggregation
The problem of information aggregation is concerned with the question whether
a mechanism designer is able to learn how many individuals in the economy
11Throughout we do not need to impose a common prior assumption. We only specify
the prior beliefs of the mechanism designer.
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have a high taste realization. Recall that the mechanism designer evalu-
ates the profile of taste announcements (θˆi)i∈I to learn the actual value of p.
Hence, he gets to know the actual state of the world if and only if (almost)
all individuals reveal their taste parameter truthfully.
However, under an incentive compatible and budgetary feasible allocation
rule individuals are indifferent which taste parameter to announce. I.e. the
revelation game suffers from a problem of multiple equilibria. The reason is
that we consider only anonymous allocation mechanisms. Consequently, no
individual has a direct impact on public good provision. In addition, incen-
tive compatibility requires that the payment scheme treats all individuals
alike. These two facts imply that individuals are willing to make any an-
nouncement in the underlying revelation game.
In particular, this implies that individuals are willing to announce any taste
parameter. The problem of information aggregation however is resolved only
if all individuals announce their taste parameter truthfully. We will now
argue that such an obedient behaviour cannot be taken for granted.
The problem with the Samuelson Rule
To illustrate this point we discuss the provision rule Q∗ : p 7→ Q∗(p), which
is chosen by a utilitarian planner who maximizes EW pointwise; i.e. who
maximizes the expression v¯(p)Q(p) − K(Q(p)) for every p ∈ [0, 1]. This
provision rule Q∗ is nothing but the Samuelson rule under equal cost sharing.
It is characterized by a continuum of first order conditions
∀p : v¯(p) = K ′(Q∗(p)) .
For brevity, we also refer to Q∗ as the first best provision rule. Under Q∗
individual preferences over the “announced state of the world” result from
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the reduced form
U∗(p, θ, w) := θQ∗(p)−
K(Q∗(p))
w
.
It is easily verified that
U∗p (p, θ, w) =
1
w
Q∗′(p)
(
θw − v¯(p)
) 
< 0 if θw < v¯(p) ,
= 0 if θw = v¯(p) ,
> 0 if θw > v¯(p) .
That is, under provision rule Q∗ an individual prefers a larger level of p –
or equivalently a larger level of public good provision – if and only if the
own effective valuation exceeds the effective utilitarian valuation. Likewise
an individual with an effective valuation below the average prefers to have a
lower quantity of the public good.
These observations imply that an individual would refuse to reveal the own
taste realization if he believed to have an influence on the decision on public
good provision. To see this, consider an individual with a low taste realization
and a high skill level which has an effective valuation close to θLw¯. Moreover,
for the sake of concreteness, assume that this individual believes p to be
very low.12 If a vast majority of individual has a low taste realization, then
this individual can be sure that its own effective valuation lies above the
average, θLw¯ > v¯(p). Put differently, under Q
∗, the individual in question
expects that the quantity of the public good is too low. As a consequence, the
individual would be happy if the mechanism designer had a larger perception
of p. Hence, this individual is inclined to announce a high taste realization
in order to “contribute” to a more preferred outcome.
12I.e. when this individual decides ex interim what taste parameter to announce, her
prior beliefs put a lot of probability mass on values of p which are close to zero.
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The Informative Voting Constraints
The point of these considerations is that, even though individuals have no
direct influence on public good provision, they are not indifferent regarding
the mechanism designer’s perception of p. That is, they are not indifferent
regarding the outcome of the revelation game.
We now state a formal condition, called informative voting (IV), that we
impose on the mechanism design problem. It is inspired by game-theoretic
models of voting decisions in the field of political economy. For the moment,
we just introduce these conditions and discuss their interpretation. However,
in Section 2.4 we discuss a more rigorous theoretical foundation.
In our setting IV ensures that individuals are “really” willing to reveal their
taste parameter. That is, the IV constraints guarantee that individuals are
not tempted to break the indifference among all conceivable taste announce-
ments such that they “contribute” with a false announcement to a more
preferred state perception.
Definition 2.2 A provision rule Q is said to satisfy the IV property if
the following holds for any w ∈ W and any p ∈ [0, 1]: U(p, θL, w) is non-
increasing in p and U(p, θH , w) is non-decreasing in p.
Referring to these monotonicity postulates as IV constraints is based on the
idea that any individual subscribes to one of two groups, either to those in-
dividuals with θi = θL or to the group with θ
i = θH . Informative voting
hence is a sufficient condition which ensures that each individual supports
the group which shares the own taste characteristic. As a consequence of
this behavior, the distribution of votes allows to deduce the actual value of
p.
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We interpret the IV constraints as a condition of robustness;13 that is, they
ensure that, whatever the prior beliefs of individuals on the likelihood of
different values of p, no individual has a reason to report a false taste para-
meter in order to “contribute” to a more favorable state perception.14 This
is most clearly seen, if Q is a differentiable function of p. In this case, the
IV constraints become: for all p and for all w,
Up(p, θL, w) ≤ 0 and Up(p, θH , w) ≥ 0 .
If the provision rule Q satisfies these IV constraints, then, for all realizations
of p, an individual with a low taste realization prefers to live in an economy,
where less individuals have a high taste realization. Likewise, all individuals
with a high taste realization are better off if p is larger.
Mechanism Design under IV constraints
We can now define the mechanism design problem of a utilitarian planner
who has to choose an IC allocation rule (Q, t) and in addition uses the IV
constraints to ensure that he can deduce the actual value of p from the profile
of taste announcements (θˆi)i∈I in the revelation game.
Definition 2.3 The following problem is called the informative voting prob-
lem (P): Choose a provision rule Q in order to maximize EW subject to the
13Further discussion of these notions of incentive compatibility can be found in Berge-
mann and Morris (2005), Chung and Ely (2004) or Kalai (2004). For mechanism design
problems with private values, the notions robustness and implementation in dominant
strategies are equivalent.
14In particular, even in the extreme case in which the true value of p is known to all
individuals and the mechanism designer is the only uninformed party, all individuals are
willing to reveal their taste parameter. This case gives rise to a mechanism design problem
under complete information. See Moore (1992) for a survey.
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IV constraints. The solution to this problem is denoted by Q∗∗, the induced
optimal welfare level by EW ∗∗.
In Section 2.4 we provide a theoretical foundation of this mechanism design
problem under IV constraints. There, we show that the optimal provision
rule Q∗∗ can be interpreted as the limit outcome of a sequence of mechanism
design problems with vanishing individual influence on public good provision.
Before turning to this issue, we characterize the solution of problem P in the
next section.
2.3 Optimal Provision under Informative Vot-
ing
In this section we characterize the solution to the informative voting problem.
The key insight is that the extent by which the optimal provision rule Q∗∗
reflects variations in the average valuation of the public good p depends on a
specific measure of preference polarization. The role of skill heterogeneity for
preference polarization is easily demonstrated with the following alternative
characterization of the IV property.
Lemma 2.3 A provision rule Q satisfies IV if and only if the following two
properties hold for any pair p, p′ with p′ > p:
i) Q is increasing: Q(p′) ≥ Q(p).
ii) If Q(p′) > Q(p), then
θHw
¯
≥
K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p))
Q(p′)−Q(p)
≥ θLw¯ .
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The Lemma follows from standard arguments. It says that IV is equivalent to
the requirements that a provision rule must be monotonically increasing in p
and, moreover, that an individual with effective valuation θLw¯ always prefers
a small provision level over a large provision level, whereas an individual with
effective valuation θHw
¯
always prefers the large provision level.
Hence, to satisfy the IV constraints only the preferences of the extreme types
with effective valuations θLw¯ and θHw
¯
, respectively, have to be taken into
account. Intuitively, if even an individual with the top skill level prefers a
small quantity of the public good over a larger quantity in case of a low taste
realization, then the same is true for any individual with θi = θL and an
effective valuation θiwi ≤ θLw¯. Consequently, under a monotonic provision
rule, any individual with a low taste parameter wants the perceived state to
be as small as possible and this implies that the individual’s IV constraint is
satisfied. Analogously, for individuals with a high taste parameter only the
IV condition for an individual with the minimal skill level has to be taken
into account. These observations allow to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1
i) If θLw¯ > θHw
¯
, then a provision rule Q satisfies the IV property if and
only if it is constant: for all p, Q(p) = x, for some x ∈ R+.
ii) The first best provision rule Q∗ satisfies the IV constraints if and only
if there is no skill heterogeneity, i.e. w
¯
= w¯.
Part i) of Proposition 1 shows that the requirement of IV may indeed heavily
restrict the set of admissible provision rules. If θLw¯ > θHw
¯
, then a provision
rule satisfies IV if and only if information aggregation plays no role. The
underlying logic is as follows. If an individual with effective valuation θLw¯
Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule 40
prefers provision level Q(p) over the larger provision level Q(p′), then the
same is true for an individual with an effective valuation smaller than θLw¯.
Hence, if θLw¯ > θHw
¯
there exist individuals with a high taste realization
who prefer Q(p) as well. But IV requires these individuals to prefer Q(p′).
As a consequence, all these statements are consistent with each other only if
Q(p′) = Q(p).
We interpret such a parameter constellation with θLw¯ > θHw
¯
as one of large
within-group polarization. This terminology reflects the following consider-
ations: The IV constraints essentially require that all individuals with the
same taste realization have the same views on public good provision. How-
ever, there is within-group polarization of preferences due to skill heterogene-
ity. We take the distance w¯−w
¯
to be a measure of within-group polarization.
It is said to be large if there are individuals in the low taste group who have
a skill level which is so high that their effective valuation exceeds the one of
low skilled individuals in the high taste group.
A parameter constellation with w
¯
= w¯ is one in which there is no within-
group polarization at all. This implies that the IV constraints do not have
any bite and that the first best provision rule Q∗ is admissible. To see this
note that without within-group polarization, there are only two possible ef-
fective valuations, a high one and a low one. The utilitarian planner cares
about the average. If he decides on public good provision, without taking
the IV constraints into account, then, whatever the actual state of the econ-
omy, the chosen provision level will be too high for individuals with a low
valuation; that is, those individuals would be happy if the planner believed
that the fraction of individuals with a low taste realization was in fact larger.
Hence, their IV constraint is satisfied. The same is true for individuals with
a high taste realization.
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This reasoning does not go through if there is some degree of within-group
polarization. As has been shown in the previous section, under Q∗ there exist
values of p such that individuals with a low taste parameter but a very high
skill level would be happy if the planner believed that the share of individuals
with a high taste realization was larger.
The results in Proposition 2.1 characterize the optimal provision rule un-
der IV constraints for the extreme cases of no within-group polarization and
large within-group polarization. For the remainder of this section we consider
parameter constellations of moderate within-group polarization which satisfy
w
¯
6= w¯ and θLw¯ ≤ θHw
¯
. As follows from part ii) of Proposition 2.1, in these
cases the first best provision rule Q∗ is not available. The question thus be-
comes what an optimal deviation from Q∗ looks like. In the following we first
provide a taxonomy of possible solutions to the informative voting problem
under moderate within-group polarization and identify three relevant classes
of provision rules. In a second step, we argue that the degree of within-group
polarization determines the class to which the actual solution belongs.
As has been established in Lemma 2.3, to satisfy the IV constraints only the
extreme types with effective valuations θLw¯ and θHw
¯
matter.
An implication of this observation is that a provision rule with the IV prop-
erty has at most one provision level that falls short of the most preferred
provision level of an individual with effective valuation θLw¯, henceforth de-
noted by Q¯L and formally defined by the condition
{Q¯L} = argmaxQ θLw¯Q−K(Q) .
To see this suppose, to the contrary, that there are two provision levels below
Q¯L. Then, due to the fact that the function θLw¯Q−K(Q) is single-peaked,
an individual with effective valuation θLw¯ prefers the larger of these two. But
IV rules out this possibility. The analog reasoning establishes that there can
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be at most one provision level that exceeds the most preferred provision level
of an individual with effective valuation θHw
¯
, denoted by Q
¯
H .
Under moderate within-group polarization one has
Q∗(0) < Q¯L < Q
¯
H < Q
∗(1) .
Hence, a utilitarian planner would want to choose a continuum of different
provision levels smaller than Q¯L and as well a continuum of different provision
levels larger than Q
¯
H . The IV constraints imply, however, that he can choose
at most one such provision level.
It is shown below that an optimal provision rule has exactly one provision
level below Q¯L and exactly one exceeding Q
¯
H . To describe the relevant
provision rules with this property some additional terminology is needed.
Definition 2.4 An increasing provision rule Q4 : p 7→ Q4(p) is said to have
four pooling levels if
Q4(p) :=

Qs4 for 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ ,
Qˆs4 for pˆ < p < pˆ
′ ,
Q∗(p) for pˆ′ ≤ p ≤ p˜′ ,
Q˜l4 for p˜
′ < p < p˜ ,
Ql4 for p˜ ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where Qs4 and Qˆ
s
4 satisfy θLw¯ Q
s
4 −K(Q
4
s) = θLw¯ Qˆ
s
4 −K(Qˆ
s
4), i.e. an indi-
vidual with effective valuation θLw¯ is indifferent between these two provision
levels. Likewise, Q˜l4 and Q
l
4 satisfy θHw¯
Q˜l4 − K(Q˜
l
4) = θHw¯
Ql4 − K(Q
l
4).
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Finally, the critical indices are implicitly defined by the equations:15
v¯(pˆ) = θLw¯ , Q
∗(pˆ′) = Qˆs4 , Q
∗(p˜′) = Q˜l4 , v¯(p˜) = θHw¯
.
6
-
θLw¯Q−K(Q)
θHw
¯
Q−K(Q)
r
Q∗(0)
r
Q∗(1)
r
Q¯L
r
Q
¯
H
r
Q˜l4
r
Qˆs4
r
Ql4
r
Qs4
Fig-
ure 1: The figure depicts a provision rule characterized by four pooling levels Qs4,
Qˆs4, Q˜
l
4 and Q
l
4. Over an intermediate range the provision level equals Q
∗(p).
Provision rules with four pooling levels are such that Qs4 is linked with Qˆ
s
4
via a binding IV constraint for an individual with effective valuation θLw¯.
Likewise, Ql4 is linked with Q˜
l
4 via an IV constraint for an individual with
θHw
¯
. Moreover, there is a range of p for which the provision level is equal
to Q∗(p), the provision level that would be chosen in the absence of IV -
constraints. As a consequence, if the smallest pooling level Qs4 is close to
Q∗(0) and the largest pooling level Ql4 is close to Q
∗(1), then a provision
15This already presumes an optimal choice of the critical indices. To see this, note that
a utilitarian planner will choose e.g. pˆ according to the following criterion: Let Q(p) = Qs4
if and only if v¯(p)Qs4 −K(Q
s
4) exceeds v¯(p)Qˆ
s
4 −K(Qˆ
s
4). Given the binding IV constraint
which links Qs4 and Qˆ
s
4, this is equivalent to Q(p) = Q
s
4 if and only if v¯(p) ≤ θLw¯.
Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule 44
rule with four pooling levels approximates provision rule Q∗. A degenerate
case of a provision rule with four pooling levels arises if the range where the
provision rules Q4 and Q
∗ coincide shrinks to a singleton. We say that such a
provision rule is characterized by three pooling levels. It has a medium sized
provision level Qm3 that is linked via a binding IV constraint with a small
pooling level Qs3 and via a binding IV constraint with a large pooling level
Ql3. Finally, a provision rule with no provision level between Q¯L and Q
¯
H is
characterized by two pooling levels .
Definition 2.5 An increasing provision rule Q2 : p 7→ Q2(p) is said to have
two pooling levels if,
Q2(p) :=
 Qs2 for 0 ≤ p ≤ p¯ ,Ql2 for p¯ < p ≤ 1 ,
where Qs2 ≤ Q¯L, Q
l
2 ≥ Q
¯
H and p¯ is defined implicitly be the equation
v¯(p¯)Qs2 −K(Q
s
2) = v¯(p¯)Q
l
2 −K(Q
l
2) .
Proposition 2.2 Suppose there is skill heterogeneity (w
¯
6= w¯). A provision
rule which solves the informative voting problem either makes no use of
information or has two, three or four pooling levels.
This Proposition shows that a provision rule whose image lies entirely be-
tween Q¯L and Q
¯
H cannot be optimal. In the appendix it is shown by a
Lagrangean approach that one can always find a provision rule with four
pooling levels that is superior to such a truncated provision rule. The same
argument can be used to show that an optimal provision rule has exactly one
element smaller than Q¯L and exactly one element larger than Q
¯
H ; that is,
also partial truncations can be excluded. These considerations single out the
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above candidates.
This taxonomy allows to solve problem P in the following way. One has
to compare the welfare levels that can be realized with a constant provision
rule, a provision rule with two pooling levels , a provision rule with three
pooling levels and a provision rule with four pooling levels. Generally, this
requires to solve for each class a separate optimization problem and to rank
the resulting welfare levels.
There is however a general intuition, to which class the optimal provision
rule belongs, depending on the parameters of the model. Reconsider Figure
1 and note that if Q¯L is close to Q
∗(0) and Q
¯
H is close to Q
∗(1), then a
provision rule with four pooling levels is close to Q∗, which is optimal if IV
is not required. This suggests that if the within-group polarization of views
on the optimal level of public good provision is relatively mild – in the sense
that all individuals with taste parameter θL want to have a provision level in
a neighborhood of Q∗(0) and all individuals with θH want to have a provision
level similar to Q∗(1) – then one ends up with a provision rule which exhibits
four pooling levels and approximates the first best rule Q∗.
However, if the difference between Q¯L and Q
¯
H – or equivalently the difference
between θHw
¯
and θLw¯ – shrinks, so does the range over which a provision
rule with four pooling levels coincides with Q∗. There will be a critical pa-
rameter constellation such that the monotonicity constraint Qˆs4 ≤ Q˜
l
4 binds
and one ends up with three pooling levels .
As the within-group polarization increases further, the difference Q
¯
H−Q¯L
becomes very small. Then a provision rule with three pooling levels needs to
have all three provision levels very close to each other. Hence, there is only
very little use of information as a provision rule with three pooling levels
becomes similar to one with Q(p) = const, for all p. In such a case a provi-
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sion rule with only two pooling levels, which are however to a larger extent
differentiated from each other, is superior; that is, a provision rule with only
two pooling levels eventually becomes more attractive.
We refrain from providing a general proof of these intuitive statements. This
would require an awkward exercise, which distinguishes a variety of assump-
tions on the parameters θL, θH , w¯, w
¯
and λ, i.e. the skill distribution F . We
only provide an example which allows to verify the intuition developed above.
Example Suppose K(Q) = 1
2
Q2, θL = 1, θH = 3, and λ = 1. Let w
¯
= 1− x
and w¯ = 1+x. In this example x is a measure of the welfare burden imposed
by the requirement of IV . This welfare burden vanishes as x → 0 implying
that w
¯
→ w¯. As x → 1
2
one converges to the case with θLw¯ = θHw
¯
which
precludes any information aggregation. One may verify that for sufficiently
small x, a provision rule with four pooling levels is optimal. For x ≥ 2−
3
2 ,
an optimal provision rule with four pooling levels is transformed into the
degenerate case with only three pooling levels . Finally, for x close to 1
2
a
provision rule with only two pooling levels is superior.
2.4 Sampling
In section 2.2 we observed that in a continuum economy, the problem of
information aggregation has no structure because individuals are indifferent
which taste parameter to announce. For the definition of the informative vot-
ing problem we just assumed that individuals break this indifference based
on their most preferred state perception. The purpose of this section is to
derive the IV constraints in a way that avoids this ad-hocery.
We discuss informative voting decisions by a finite random sample of N in-
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dividuals. In a finite sample, each sample member has a strictly positive
influence on the mechanism designer’s state perception. This structure can
be used to study the limit case as individual influence gets arbitrary small.
We thus regard the sampling approach, as a way to single out the “reason-
able” outcome in a continuum economy. Indeed, as we will show below, as
N →∞, the optimal provision rule based on sampling converges to the pro-
vision rule which solves the informative voting problem P. We view this result
as the ultimate foundation of the idea that informative voting is the relevant
constraint for the problem of information aggregation.
More precisely, we analyze the following mechanism design problem: Indi-
vidual preferences are given by the reduced form utility function U(p, θ, w).
A mechanism designer tries to learn the actual value of p. To this end he
draws a random sample of N individuals and asks those individual to report
a low or a high valuation of the public good, or, equivalently, asks the sam-
pled individuals to vote. Based on these N preference announcements, the
mechanism designer forms beliefs about the actual state of the world p. The
final decision on public good provision is a function of those beliefs and hence
dependent on the preference announcements of the sampled individuals, or,
equivalently, on the distribution of votes in the sample. As a consequence,
there is a need of appropriate incentives for sampled individuals: in a finite
sample, sampled individuals have a strictly positive impact on the mech-
anism designer’s beliefs. He will thus learn the true sample distribution of
characteristics, only if he decides on public good provision in such a way that
indeed each sampled individual is willing to reveal the own taste realization
truthfully. Put differently, information aggregation is possible only if sample
members are willing to vote informatively.
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Remark 2.2 The sampling procedure that we study is based on the reduced
form representation of individual utility. Sampled individuals thus internal-
ize the consequences of their announcements for a given scheme of public
goods finance. As a consequence our approach differs from the sampling
mechanisms analyzed by Green and Laffont (1979, Ch.12) and Gary-Bobo
and Jaaidane (2000). While these authors study as well allocation problems
where only a subset of individuals is used for information aggregation, they
assume that contributions to the cost of public good provision may differ
for individuals within the sample and those who are not in the sample. By
contrast, we assume that there is a tax system that treats all individuals
identically, irrespective of whether or not they are sample members.
Mechanism design based on sampling
For the purpose of information aggregation, the mechanism designer com-
municates with a random sample SN of N individuals. He uses the number
m = #{i ∈ SN | θ
i = θH} of high taste realizations to update his prior
beliefs on the actual state p of the economy. These updated beliefs give rise
to a posterior density function φN . I.e. the density φN formalizes the notion
of the mechanism designer’s perceived state of the economy.
Lemma 2.4 Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds and that there are m high
taste realizations in a sample of size N . The conditional density φN(· | m) is
given by
φN(p | m) = (N + 1)
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−m . (2.2)
Based on the state perception φN(· | m) the mechanism designer decides on
public good provision. That is, he chooses a provision rule based on sampling
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of size N ,
QN : {0, 1, . . . , N} → R+, m 7→ QN (m) .
A scheme of public goods finance has to satisfy incentive compatibility and
budget balance. As a consequence, equal cost sharing is the only admissible
payment scheme and preferences over the level of public good provision can
be represented in reduced form,
U(m, θ, w) = θQN (m)−
K(QN(m))
w
.
In a revelation game, each sampled individual has an impact on the numberm
of high taste realizations which are observed by the mechanism designer. The
following incentive conditions ensure that each sampled individual is willing
to reveal the own taste realization truthfully. We call those constraints the
informative voting under sampling of size N (IVN) constraints.
Definition 2.6 A provision rule QN allows for informative voting under
sampling of size N (IVN) if the following inequalities hold for all m ∈
{0, . . . , N − 1} and for all w ∈W :
θLwQN(m)−K(QN (m)) ≥ θLwQN(m+ 1)−K(QN (m+ 1)) ,
θHwQN(m)−K(QN(m)) ≤ θHwQN(m+ 1)−K(QN (m+ 1)) .
The IVN constraints ensure that the truth is a dominant strategy in a rev-
elation game, in which individuals announce either a high or a low taste
parameter and preferences are given in reduced form. Put differently, IVN
achieves robustness in the sense that ex post no sample member would want
to revise his taste announcement in order to improve the quantity of the
public good installed under provision rule QN .
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We assume that the mechanism designer chooses QN in order to maximize
utilitarian welfare from the ex ante perspective. Ex ante the sample distrib-
ution m is unknown. The mechanism designer takes m to be the realization
of a random variable which behaves in accordance with the planner’s prior
beliefs and the Law of Large Numbers. As shown in the appendix, this im-
plies that the mechanism designer takes m to be the realization of a random
variable which is uniformly distributed over the support {0, 1, . . . , N}. Con-
sequently, an explicit expression for this utilitarian objective function can be
derived.
Lemma 2.5 Under Assumption 2.1, a provision rule based on sampling of
size N , QN , gives rise to the following level of expected utilitarian welfare
EWN := λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
QN(m)−K(QN (m))
}
.
According to Lemma 2.5, a mechanism designer who observes a sample in
which m individuals have a high valuation of the public good ends up with
an effective valuation of the public good given by
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
=
m+ 1
N + 2
θH
λ
+
N −m+ 1
N + 2
θL
λ
.
Note that this effective valuation is strictly increasing in m, and for all m ∈
{0, . . . , N} it exceeds v¯(0) and falls short of v¯(1).
Definition 2.7 The following problem is called the finite sample problem
PN : Choose a provision rule based on sampling of size N , QN , in order to
maximize EWN subject to the IVN constraints. The solution to this problem
is denoted by Q∗∗N , the induced optimal welfare level by EW
∗∗
N .
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In the following we will study the behavior of Q∗∗N and EW
∗∗
N as N → ∞.
Before, we state an alternative characterization of the IVN requirement which
is entirely analogous to the characterization of the IV property in Lemma
2.3.
Lemma 2.6 A provision rule based on sampling QN satisfies IVN , if and
only if the following two properties hold for any pair m,m′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}
with m′ > m:
i) QN is increasing: QN (m
′) ≥ QN(m).
ii) If QN(m
′) > QN(m), then
θHw
¯
≥
K(QN(m
′))−K(QN(m))
QN (m′)−QN(m)
≥ θLw¯ .
Large sample properties
We will now derive the main result of this section, namely that as N → ∞
the informative voting problem P and the finite sample problem PN are es-
sentially equivalent.
We start with the observation, that the maximal welfare level EW ∗∗, which
is achievable under IV constraints, is, for any sample size N , an upper bound
for the expected welfare which is achievable under IVN constraints. To es-
tablish this claim, we define, for any given N ∈ N, the following piecewise
constant continuation of the solution of problem PN , which we denote by
Q˜∗∗N :
Q˜∗∗N : [0, 1] → {Q
∗∗
N (m)}
N
m=0 with
Q˜∗∗N (p) := Q
∗∗
N (m) for
m
N + 1
≤ p <
m+ 1
N + 1
, (2.3)
Q˜∗∗N (1) := Q
∗∗
N (N).
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The welfare level induced by Q˜∗∗N is denoted E˜W
∗∗
N .
Lemma 2.7 For any N ∈ N, the following inequalities hold:
EW ∗∗N ≤ E˜W
∗∗
N ≤ EW
∗∗ .
The first inequality is strict if and only if Q∗∗N is not constant.
The inequality E˜W
∗∗
N ≤ EW
∗∗ is obvious because the provision rule Q˜∗∗N
satisfies IV and hence is an admissible choice for problem P. The remainder
of the proof then is to verify that the construction works. There is no deep
insight to be gained from this exercise. Lemma 2.7 is the key in order to
derive the main results of this section.
Proposition 2.3 As N → ∞, the welfare level which is realized under a
solution of the finite sample problem PN , EW
∗∗
N , converges to the welfare
level which is realized under a solution of the informative voting problem P ,
EW ∗∗. Formally,
lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗N = EW
∗∗ .
The proof is based on the following construction. Start out from the provision
rule Q∗∗ which solves problem P and define its restriction Q∗∗|N to the domain
of m as follows: for each m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, let Q∗∗|N(m) := Q
∗∗(m/N). Using
that Q∗∗ satisfies the IV constraints, one easily verifies that Q∗∗|N has the IVN
property. This implies that the welfare level EW ∗∗|N which results from Q
∗∗
|N
has to be smaller than the one which results from a solution to problem PN ,
i.e. EW ∗∗|N ≤ EW
∗∗
N . However as N →∞ the difference between Q
∗∗
|N and Q
∗∗
vanishes, i.e. EW ∗∗|N → EW
∗∗. Combining these observations with Lemma
2.7 implies that Proposition 2.3 must be true.
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The Proposition basically shows that as N →∞ the concepts of informative
voting under sampling and informative voting are equivalent in terms of
their welfare implications. If there is a unique solution Q∗∗ of problem P , this
equivalence is strengthened: the optimal provision rule under IV constraints,
Q∗∗, and the optimal provision rule under IVN constraints Q
∗∗
N “coincide” in
the limit.
Corollary 2.1 Suppose there is a unique solution Q∗∗ to problem P , and
let Q˜∗∗N be as defined in (2.3). Then, for all p ∈ [0, 1]
lim
N→∞
Q˜∗∗N (p) = Q
∗∗(p) .
A Condorcet Jury Theorem
As a byproduct of the preceding analysis we can prove a version of the famous
Condorcet Jury Theorem. This theorem is concerned with decision making
in committees. In its most simple version,16 the theorem says that whenever
each committee member has some private information on the state of the
world and, moreover, all committee members have identical preferences, then
a larger committee size is always preferable. The underlying logic, is that
a larger committee has more pieces of information available and will thus
undertake the “right” decision with a larger probability.
For our version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem we interpret the random
sample SN as a committee.
17 We then ask the question whether there is a
finite optimal sample size. We will show that, whenever some information
aggregation is desirable, then, for any N there exists N ′ > N such that
16See Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Piketty (1999). A more advanced treatment
can be found in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997).
17A similar approach can be found in Auriol and Gary-Bobo (2005).
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EWN ′ > EWN .
It has been shown in Lemma 2.7 that EW ∗∗N ≤ EW
∗∗, i.e. a planner who
evaluates a continuum of taste reports but is constrained by the requirement
of IV will never do worse than a planner who just uses the reports of a finite
sample of individuals under IVN constraints. As stated in the following
Proposition, whenever a solution to the informative voting problem P is not
degenerate, this inequality is strict.
Lemma 2.8 Suppose that provision rule Q∗∗, which solves P, is not con-
stant.18 Then for any N ∈ N, the following inequality holds: EW ∗∗N < EW
∗∗.
Combining this observation with Proposition 2.3 yields the desired result.
Corollary 2.2 Suppose that provision rule Q∗∗ is not constant. Then for
any given N ∈ N there exists N ′ ∈ N with N ′ > N such that EW ∗∗N < EW
∗∗
N ′ .
Whenever some degree of information aggregation is desirable, there is no
optimal sample size. The intuition for this result is the following. A growing
sample size N implies that the mechanism designer’s estimate of the actual
state of the economy becomes more precise. This allows for a better adjust-
ment of the final provision level to the actual state of the economy. However,
a larger N also implies a larger set of IVN constraints. These additional con-
straints, however, do not undermine this reasoning. A mechanism designer
with a large sample can always mimic a small sample outcome by choos-
ing not to use certain pieces of information. Hence, larger samples generate
additional degrees of freedom for the mechanism designer.
18Sufficient conditions are: θLw¯ ≤ θHw
¯
, Qˆ∗(0) ≤ Q∗(1) and Q∗(0) ≤ Q˜∗(1).
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
We have addressed a problem of public goods provision in a continuum econ-
omy with private information of individuals on their valuation of a public
good and uncertainty about the average valuation. As has been shown, the
requirement of an incentive compatible payment scheme gives rise to a prob-
lem of multiple equilibria in the underlying revelation game.
We have formulated two different approaches to deal with this problem. The
first, rather naive, idea is a simple criterion for breaking individual indiffer-
ence: whenever an individual is literally indifferent among all conceivable
announcements in a revelation game, use the individual’s preferences over
the composition of the economy to break this indifference. I.e. whenever an
individual is indifferent between, say, announcements a and b but would be
happy if more individuals in the economy announced b, then assume that the
individual in question will announce b as well.19
The second approach, informative voting under sampling, distinguishes more
explicitly between information aggregation to determine the optimal quan-
tity of a public good and the financing of this desired quantity. A large
random sample of individuals is used for the process of information aggre-
gation. Sampled individuals now have an impact on public good provision
and this governs their behavior in the revelation game. Hence, the multiple
equilibrium problem is eliminated.
The crucial assumption is that the payment scheme treats sampled individ-
uals not differently as compared to individuals who possess the same charac-
19In models with voting over two alternatives and a continuum of voters one often finds
the statement that this behavior is the only one which survives the elimination of weakly
dominated strategies. Implicitly, this reasoning appeals to a large but finite economy.
Examples include Gersbach (2005) or Meirowitz (2005).
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teristics but have not been in the sample. From a general mechanism design
perspective, this assumption clearly involves a loss of generality. There cer-
tainly exist welfare superior allocation mechanisms, which do not share this
property. Hence, it has to be emphasized, that we ask a more special ques-
tion, namely how a scheme of taxation, which treats all individuals equally
for public goods finance, should be designed under a need of information
aggregation.
Finally we have shown, that, for large random samples, these two differ-
ent approaches, are equivalent. That is, the simple rule which we refer to
as informative voting can be interpreted as the limit outcome of vanishing
individual influence under a voting mechanism with a finite number of indi-
viduals.
A third approach which also provides a foundation of the informative voting
constraints can be found in Chapter 3. That paper allows agents to form
coalitions in order to manipulate the mechanism designer’s perception of the
state of the world. An admissible provision rule for public goods then has
to fulfill a condition which eliminates incentives for manipulative collective
actions. It is shown in Chapter 3 that for the simple quasi-linear environment
analyzed in this paper, to achieve coalition-proofness it suffices to prevent the
formation of coalitions which are arbitrary small but have strictly positive
mass. This requirement is then shown to be equivalent to the informative
voting constraints.
The common feature of Chapter 3 and the present chapter is, that in order
to get a foundation of incentive constraints in the continuum, one has to
grant individuals some small influence on public good provision. This can
be achieved either by considering their impact in a large, but finite, random
sample, or by considering the scope for collective action in small neighbor-
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hoods with positive mass.
2.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.3. We first show that the IV constraints imply state-
ments i) and ii). The IV constraints imply that the following two inequalities
have to hold,
θLwQ(p)−K(Q(p)) ≥ θLwQ(p
′)−K(Q(p′)) ,
θHwQ(p)−K(Q(p)) ≤ θHwQ(p
′)−K(Q(p′)) .
Adding up these inequalities yields:
(θH − θL)w[Q(p
′)−Q(p)] ≥ 0 .
This establishes i). Now suppose that Q(p) < Q(p′). Then for any w ∈ W ,
IV requires that
K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p))
Q(p′)−Q(p)
≥ θLw .
This property holds for all w ∈W if and only if it holds for the largest skill
level w¯,
K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p))
Q(p′)−Q(p)
≥ θLw¯ .
Likewise we derive the requirement
θHw
¯
≥
K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p))
Q(p′)−Q(p)
.
This establishes ii).
The proof that i) and ii) imply that the IV property holds is now immediate.
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Proof of Proposition 2.1. Statement i) is a direct consequence of Lemma
2.3. It thus remains to be shown that Q∗ satisfies IV if and only if w
¯
= w¯.
To prove the “only if part”, suppose that w
¯
6= w¯. Consider the indirect utility
function U∗(p, θ, w) As shown in the body of the text U∗ is increasing in p as
long as θw > v¯(p), i.e. the individual’s effective valuation of the public good
exceeds the effective utilitarian valuation. Analogously, U∗ is decreasing in
p if θw falls short of the utilitarian valuation. Now consider a level of p such
that20
θLw¯ > v¯(p) >
θL
λ
.
This implies that there exists a critical value wˆ ∈]w
¯
, w¯[ such that all indi-
viduals with θi = θL and w
i > wˆ have an effective valuation θLw
i exceeding
v¯(p). Therefore, they would prefer a slightly larger perceived value of p. This
violates the IV property.
To prove the “if part”, suppose that w
¯
= w¯ =: w˜. As Q∗ is a strictly increas-
ing function, Lemma 2.3 implies that Q∗ satisfies IV if and only if p′ > p
implies that
θHw˜ ≥
K(Q∗(p′))−K(Q∗(p))
Q∗(p′)−Q∗(p)
≥ θLw˜ .
We show in the following that the convexity of K and the first order condi-
tions characterizing Q∗ imply that these inequalities are indeed satisfied for
any pair p′ and p with p′ > p. From the convexity of the cost function we
have
K ′(Q∗(p′)) >
K(Q∗(p′))−K(Q∗(p))
Q∗(p′)−Q∗(p)
> K ′(Q∗(p)) .
20As v¯(p) is a convex combination of θH
λ
and θL
λ
, for any x ∈ [ θL
λ
, θH
λ
] there exists p such
that v¯(p) = x.
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With w
¯
= w¯ =: w˜, the first order conditions characterizing Q∗ imply
K ′(Q∗(p)) = v¯(p) = w˜(pθH + (1− p)θL) ≥ w˜θL ,
K ′(Q∗(p′)) = v¯(p′) = w˜(p′θH + (1− p
′)θL) ≤ w˜θH .
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The required arguments are lengthy but not
difficult. Hence the arguments are only sketched. As has been shown in
Proposition 2.1, there are parameter constellations such that Q∗∗ is indeed
constant. Now suppose that Q∗∗ is not constant. Thus, by Proposition 2.1,
θLw¯ ≤ θHw
¯
and hence Q∗(0) ≤ Q¯L ≤ Q
¯H
≤ Q∗(1). We show within the next
three steps that Q∗∗ is a provision rule with either two, three or four pooling
levels .
Step 1. Denote by VQ the image of a provision rule Q, i.e. x ∈ VQ if and
only if there exists p ∈ [0, 1] with Q(p) = x. Under the IV constraints, there
exists at most one element x ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L.
Proof of step 1. To see this, suppose to the contrary that there exist x, y ∈ VQ
with x < y < Q¯L. Under IV, as characterized in Lemma 2.3, this implies
that there exist p and p′ > p with Q(p) < Q(p′) < Q¯L. This yields
θLw¯Q(p)−K(Q(p)) < θLw¯Q(p
′)−K(Q(p′)) ,
a contradiction to the IV requirement for an individual with effective valua-
tion θLw¯. Analogously one shows that the image of an admissible provision
rule contains at most one element x with x > Q
¯H
.
Step 2. We now show that a provision rule Q for which there exists y ∈ VQ
with y ∈ [Q¯L, Q
¯H
] is a candidate for a solution only if there exist as well
x, z ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L and Q
¯H
< z.
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Proof of step 2. To this end, we first argue that a provision rule Q for which
there exist neither x ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L nor z ∈ VQ with z > Q
¯H
cannot
be optimal. Such a hypothetical provision rule would satisfy VQ ⊂ [Q¯L, Q
¯H
].
But this, for such a provision rule to be optimal, would imply even VQ =
[Q¯L, Q
¯H
]. However, this would be the degenerate case of a provision rule
with four pooling levels, which results as the limit outcome as Qs4 converges
to Q¯L and Q
l
4 converges to Q
¯H
. Under a provision rule characterized by four
pooling levels expected welfare EW satisfies the following equation:
EW
λ
= pˆ
[
v¯
(
pˆ
2
)
Qs4 −K(Q
s
4)
]
+ (pˆ′ − pˆ)
[
v¯
(
pˆ′ + pˆ
2
)
Qˆs4 −K(Qˆ
s
4)
]
+
p˜′∫ˆ
p′
{¯
v(p)Q∗(p)−K(Q∗(p))
}
dp+ (p˜−p˜′)
[
v¯
(
p˜′ + p˜
2
)
Q˜l4−K(Q˜
l
4)
]
+(1− p˜)
[
v¯
(
1 + p˜
2
)
Ql4 −K(Q
l
4)
]
,
where Qˆs4 and pˆ
′ are implicit functions ofQs4. Similarly, Q˜
l
4 and p˜
′ are implicit
functions of Ql4. Taking these functional relationships into account one may
compute the partial derivatives and verify that
lim
Qs
4
→Q¯L
∂EW (Qs4, Q
l
4)
∂Qs4
< 0 and lim
Ql
4
→Q
H
∂EW (Qs4, Q
l
4)
∂Ql4
> 0.
Thus, Qs4 = Q¯L and Q
l
4 = Q
¯H
cannot be optimal.
We now argue in a similar manner that it cannot be optimal to choose a
provision rule such that there exist y, z ∈ VQ with Q¯L < y < Q
¯H
< z, but
such that there does not exist x ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L.
Define z˜ < Q
¯H
by the equation θHw
¯
z −K(z) = θHw
¯
z˜ −K(z˜). Note that
for such a provision rule to be a optimal under IV it has to be true that
y ≤ z˜ and that VQ = [Q¯L, z˜]∪ {z} by optimality and step 1. Again, this is a
degenerate case of a provision rule with four pooling levels , namely the one
that results as Qs4 converges to Q¯L and Q
l
4 = z. As above this hypothetical
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solution can be ruled out as
lim
Qs
4
→Q¯L
∂EW (Qs4, Q
l
4)
∂Qs4
< 0 .
The analogous argument allows to rule out a provision rule such that there
exist x, y ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L < y < Q
¯H
but such that there does not exist
z ∈ VQ with z > Q
¯H
.
Step 3. We now claim that a provision rule, for which there exist x, y ∈ VQ
with Q¯L < x < y < Q
¯H
, is a candidate for a solution only if the whole
interval satisfies [x, y] ⊂ VQ.
Proof of Step 3. By step 2, there are a, b ∈ VQ with a < Q¯L < Q
¯H
< b.
Define b˜ < Q
¯H
by the equation θHw
¯
b−K(b) = θHw
¯
b˜−K(b˜). Analogously,
define aˆ > Q¯L by θLw¯ a − K(a) = θLw¯ aˆ − K(aˆ). For the hypothesized
provision rule to be a optimal under IV it has to be true that, aˆ ≤ x < y ≤ b˜
and that [x, y] ⊂ [aˆ, b˜] ⊂ VQ.
Steps 1-3 imply that an optimal provision rule under IV which is not constant
has to be one with two, three or four pooling levels.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. The mechanism designer’s prior beliefs are given by
the density function φ. Under Assumption 2.1, φ(p) = 1 for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Let ν be the number of agents with high taste parameters in a sample of size
N . Again, from an ex ante perspective ν is a random variable. If one uses
repeatedly that
1∫
0
pm(1− p)N−mdp =
m!(N −m)!
(N + 1)!
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one can verify the following statement,
pr(ν = m) =
1∫
0
pr(ν = m | p)φ(p)dp
=
1∫
0
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−mdp =
1
N + 1
.
(2.4)
This is intuitive, with p uniformly distributed, all possible realizations of ν
are equally likely. Now suppose that ν = m and consider the conditional
density φN thereby induced over p. By Bayes’ rule
φN(p | ν = m) =
pr(ν = m | p)φ(p)
pr(ν = m)
= (N + 1)
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−m .
Proof of Lemma 2.5. At the interim stage, after observing m, the mecha-
nism designer updates his beliefs on p. Expected welfare at the interim stage
is hence given by
EW intN (m) = λE[v¯(p)QN (m)−K(QN (m)) | m]
= λ
1∫
0
[v¯(p)QN (m)−K(QN (m))]φ(p | ν = m)dp
= λ(N + 1)
(
N
m
)( 1∫
0
[
pθH + (1− p)θL
λ
QN (m)−K(QN (m))
]
×
pm(1− p)N−m dp
)
= λ
[
m+ 1
N + 2
θH
λ
+
N −m+ 1
N + 2
θL
λ
]
QN (m)−K(QN (m)).
From the ex-ante perspective, the outcome m of the sampling procedure is
the realization of a random variable, which we denote by ν. Taking expec-
tations over m, using (2.4), expected welfare from the ex-ante perspective
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equals
EWN =
N∑
m=0
EW int(m)pr(ν = m)
= λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
QN (m)−K(QN(m))
}
.
Proof of Lemma 2.7. By definition, Q˜∗∗N is monotonically increasing in
p and inherits the IV property from the fact that {Q∗∗N (m)}
N
m=0 is RSN .
This is obvious from the characterization of RSN in Lemma 2.6 and the
characterization of IV in Lemma 2.3. Hence, by the optimality of Q∗∗ among
the provision rules satisfying IV, E˜W
∗∗
N ≤ EW
∗∗. It thus remains to be
shown that EW ∗∗N ≤ E˜W
∗∗
N .
In order to compute E˜W
∗∗
N , we first collect a number of observations which
are easily verified by the reader.
1. For all p
¯
, p¯ ∈ [0, 1]
∫ p¯
p
¯
v¯(p)dp = (p¯− p
¯
)v¯
(
p¯+ p
¯
2
)
.
2. For all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}
m+ 12
N + 1
=
m+ 1
N + 2
+
m− 12N
(N + 1)(N + 2)
.
3. For all x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x+ y ∈ [0, 1], v¯(x+ y) = v¯(x) + θH−θL
λ
y.
4. By definition of EW ∗∗N and Q
∗∗
N ,
EW ∗∗N = λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
Q∗∗N (m)−K(Q
∗∗
N (m))
}
.
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Using these equalities one arrives at
E˜W
∗∗
N = λ
1∫
0
{
v¯(p)Q˜∗∗N (p)−K(Q˜
∗∗
N (p))
}
dp
= EW ∗∗N +
θH − θL
(N + 1)2(N + 2)
N∑
m=0
(m−
1
2
N)Q∗∗N (m) .
To complete the proof we show that
N∑
m=0
(m−
1
2
N)Q∗∗N (m) ≥ 0. This expres-
sion equals ∑ 1
2
N
m=0(
1
2
N −m)(Q∗∗N (N −m)−Q
∗∗
N (m))
if N is even and
∑N−1
2
m=0(
1
2
N −m)(Q∗∗N (N −m)−Q
∗∗
N (m))
if N is odd. However, as Q∗∗N is increasing, those sums are non-negative.
Moreover, they are strictly positive, and hence EW ∗∗N <
˜EW
∗∗
N , if and only
if Q∗∗N is not constant.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Let Q∗∗ be a solution of problem P and Q∗∗|N its
restriction to the domain {0, 1, . . . , N}, Formally, for each m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N},
Q∗∗|N(m) is defined by the equation
Q∗∗|N(m) := Q
∗∗
(
m
N
)
.
Using that Q∗∗ satisfies the IV constraints, one easily verifies that Q∗∗|N has
the IVN property.
Denote by EW ∗∗|N the expected welfare level induced by Q
∗∗
|N . Then, since Q
∗∗
N
is optimal among the provision rules with the IVN property, EW
∗∗
|N ≤ EW
∗∗
N .
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Moreover,
EW ∗∗|N = λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
−K(Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
)
}
= λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m
N
)
Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
−K(Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
)
}
+
θH − θL
N(N + 1)(N + 2)
N∑
m=0
(N − 2m)Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
.
The first term in this sum is a so-called Riemann sum21 for v¯(p)Q∗∗(p) −
K(Q∗∗(p) and thus converges to EW ∗∗ for growing N . The second term
in the sum is bounded from above by the expression θH−θL
N+2
Q∗∗(1), which
vanishes as N →∞. Consequently,
lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗|N = EW
∗∗ .
Summing up and using Lemma 2.7, the following chain of inequalities must
hold:
EW ∗∗ = lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗|N ≤ lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗N ≤ EW
∗∗ .
Proof of Corollary 2.1. By Lemma 2.7 and Proposition 2.3,
lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗N = lim
N→∞
E˜W
∗∗
N = EW
∗∗ .
Q˜∗∗N is IVN for all N ∈ N. Thus, the uniqueness of Q
∗∗ among the provision
rules which satisfy IV and yield welfare level EW ∗∗ implies the claimed
property of pointwise convergence.
21See e.g. Heuser (1998, Ch.10).
Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule 66
Proof of Lemma 2.8. Denote by EW u the maximal level of expected wel-
fare which can be generated by some constant provision rule. If the solution
to problem P is not constant, then EW u < EW ∗∗. If, for N ∈ N, a solution
to problem PN is constant, then EW
∗∗
N = EW
u < EW ∗∗. If, by contrast,
Q∗∗N is not constant, then EW
∗∗
N < EW
∗∗ by Lemma 2.7.
Chapter 3
Collectively Incentive
Compatible Tax Systems
3.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the concept of a collectively incentive compatible tax
system as a tool that allows the study of two incentive problems simulta-
neously. The first incentive problem stems from the fact that individuals
have private information on their earning ability. This restricts the set of
admissible tax systems in a way analyzed in the theory of optimal income
taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). The second incentive problem
arises because of the fact that individuals have private information on their
valuation of a non-excludable public good. This yields the classical free-rider
problem in public good provision. Individuals like to enjoy the public good
but are not willing to pay for it. This restricts the set of admissible provision
rules for public goods.
The joint treatment of these two incentive problems fills a gap in the the-
ory of public economics. This gap exists because the normative theory of
67
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public goods provision has two separate branches. On the one hand, there
is the theory of optimal taxation. This theory assumes that there is a large
economy and that the tax setting institution can be assumed to know the
distribution of characteristics in the economy. This institution has some set
of instruments available which include various direct and indirect tax instru-
ments, as well as the quantities in which public goods are provided. Given
some welfare assessment, the tax setting institution solves for an optimal
scheme of taxation and public goods provision under a public sector bud-
get constraint. The optimal quantity of a public good is then determined
according to some modified version of the classical Samuelson rule, named
after Samuelson (1954), which takes the use of distortionary tax instruments
to finance public good provision into account.1
In this approach there is no problem of information aggregation. The econ-
omy is large. This justifies the assumption that the distribution of charac-
teristics is taken to be commonly known. Consequently, there is no need to
elicit individual valuations of public goods.
The second branch of the literature on public goods provision is driven by
this latter problem. I refer to it as the mechanism design approach.2 In the
simplest setting, a benevolent mechanism designer has to choose a provision
rule for a public good and a payment scheme. He wants to provide a public
good in such a way that the level of provision reflects the average valuation
1Examples of this approach include Atkinson and Stern (1974), Wilson (1991), Boadway
and Keen (1993), Nava et al. (1996), Sandmo (1998), Hellwig (2005b, 2004) and Gaube
(2000, 2005).
2This literature originates from the study of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms, see
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973). A survey can be found in Laffont (1987) or the textbook
of Mas-Colell et al. (1995). Recent contributions to this line of research are Hellwig (2003)
and Norman (2004).
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of those individuals who enjoy the public good; i.e. the higher the average
valuation, the more of the public good should be provided. Obviously, such
a provision rule requires that the average valuation of the public good be
learned. Accordingly, the mechanism is used for the purpose of information
aggregation.
Such an analysis is typically undertaken for an economy consisting of finitely
many individuals. This implies that every single individual’s valuation is
an important quantity for a determination of the average valuation. Conse-
quently, each single is able to influence on the level of public good provision
and hence the enjoyment of the public good by all other individuals. Public
good provision in a finite economy thus becomes a rather complex strategic
game, driven by multilateral externalities.
To summarize this brief overview, the idea that a reasonable criterion for
public good provision requires the collection of information on valuations of
the public good and that this causes an incentive problem has been addressed
in finite economies but not in large economies and not in conjunction with the
tax instruments which are used to finance public expenditures. The present
paper provides a framework that allows these issues to be addressed.
At a conceptual level, this raises the question of an appropriate solution
concept. The main issue is whether information aggregation is really an in-
centive problem in a large economy. To see this, suppose there are infinitely
many individuals, each with private information about his or her own val-
uation of the public good. Moreover, assume that the average valuation of
the public good is not known to the institution that decides on public good
provision. This institution uses a revelation game to learn this average val-
uation; i.e. it collects data from all individuals and computes the average.
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Based on this exercise, it determines the quantity of a public good.
In a large economy no single individual has a direct impact on the average
valuation of the public good, as perceived by the institution in charge of
public good provision. Hence, no single individual has a direct reason to
hide his true valuation of the public good. Viewing the problem from this
perspective, which focusses on individual incentives, would lead to the con-
clusion that, in a large economy, information aggregation does not involve
an incentive problem.
The present paper, however, takes a different view. It is assumed that in-
dividuals can form coalitions in order to manipulate jointly the perceived
average valuation of the public good and hence the decision on public good
provision. Consequently, the institution in charge of public good provision
learns the true average valuation only if there is no large group of individ-
uals that benefits from a collective manipulation of the announced profile
public goods preferences. Allocations which do not provoke such strategic
manipulations by groups of agents are henceforth called collectively incentive
compatible.
The formalism developed below introduces this idea into the setup typically
used in the literature on optimal income taxation; i.e. individuals have pri-
vate information on their earning ability. Simultaneously it is assumed that
this uncertainty about individual productivity levels disappears in the aggre-
gate and that the cross-section distribution of earning ability is commonly
known. The link between income taxes and public goods arises via a public
sector budget constraint. It is required that tax revenues are sufficient to
cover the cost of public good provision.
The new assumptions introduced in this paper are that, in addition to the
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private information on earning ability, individuals have private information
on their valuation of a public good. Moreover, this uncertainty about in-
dividual valuations does not wash out in the aggregate. There is aggregate
uncertainty because the joint cross-section distribution of earning ability and
valuations of the public good is not commonly known.
The characterization of the set of implementable allocation is treated as a
problem of mechanism design in a large economy.3 An allocation consists
of an income tax schedule and a provision rule for public goods. To be im-
plementable it has to fulfill three requirements. First, it has to be feasible.
Second, it has to be individually incentive compatible (I-IC): From a single
individual’s perspective there is no reason to hide one’s characteristics, taking
the announcements of all other individuals in the revelation game as given.
Finally, it has to be collectively incentive compatible (C-IC): No coalition of
individuals has an incentive to engage in a collective manipulation of the
decision on public good provision, taking the behavior of individuals outside
the coalition as given.
The main formal result of the paper provides a characterization of individu-
ally and collectively incentive compatible tax systems that is useful in appli-
cations. If preferences of individuals are additively separable between private
and public goods, then one can separate individual and collective incentive
problems. Individual incentives deal with a screening problem, namely of
identifying individual levels of earning ability. Collective incentives address
the problem of information aggregation that arises because the joint distribu-
tion of earning ability and public goods preferences is not commonly known.
The separability result shows that collective incentive compatibility holds if
3This approach has been introduced by Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995). See
Hellwig (2004) for a recent contribution.
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no coalition of individuals benefits from a manipulation of public goods pref-
erences, taking as given that these individuals reveal their earning ability.
Put differently, there is no need to worry about coalitions that manipulate
the announced profile of earning ability.
While this is per se not a deep insight, it proves convenient for a more explicit
characterization of implementable allocations in more specific environments.
To illustrate this, one such application is studied in more detail, namely an
economy in which individuals have quasi-linear preferences over the quantity
of a public good and their individual payment obligation.4
Moreover, the separability result is used in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5.5
These papers study an economy with only two groups of individuals, those
with a high and those with a low level of earning ability. Chapter 4 shows
that, in order to ensure collective incentive compatibility, it suffices to exclude
collective manipulations which are such that all individuals with the same
level of earning ability jointly misreport their valuation of the public good.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 contains
the formal description of the economy. In addition, the example of a quasi-
linear economy is used to demonstrate that an optimal scheme of income
taxation and public good provision is in general vulnerable to the forma-
tion of manipulating coalitions. In section 3.3 the solution concept of a
collectively incentive compatible tax system is introduced. This section also
4The analysis uses some results from Chapter 2. That paper studies the same environ-
ment but is concerned with voting as a mechanism that solves the problem of information
aggregation.
5These papers differ in the set of available tax instruments. In Chapter 5 the proceeds
from a linear tax on income are used to finance public good provision. Chapter 4 studies
the case of optimal nonlinear income taxation.
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contains a discussion of the related literature on mechanism design problems
under coalition formation. Section 3.4 derives the result that, with separa-
ble preferences, a separation of individual and collective incentive problems
is possible. In Section 3.5 this observation is used to characterize the opti-
mal I-IC and C-IC allocation in the quasi-linear economy. The last section
contains concluding remarks. All proofs are in the appendix.
3.2 The Problem
3.2.1 The environment
There is a large set of individuals identified with the unit interval I = [0, 1]
and equipped with measure µ. An individual i ∈ I has a utility function
U defined over the quantity Q ∈ R+ of a non-excludable public good, and
bundles of private goods A ∈ Rl. In addition, utility depends on individual
characteristics. I distinguish a taste parameter θi ∈ Θ, Θ ⊂ R+, to formalize
heterogeneity regarding valuations of the public good and a productivity or
skill parameter wi ∈ W , W ⊂ R+. For brevity, I denote a pair of individual
characteristics (θi, wi) by γi and the set Θ×W by Γ. U is thus written as
U = U(Q,A, γi) .
Example 3.1 In the theory of optimal income taxation A is a pair (C, Y )
consisting of consumption of private goods C ∈ R+ and effective labour sup-
ply or income Y ∈ R+. In this setting, the productivity parameter captures
individual heterogeneity with respect to the utility loss associated with a
given level of effective labour supply.
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When discussing applications, I impose the assumption that the utility func-
tion U is additively separable in the utility contribution of the public good,
depending on the taste parameter θi, and the utility contribution of A, de-
pending on the skill parameter wi.
Assumption 3.1 The utility function U is additively separable:
U = v(Q, θi) + u(A,wi) .
The assignment of characteristics to individuals is represented by an assign-
ment function γa : I → Γ with image denoted by {γi}i∈I = {(θi, wi)}i∈I . It is
assumed throughout that there is assignment uncertainty. I.e. the function
γa – or equivalently the profile {γi}i∈I – is not commonly known. Instead,
individual i has private information on the parameter γi.
Assumption 3.2 Almost all assignments γa are measurable functions.
Assumption 3.2 implies that expressions such as e.g.
µ({i | θi ≤ θ and wi ≤ w}) or µ({i | θi ≤ θ })
are, for any resolution of assignment uncertainty γa, well defined.
In addition to assignment uncertainty, there is aggregate uncertainty referring
to the empirical distribution of individual characteristics in the economy.
From an ex ante perspective there are different states of the economy. Each
such state corresponds to a cross-section distribution of characteristics and
is represented by a cumulative distribution function (cdf) D : Γ → [0, 1]
that lists for each γ = (θ, w) the fraction of individuals with characteristics
γi ≤ γ,
D(γ) = µ({i | θi ≤ θ and wi ≤ w}) .
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Assumption 3.3 There is aggregate uncertainty, in the sense that the ac-
tual cross-section distribution of characteristics D in the economy is not
commonly known. There is a commonly known set D of possible states of
the economy.
The following information about the distribution of characteristics in the
economy is common knowledge. There is aggregate stability regarding the
marginal distribution of productivity parameters: any feasible distribution
D ∈ D gives rise to the same marginal cumulative distribution function F ,
with F (w) = µ({i | wi ≤ w }), of the skill parameter in the economy.
Assumption 3.4 There is aggregate stability with respect to the produc-
tivity parameter; i.e. for any D ∈ D there is a commonly known marginal
cumulative distribution function F : W → [0, 1].
Remark 3.1 At this general level, there is no need to be more specific on
the relation between randomness at the individual level – i.e. the precise
nature of assignment uncertainty – and Assumptions 3.3 and 3.4 on the
aggregate structure of the economy. In the literature one often finds that
{γi}i∈I is taken to be the realization of stochastic process consisting of in-
dependent and identically distributed (iid) random variables. In addition,
with appeal to some Law of Large Numbers for Large Economies, any real-
ization of this process is assumed to induce an assignment that is consistent
with the assumptions imposed on the aggregate features of the economy. A
mathematical foundation for this approach is provided by Al-Najjar (2004).
The following example is used repeatedly to illustrate the main ideas of this
paper.
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3.2.2 An Example
Let W = [w
¯
, w¯] be a compact interval and let F be such that there exists a
density f that is strictly positive on (w
¯
, w¯). Let Θ = {θL, θH} with θL < θH .
Aggregate uncertainty is formalized as follows: Denote by p the fraction of
individuals with a high taste parameter, p = µ({i | θi = θH}). While each
individual observes the own taste realization, p is an unknown parameter
between 0 and 1. It is assumed that p is the only source of aggregate un-
certainty; that is, there exists a bijection between possible values of the
parameter p ∈ [0, 1] and the set D of states of the economy. To be more
precise, the following assumptions are imposed.
Assumption 3.5 The assignment of characteristics to individuals proceeds
sequentially. First, there is a skill assignment wa : W → I. Second, there
is an assignment of taste parameters to skill parameters θa : W → Θ with
image denoted by {θw}w∈W . The interpretation is that for an individual
with productivity level w the taste parameter is given by θw. Skill and taste
assignments are assumed to satisfy the following properties.
i) For any p ∈ [0, 1], the profile {θw}w∈W is the realization of an iid process
of random variables {θ˜w}w∈W .
ii) A Law of Large Numbers applies: almost all realizations of {θ˜w}w∈W
are such that, for every subinterval [w1, w2] ⊂W ,
1
F (w2)− F (w1)
w2∫
w1
θw dF = pθH + (1− p)θL .
Remark 3.2 In Assumption 3.5 the random taste assignment operates on
the set W of possible skill levels and not directly on the set of individuals
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I. As both W and I are continua this does not affect the mathematical
structure. The results of Al-Najjar (2004) remain applicable.
This specification has the property that in every state of the economy the
empirical marginal cross-section distribution of the skill parameter and the
empirical marginal cross-section distribution of the taste parameter are in-
dependent. Put differently, in every state of the economy, the average taste
level is the same on every subinterval of W . A setup that does not use this
assumption is the Two-Class Economy analyzed in Chapter 4.
3.2.3 Individually incentive compatible allocations and
the taxation principle
A tax system is interpreted as the outcome of a mechanism design problem
under the restriction that allocations have to be anonymous. An anonymous
allocation consists of two mappings, a provision rule for the public good,
Q : D → R+, D 7→ Q(D),
and a menu of private goods bundles
A : D × Γ→ Rl, (D, γ) 7→ A(D, γ) .
Remark 3.3 Following Guesnerie (1995) two aspects of anonymity can be
distinguished. There is recipient anonymity as the private goods bundle ded-
icated to an individual depends only on that individual’s characteristics but
not on the index i. In addition, there is anonymity in influence. Neither the
menu {A(D, γ)}γ∈Γ nor the provision level Q(D) change in response to a per-
mutation of {γi}i∈I that leaves the cross section distribution D unaffected.
6
6Guesnerie (1995) argues that the consideration of anonymous allocations contains no
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Definition 3.1 An anonymous allocation is said to be individually incentive
compatible (I-IC) if
∀D, ∀γˆ, ∀γ : U(Q(D), A(D, γ), γ) ≥ U(Q(D), A(D, γˆ), γ) .
It is feasible if for all D ∈ D, the collection [Q(D), {A(D, γ)}γ∈Γ] belongs to
the set of feasible allocations Z.
The individual incentive compatibility conditions are stated for a given D;
that is, they restrict the possibility for a differential treatment of individuals
only within a given cross-section distribution of characteristics. They do not
place constraints on the ability of an allocation to specify different outcomes
for different members of D. This is due to the fact that in a continuum
economy any one individual has a mass of zero and hence does not affect
the distribution of characteristics; i.e. there is no impact on the state of the
world as perceived by the mechanism designer. In combination with the
postulate of anonymity this implies in particular, that no single individual
has an impact on public good provision.
Remark 3.4 It is possible to prove a revelation principle for anonymous
allocations. Accordingly, the set of anonymous allocations which are imple-
mentable as the outcome of some anonymous game7 in which each individual
has a dominant strategy coincides with the set of I-IC allocations. A more
loss of generality if the profile of characteristics {γi}i∈I is viewed as the realization of an
iid process of random variables. In that case there is no correlation among individual
characteristics that a mechanism designer could potentially exploit.
7An anonymous game is defined by the property that a player’s payoff depends on the
own action and the own characteristics, while the actions chosen by other players only
enter via their empirical distribution. More details can be found in Kalai (2004).
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precise statement and a proof of this revelation principle can be found in the
Appendix.
If one seeks for allocations that can be reached via some anonymous game
form, then Remark 3.4 allows to restrict attention to anonymous allocations
which are I-IC and feasible. Moreover, as the following proposition claims
those allocations have the property of being decentralizable.
Definition 3.2 An anonymous allocation [Q,A] is called decentralizable if
there exists a collection of budget sets {B(D)}D∈D such that
∀γ, ∀D : A(D, γ) ∈ argmaxX∈B(D) U(Q(D), X, γ)
Proposition 3.1 (Taxation Principle) An anonymous allocation is I-IC
and feasible if and only if it is a decentralizable.
A proof can be found in Hammond (1979). According to the taxation princi-
ple, any I-IC and feasible allocation has the property of being decentralizable
via a budget set B(D) that is common for all individuals in the economy, and
vice versa. Consequently, the set of decentralizable allocations is the relevant
object for a study of tax systems. Any tax system generates a decentralized
allocation, where the budget set B(D) is shaped by the available tax in-
struments. The final allocation then results from the solution of the utility
maximization problems that individuals face under the given tax system. In
reverse direction, the taxation principle implies that to each I-IC allocation
one can find a corresponding tax system – implicitly defined as the set of tax
instruments that generate the set B(D).
In the theory of optimal income taxation the taxation principle takes a more
concise form as illustrated by the following example.
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Example 3.2 Suppose that A = (C, Y ) as in Example 3.1. An anonymous
allocation [Q,C, Y ] is said to be feasible if
∀D :
∫
Γ
Y (D, γ)− C(D, γ) dD = K(Q(D)) ,
where K(·) is a cost function that captures the resource requirement of pub-
lic good provision. The allocation [Q,C, Y ] is said to be decentralizable by
an income tax, if there exists a function T : D × R+ → R such that for
all D and for all γ: Consumption equals after tax income: C(D, γ) =
Y (D, γ) − T (D, Y (D, γ)), individuals choose a utility maximizing level of
income subject to the given income tax schedule,
Y (D, γ) ∈ argmaxY U(Q(D), Y − T (D, Y ), Y, γ) ,
and the public sector budget constraint is satisfied,
∫
Γ
T (D, Y (D, γ))dD = K(Q(D)) .
For this environment the taxation principle takes the following form: An
anonymous allocation is I-IC and feasible if and only if it is decentralizable
by an income tax. A proof can be found in the Appendix.
3.2.4 Why individual incentive compatibility is not enough
under aggregate uncertainty
As has been emphasized in the previous subsection, the I-IC constraints
are stated for a given cross-section distribution of characteristics D. They
address the screening problem, dealing with the question to what extent a
differential treatment of individuals with different characteristics is possible if
information on these characteristics is private. However, next to the screen-
ing problem an allocation has to solve a problem of information aggregation
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as the actual distribution D is not commonly known but has to be deduced
from the profile of reports {γˆi}i∈I in the revelation game.
One could take the view that this problem of information aggregation is
solved trivially as a by product of I-IC because the economy under consid-
eration is large. No individual has an impact on the mechanism designer’s
perception of D, and hence there is no reason to hide individual character-
istics provided that I-IC is ensured.8 Put differently, as no individual has
an impact on public good provision and the shape of the tax system B(D),
individuals cannot do better than undertaking a utility maximizing choice
taking B(D) as given.
This paper, however, takes a different view. The requirement of I-IC still
leaves room for collective manipulations which exploit the fact that a subset
of agents with positive mass can affect the perceived distribution of character-
istics. This is most easily demonstrated if the utility function U is additively
separable. In this case I-IC cannot ensure that individuals reveal their taste
parameter truthfully.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds. An anonymous allocation is
I-IC if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
i) The no discrimination of taste (NDT) property:
∀D, ∀w, ∀θ, ∀θ′ : u(A(D, θ, w), w) = u(A(D, θ′, w), w) .
ii) The individual revelation of productivity (I-RP) property:
∀D, ∀θ, ∀w, ∀w′ : u(A(D, θ, w), w) ≥ u(A(D, θ, w′), w) .
8Even ex post, after the actual D has become known, no individual would want to
revise his announcement, if hypothetically given the opportunity to do so. This relation-
ship between dominant strategy implementation and ex post incentive compatibility is
discussed further in Bergemann and Morris (2005) and Chung and Ely (2003, 2004).
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The Lemma follows from the fact that individuals take D and hence the
level of public good provision as given. Due to the separability assumption,
the utility contribution of the public good vanishes from individual incentive
compatibility constraints. In particular, this implies that I-IC conditions
become independent of taste parameters. Consequently, a tax system uses
individual differences in productivity as a screening device and leaves all in-
dividuals indifferent regarding possible taste announcements.
The application discussed below shows that this creates an opportunity for
collective manipulations of taste announcements that induce a state per-
ception Dˆ 6= D under which the deviating group of individuals achieves a
preferred treatment.
3.2.5 The Example continued
Reconsider the economy described in subsection 3.2.2. Assume that the
utility function satisfies Assumption 3.1 and, moreover, takes the following
quasi-linear form
U = θQ−
t
w
,
where t is the individual’s contribution to the cost of public good provision.
This utility specification captures the idea that less able individuals suffer
from a larger utility loss if forced to generate the income that is needed to
meet a given payment obligation t.
While U is the cardinal utility function that is relevant for welfare assess-
ments its ordinal properties are equivalently represented by the following
monotone transformation V := wU = θwQ− t. I refer to to the term θw as
the effective valuation of the public good by an individual with characteris-
tics (θ, w).
Recall the information structure specified in subsection 3.2.2. Each state
Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems 83
of the economy corresponds to a realization of the parameter p that deter-
mines the average valuation of the public good pθH + (1− p)θL. An anony-
mous allocation is hence represented by a provision rule for the public good
Q : p 7→ Q(p) and a payment scheme t : (p, θ, w) 7→ t(p, θ, w) that specifies
for each state of the economy the contribution of an individual with charac-
teristics (θ, w) to the cost of public good provision.
A straightforward application of Lemma 3.1 yields the observation that an
allocation [Q, t] is I-IC if and only if, for each p all individuals have the
same payment obligation; i.e. for all p and for all (θ, w) and all (θ′, w′),
t(p, θ, w) = t(p, θ′, w′). Moreover, assuming that the cost of public good
provision is given by a strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function
K : Q 7→ K(Q) and adding a resource constraint yields the result that [Q, t]
is I-IC and feasible if and only if the payment scheme t prescribes equal cost
sharing ; that is, for all p and for all (θ, w), t(p, θ, w) = K(Q(p)).9
These observations allow to represent an individual’s assessment of an allo-
cation rule [Q, t], which is budgetary feasible and incentive compatible, in
the following reduced form that depends only on the provision rule Q,
V (p, θ, w) := θwQ(p)−K(Q(p)) . (3.1)
In what follows, I consider the choice of an optimal I-IC and feasible alloca-
tion by a benevolent utilitarian planner. The planner evaluates an allocation
from the ex ante perspective, i.e. before the actual value of p is known. For
simplicity, I assume that the planner takes the actual state of the economy p
to be the realization of a random variable p˜ that is uniformly distributed on
the unit interval [0, 1].10 Using the Law of Large Numbers in Assumption 3.5,
9A more detailed derivation can be found in Chapter 2.
10Throughout I do not impose a common prior assumption. Only the prior beliefs of
the mechanism designer are specified.
Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems 84
this implies that expected utilitarian welfare from the ex ante perspective is
given by
EW :=
1∫
0
{[
pθH + (1− p)θL
]
Q(p)−
[∫ w¯
w
¯
f(w)
w
dw
]
K(Q(p))
}
dp
= λ
1∫
0
{v¯(p)Q(p)−K(Q(p))} dp ,
where λ :=
∫
(1/w)f(w)dw is an index of the marginal welfare effect of the
cost of public good provision under equal cost sharing and
v¯(p) :=
pθH + (1− p)θL
λ
is the effective utilitarian valuation of the public good.
I will now show that if EW is maximized under the requirements of I-IC and
feasibility only, then the resulting allocation is vulnerable to manipulative
collective actions by groups of individuals who oppose the decision on public
good provision. To see this consider the provision rule Q∗ : p 7→ Q∗(p) that
is chosen by a utilitarian planner who maximizes EW pointwise; i.e. who
maximizes the expression v¯(p)Q(p) − K(Q(p)) for every p ∈ [0, 1]. This
provision rule is characterized by a continuum of first order conditions
∀p : v¯(p) = K ′(Q∗(p)) .
Under Q∗ individual preferences over the “announced state of the world” can
be represented by the following indirect utility function,
V ∗(p, θ, w) := θwQ∗(p)−K(Q∗(p)) .
It is easily verified that
V ∗p (p, θ, w) = Q
∗′(p)
(
θw − v¯(p)
) 
< 0 if θw < v¯(p) ,
= 0 if θw = v¯(p) ,
> 0 if θw > v¯(p) .
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That is, under provision rule Q∗ an individual prefers a larger level of p –
or equivalently a larger level of public good provision – if and only if the
own effective valuation exceeds the effective utilitarian valuation. Likewise
an individual with an effective valuation below the average prefers to have a
lower quantity of the public good.
These observations imply that groups of individuals would refuse to reveal
their true taste parameters if they could thereby affect the mechanism de-
signer’s perception of p. To see this, consider the set of individuals with a low
taste realization and a high skill level who have an effective valuation close to
θLw¯. Moreover, for the sake of concreteness, assume that these individuals
share the belief that p is very low.11 Put differently, these individuals believe
that a vast majority has a low taste realization and that, as a consequence,
their own effective valuations lie above the effective utilitarian valuation.
Hence, under Q∗, this group of individuals expects that the quantity of the
public good is too low and would be happy if the mechanism designer had a
larger perception of p. But this implies that these individuals are better off
if they collectively announce a high taste realization and thereby manipulate
the perceived state of the economy.
These considerations highlight the following issues: First, a collective de-
viation from the truth may be beneficial for a subset of agents. Second such
a collective deviation is not prevented by individual incentive compatibility.
Given that all high skilled individuals lie about their taste parameter, there
is no incentive for an isolated high skilled individual to reveal his taste pa-
rameter truthfully. Due to the NDT property, this is a systematic feature.
11This means that ex interim these individuals have prior beliefs that put a lot of
probability mass on values of p which are close to zero.
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With separable preferences a collective deviation involving taste parameters
is not undermined by individual incentives.12
3.3 Collective Incentive Compatibility
As the discussion in the preceding subsection has shown, the requirement of
I-IC is not sufficient to ensure that an allocation is able to fulfill the task
of information aggregation. Under I-IC incentives for a collective manipu-
lation of the mechanism designer’s perception of the distribution D are not
eliminated. In the following the notion of a collectively incentive compatible
(C-IC ) tax system is introduced that does not suffer from this problem.
More specifically, the definition of collective incentive compatibility that is
given below requires that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for each con-
ceivable coalition. The main advantage of this approach is that the analysis
of coalition formation does not require assumptions on the prior beliefs of
individuals. Moreover, as will be explained below, the focus on dominant
strategies implies that coalition formation can be analyzed as if individuals
had complete information on the state of the economy.
Before the definition of a C-IC tax system can be stated, I need to define a
coalition and a subcoalition. For reasons that will become clear, I require that
any potentially manipulating subset of agents must have a fixed minimal size
ǫ > 0, where ǫ can be arbitrary small. Moreover, a subcoalition J ′ is a subset
of a given coalition J that excludes at least an ǫ - mass of individuals from
J .
12A further example for the vulnerability of an optimal I-IC and feasible allocation is
found in Chapter 4.
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Definition 3.3 A coalition J is a subset of agents with µ(J) ≥ ǫ, for some
fixed but arbitrary ǫ > 0. A subcoalition J ′ of coalition J is a coalition with
the properties J ′ ⊂ J and µ(J ′) ≤ µ(J)− ǫ.
Two implications of this definition, that are used below, are the following:
i) A coalition J with ǫ ≤ µ(J) < 2ǫ possesses no subcoalition.
ii) Consider a chain . . . ⊂ J ′′′ ⊂ J ′′ ⊂ J ′ ⊂ J resulting from a successive
formation of subcoalitions. Any such chain has a finite length.
The following notation is needed to describe the potential impact of a coali-
tion on the perceived distribution of characteristics. Denote by Jǫ, with
typical element J , the set of subsets of I which satisfy µ(J) ≥ ǫ. Denote the
true profile of characteristics in J by γJ := {γj}j∈J . Denote the reported
profile by γˆJ := {γˆj}j∈J . Let the actual distribution of characteristics in the
economy be D ∈ D. Denote the cross section distribution of announcements
induced by γˆJ if all individuals not in J report truthfully by Dˆ(γˆJ , D) ∈ ∆Γ,
where ∆Γ is the set of cdfs with domain Γ.
13
Consider a coalition J with µ(J) ≥ 2ǫ. Suppose that J induces state per-
ception Dˆ(γˆJ , D) via the profile of announcements γˆJ . Suppose that the
members of a subcoalition J ′ of J deviate from this profile and report instead
according to γ˜J ′ 6= γˆJ ′. The induced announced distribution of characteristics
is denoted by Dˆ(γ˜J ′, γˆJ\J ′, D).
Definition 3.4 A coalition J is said tomanipulate an alloation if there exists
D ∈ D, and γˆJ 6= γJ with the following properties:
i) Undetectability. The induced distribution is feasible: Dˆ(γˆJ , D) ∈ D.
13Assumptions 3.3 and 3.4 imply that D ⊂ ∆Γ and D 6= ∆Γ.
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ii) Unanimity. All coalition members are strictly better off when choosing
to report according to γˆJ instead of γJ . ∀j ∈ J :
U(Q(Dˆ), A(Dˆ, γˆj), γj) > U(Q(D), A(D, γj), γj) .
iii) Individual Stability. No coalition member departs – unilaterally – from
coalitional behavior. Given the I-IC -constraints, this requires ∀j ∈ J :
U(Q(Dˆ), A(Dˆ, γˆj), γj) = U(Q(Dˆ), A(Dˆ, γj), γj) .
iv) Collective Stability. There does not exist a subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J , with
an undetectable collective deviation γ˜J ′ 6= γˆJ ′ that induces a state per-
ception Dˆ(γ˜J ′, γˆJ\J ′, D) that makes all members of J
′ strictly better
off relative to Dˆ(γˆJ , s) (unanimity), prescribes for all its members in-
dividually best responses given the state perception Dˆ(γ˜J ′, γˆJ\J ′, D)
(individual stability) and is not threatened by further collective manip-
ulations, which satisfy all these requirements (collective stability).
An allocation is said to be collectively incentive compatible (C-IC) if there
exists no manipulating coalition.
According to this definition, a coalition considers a collective deviation in
response to truth-telling of all other individuals. The scope for manipulation
is limited by the requirement that it must not be detectable; i.e. relevant
coalitional plans need to have the property that it does not become apparent
that a manipulation has occurred. Moreover, coalition members have to agree
unanimously on a deviation and may not use side payments to reach such
an agreement. Finally, a coalition has to meet two stability requirements.
The incentives coalition members face individually must not conflict with
the message profile used by the coalition; that is, collective manipulations
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are a concern only in so far as they do not conflict with I-IC. In addition, a
conceivable collective manipulation has to be such that it does not provoke
the formation of a subcoalition which departs from the original coalitional
plan.
A peculiarity of Definition 3.4 is that collective stability of a coalition J is
defined with reference to the collective stability of a subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J .
The requirement of a minimal size for coalitions and subcoalitions ensures
that these notions can be traced back to the collective stability of a set of
“smallest” coalitions, those with mass between ǫ and 2ǫ.14
The requirement of collective incentive compatibility ensures that the alloca-
tion [Q,A] can be implemented as the outcome of an anonymous revelation
game in such a way that for each coalition J truth-telling is a dominant strat-
egy in the following sense: for any profile of announcements of individuals
not in J , truth-telling is the best stable collective announcement for individ-
uals in J .15 In Remark 3.4 it has been claimed that I-IC of an allocation is
equivalent to the possibility to implement it as the outcome of an anonymous
revelation game in which each individual possesses a dominant strategy. The
requirement of C-IC is hence commensurate to I-IC in the sense that both
ensure implementability in dominant strategies.
The interpretation of these requirements in terms of admissible tax systems
is the following. According to the taxation principle in Proposition 3.1 the
14Bernheim et al. (1986) introduce the notion of a coalition-proof Nash-equilibrium for
games with a finite number of players. They provide a recursive definition based on a
definition of coalition-proofness for games with only one player. The above definitions of
stability are an adaption of this idea for the present setup.
15Alternatively, C-IC can be framed as a robustness-requirement that ensures incentive
compatibility of collective actions irrespective of the prior beliefs of individuals in the
economy; see Bergemann and Morris (2005) or Kalai (2004).
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requirements of anonymity and I-IC are equivalent to the existence of a
tax system that can be used to decentralize an allocation. However, decen-
tralization via the budget set B(D) presumes that the actual state D has
already been determined. The additional requirement of C-IC ensures that
this information is indeed available; that is, under C-IC the tax system does
not rely on information that creates a scope for collective manipulations by
groups of individuals. Put differently, allocations that are I-IC and C-IC
imply the existence of a tax system and simultaneously allow for information
aggregation.
As a final comment, one might take the view that the requirement of C-IC
is too strong in the sense that there exist alternative ways of achieving a
non-manipulable allocation. For instance, a mechanism designer could use
use “off-the-equilibrium rewards” for subcoalitions to destabilize potential
coalitions. To illustrate this, suppose that in state D ∈ D, coalition J would
want to induce state perception Dˆ ∈ D using the false announcements in
γˆJ . Now suppose that the mechanism designer rewards a further deviation
of a subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J to some announced distribution D˜, where D˜ does
not belong to the set of feasible states D. Thereby the initial manipulation
of coalition J is undermined.16 Moreover it is undermined in a way that is
not costly in terms of the welfare properties of the final allocation because
the outcome promised to individuals in J ′ under D˜ is not part of an equilib-
rium allocation. Hence, an implicit assumption underlying the requirement
of C-IC is that such “off-the-equilibrium tax systems” that only serve to de-
stroy collective manipulations of “equilibrium tax systems” can not be used.
While this entails a loss of generality, it still seems to be a reasonable way of
modeling tax systems.
16A similar reasoning can be found in Boylan (1998).
Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems 91
3.3.1 Related Literature
The requirement of C-IC uses the notion of a coalition-proof Nash equilib-
rium that has been developed by Bernheim et al. (1986). These authors
propose a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept for games of complete
information. As in this paper, the incentives coalition members face indi-
vidually must not conflict with the action profile used by the coalition and
moreover a conceivable collective manipulation has to be such that it does
not provoke the formation of a further subcoalitions that depart from the
initial coalitional plan, where a potentially deviating subcoalition again has
to meet these stability requirements.
To relate their solution concept for games of complete information to the
setting of this paper, the requirement of C-IC can be interpreted as follows.
Suppose that, for some reason, the actual state of the economy D is com-
monly known among all individuals and that the mechanism designer is the
only uninformed party. Still, the mechanism designer uses the revelation
game to learn the actual state of the economy and to choose the level of
public good provision Q(D) and the menu of private goods bundles B(D).
The revelation game has thus become a game of complete information.17
Moreover, each D ∈ D gives rise to a different complete information game.
With this interpretation the requirement of C-IC can be stated as follows.
C-IC holds if and only if in each complete information game truth-telling is
a stable best response for each coalition, given that all individuals outside
the coalition tell the truth.
The insistence on stability of coalitions with respect to the formation of sub-
coalitions distinguishes the present paper from some recent contributions to
17Moore (1992) provides a survey of implementation problems in environments with
complete information.
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the literature on mechanism design problems under the possibility of coali-
tion formation. In a series of papers Laffont and Martimort (1997, 1999,
2000) incorporate a sequential Bayesian game of coalition formation into a
mechanism design problem. These authors however only consider collective
manipulations by the grand coalition. By contrast, Demange and Guesnerie
(2001) allow for the formation of coalitions smaller than the grand coalition.
As Laffont and Martimiort they do not require stability with respect to the
formation of subcoalitions. Instead they are concerned with concepts of the
core in games of incomplete information without aggregate uncertainty.
3.3.2 Aggregate Uncertainty and Undetectability
Recall how aggregate uncertainty has been formalized by Assumptions 3.3
and 3.4. For any w ∈W , the “share” of individuals with productivity para-
meter w is commonly known. By contrast, the “share” of individuals with a
taste parameter θ among those with productivity w, is not commonly known
for all w ∈W . Finally, those properties of the joint distribution of taste and
skill parameters that are commonly known, determine the structure of the
set D.
The undetectability requirement in the above definition of a C-IC tax system
precludes the formation of coalitions which induce an announced distribution
of characteristics that does not belong to D. Implicitly it is thus assumed,
that the mechanism designer can effectively deter those collective manipula-
tions for which it becomes obvious that some set of agents must have been
deviating from the truth.18
18Note that even if a manipulation becomes apparent, the manipulating individuals are
not yet identified. The above definition hence implicitly relies on the assumption, that
the mechanism may punish all individuals harshly in response to an obvious collective lie.
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The difficulty of achieving C-IC depends to a large extent on the assumptions
on the feasible set D and the mechanism designer’s ability to detect collec-
tive manipulations. To illustrate this, the application specified in subsections
3.2.2 and 3.2.5 is discussed once more.
3.3.3 The Example continued
Again consider the example discussed in subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.5. Recall
that it is assumed to be commonly known, that the average taste realization
pθH + (1 − p)θL, is the same on every subset of W . Aggregate uncertainty
stems only from the fact that p itself is an unknown parameter.
One can take the view that if the empirical taste and the empirical skill dis-
tribution satisfy this property of independence almost surely, then basically
any collective manipulation is detectable. Whenever agents from a partic-
ular part of the skill distribution form a manipulating coalition – while all
other agents stick to the truth – this induces an announced distribution of
characteristics which is inconsistent with the commonly known fact that the
average taste level is the same on every subset ofW . Consequently, an unde-
tectable manipulation has to be such that the average taste level is affected
on every subinterval of W in the same way. This basically requires that the
whole set of agents I is willing to undertake a collective manipulation. The
only coalition which might potentially undermine an allocation is thus the so
called grand coalition consisting of all agents. This is a perfectly consistent
view on undetectability. It is formalized below.
In addition, I define an alternative which is such that the mechanism designer
cannot impose as much discipline on potential coalitions. As the realization
of taste parameters is governed by an iid process of random variables, it
This in turn implies, that no coalition will consider such a collective plan.
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can in principle happen that the average taste level is different for differ-
ent subintervals of W . Even though such an event has probability zero it
is not excluded from the support of the stochastic process {θ˜w}w∈W . This
distinction between supported outcomes and those which arise with strictly
positive probability allows for two different versions of the undetectability
requirement:
Definition 3.5 Consider the application specified in subsections 3.2.2 and
3.2.5.
i) A collective manipulation is weakly undetectable if the induced skill
distribution is given by F .
ii) A collective manipulation is strictly undetectable if the induced skill
distribution is given by F and the induced taste distribution is such
that average taste level is the same on every subinterval of the skill
distribution.
Below, in section 3.5, the set of allocations which are not only I-IC but
also C-IC is characterized for this environment. As will become clear, which
version of undetectability is used, has a huge impact on the set of admissible
allocations.
3.4 Separability
In this section the set of allocations that are feasible, I-IC and C-IC is ana-
lyzed under the assumption that the utility function U is additively separable.
This allows to establish a property which proves very useful in applications:
The different incentive concerns can be separated. The requirement of I-IC
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deals with the resolution of pure assignment uncertainty in the profile of skill
parameters; i.e. it allows to solve the screening problem of identifying indi-
vidual skill levels within a given cross-section distribution F . The postulate
of C-IC is concerned with problem of information aggregation which arises
due to the aggregate uncertainty in the joint distribution of skill and taste
parameters. It turns out that, in order to ensure C-IC, it suffices to eliminate
incentives for a collective manipulation of taste parameters. There is no need
to worry about collective manipulations of reported skill parameters.
Definition 3.6 A utility allocation is a mapping U˜ : (D, γ) 7→ U˜(D, γ). A
utility allocation U˜ is said to be implementable if there exists an anonymous
allocation [Q,A], which is feasible, I-IC and C-IC and such that:
∀D, ∀γ : U˜(D, γ) = U(Q(D), A(D, γ), γ) .
It will prove helpful to have an own terminology for coalitional manipulations
which are based on a false report of taste parameters but which are truthful
with respect to the reported skill parameters. A typical message profile of
a manipulating coalition J which is such that, ∀j ∈ J , the reported skill
parameter wˆj is equal to the true skill parameter wj is henceforth called
a partial taste manipulation and denoted by γˆpJ . To emphasize that some
manipulation γˆJ is not partial, I write γˆJ = [wˆJ , θˆJ ] with wˆJ 6= wJ .
Definition 3.7
i) A coalition J is said to possess a partial taste manipulation if there ex-
ists D ∈ D and an undetectable partial manipulation γˆpJ that induces a
state perception Dˆ(γˆpJ , D), which makes all members of J strictly better
off relative to D (unanimity), prescribes for all its members taste an-
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nouncements which are individually a best response in conjunction with
a truthful skill announcement under state perception Dˆ(γˆpJ , D) (indi-
vidual stability), and is not threatened by further partial taste manipu-
lations of subcoalitions, which satisfy all these requirements (collective
stability).
An allocation is said to have the collective revelation of taste (C-RT)
property if there does not a exist a coalition with a partial taste ma-
nipulation.
ii) A utility allocation is partially implementable if there exists an anony-
mous allocation [Q,A], which is feasible, I-IC, has the C-RT property
and is such that:
∀D, ∀γ : U˜(D, γ) = U(Q(D), A(D, γ), γ) .
Obviously, if an allocation is C-IC, then it has also the C-RT property. As
a consequence, the set of implementable utility allocations is a subset of the
set of partially implementable allocations. The following Lemma shows that
the converse inclusion holds true as well. Hence, it justifies an analysis of
allocations which possess only the C-RT property.
Lemma 3.2 Under assumptions 3.1 - 3.4, the set of implementable utility
allocations is equal to the set of partially implementable utility allocations.
The proof is based on the observation that under aggregate stability with
respect to the distribution of skill parameters, any conceivable undetectable
collective manipulation which involves both taste and skill parameters can
be mimicked by a partial manipulation which involves only reported taste
parameters. Intuitively, any manipulation has to be undetectable. Hence,
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whenever a subset of agents J manipulates via some γˆJ = [wˆJ , θˆJ ] with
wˆJ 6= wJ , this manipulation has to be such that the resulting distribution of
announcements Dˆ has a marginal skill distribution which is equal to F . But
this implies that coalition J can induce Dˆ as well by a suitably chosen partial
taste manipulation. As a consequence, it suffices to exclude the possibility
of partial taste manipulations in order to establish the C-IC property.
The results in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 imply that, under assumptions 3.1-3.4,
attention can be restricted to the set of feasible allocations which satisfy I-
RP, NDT and C-RT. These observations are summarized in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Under assumptions 3.1-3.4, any implementable utility alloca-
tion is also implementable via an allocation [Q,A] that satisfies the following
properties: I-RP, NDT, C-RT and feasibility.
The C-RT constraints may seem rather opaque at the present level of ab-
straction. It is not obvious how to represent them by a well-defined set of
constraints that could, for instance, be included in an exercise of solving for
an optimal constrained efficient allocation. To illustrate the impact of the
C-RT property the next section returns once more to the application.
3.5 The Example continued
This section returns to the application already discussed in subsections 3.2.2,
3.2.5 and 3.3.3. For this environment the set of allocations that are feasible,
I-IC and C-IC is explicitly characterized in the following. This finally allows
to solve for the optimal allocation that meets all these criteria.
By Theorem 3.1 attention is restricted to allocations [Q, t] that satisfy I-RP,
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NDT, feasibility and the C-RT property. As has already been observed in
subsection 3.2.5, the first three requirements are equivalent to the payment
scheme t being such that the cost of public good provision are shared equally
among all individuals, for every state p of the economy. Consequently, the
remaining task is to characterize the provision rules Q : p 7→ Q(p) that
yield the C-RT property under such a payment scheme. To achieve this, the
two versions of the undetectability requirement, that have been introduced
in definition 3.5 have to be distinguished.
3.5.1 Undetectability in the strict sense
Recall that under undetectability in the strict sense the mechanism designer
infers the actual value of the parameter p from a profile of reports {γˆi}i∈I =
{(θˆi, wˆi)}i∈I and is able to deter any manipulation such that the reported
average taste level is different on different subintervals of W .
Proposition 3.2 Suppose a manipulation is called undetectable if it is strictly
undetectable in the sense of definition 3.5. Any pair [Q, t] that satisfies equal
cost sharing also satisfies the C-RT property if there do not exist p and p′
such that,
∀w, ∀θ : V (p, θ, w) > V (p′, θ, w) . (3.2)
Under undetectability in the strict sense basically any provision rule Q :
p 7→ Q(p) is implementable if accompanied by equal cost sharing. The only
additional restriction imposed by C-RT is that there must not exist a state
of the world p such that all individuals unanimously agree that there exists a
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preferred outcome of the revelation game.19 This implies in particular, that
provision rule Q∗(p) which maximizes EW pointwise, is implementable.
3.5.2 Undetectability in the weak sense
Under undetectability in the weak sense, an inconsistency of average taste
levels on different subintervals of W is a possible event. The following as-
sumption on the mechanism designer’s perception of p does allow for such
announcements in the revelation game.
Assumption 3.6 The mechanism designer’s perception of p is given by p =
µ({i | θˆi = θH}), where θˆi is the taste announcement of individual i in the
revelation game.
Remark 3.5 Measurability of the set {i | θˆi = θH} is again ensured with
reference to Al-Najjar (2004). In his model of a large economy I is a countable
set of infinitely many individuals and the set {i | θˆi = θH} is measurable with
respect to an appropriate generalization of the counting measure.
Assumption 3.6 implies that the mechanism designer chooses the same pro-
vision level Q(p) whenever he observes that µ({i | θˆi = θH}) is equal to p.
20
Consequently, under assumption 3.6 there is an obvious channel along which
19This is a sufficient condition. (3.2) implies that there does not exist a partial taste
manipulation for the grand coalition of all agents which satisfies Undetectability, Unanimity
and Individual Stability.
20The provision rule Q can thus be viewed as resulting from a voting procedure. To see
this, interpret a high (low) taste announcement as a vote in favor of a large (small) level
of public good provision. In this sense, the provision rule p 7→ Q(p) specifies a provision
level for each conceivable vote distribution; see Chapter 2 for more details.
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a coalition might manipulate an allocation. Any partial taste manipulation
that affects the share of high taste announcements has an effect on the level
of public good provision. In particular, this implies that any partial taste
manipulation that affects the average taste level on some subinterval of W
becomes effective. The following proposition derives the implications of this
property for the set of implementable allocations.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that assumption 3.6 applies. Consider an allo-
cation [Q, t] with equal cost sharing. [Q, t] has the C-RT property for any
minimal coalition size ǫ if and only if the following properties are satisfied.
i) Q is a non-decreasing function of p.
ii) V (p, θL, w¯) is non-increasing and V (p, θH , w¯) is non-decreasing in p.
The “if-part” in the proposition follows from the observations that, under
a non-decreasing provision rule, V (p, θL, w¯) is non-increasing in p only if an
individual with effective valuation θLw¯ always desires a small provision level
over a large provision level. This implies that the same is true for any individ-
ual with an effective valuation θLw ≤ θLw¯. As a consequence, no individual
with a low taste realization is willing to join a manipulating coalition that
attempts to achieve a larger perception of the average taste parameter p, or,
equivalently, a larger quantity of the public good. Analogously one shows
that no individual with a high taste realization wants to achieve a smaller
perception of p. Consequently, even with the opportunity to undertake ma-
nipulative collective actions, individuals cannot to better than to reveal their
taste parameter.
The proof of the “only if-part” is based on the observation that whenever
property i) or property ii) is violated, then there exists some small ǫ such that
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the C-RT property fails. For instance, as shown in the appendix, if there
exist p′ and p with p′ − p = ǫ and Q(p′) < Q(p), then there exists a small
coalition of individuals with a low taste realization that tries to induce the
outcome Q(p′) if the true state is p, or a coalition of high taste individuals
that aims at Q(p) if the true state is p′. Hence, the C-RT property holds for
any small ǫ only if properties i) and ii) are fulfilled.
Using Proposition 3.3 it is easily verified that Q∗, the welfare maximizing
provision rule under equal cost sharing, is not part of an implementable al-
location. As has already been discussed in subsection 3.2.5, there exists a
range of small values of p such that the indirect utility function under Q∗,
V ∗(p, θL, w¯), is strictly increasing in p. Analogously one can show that there
exists a range of large values of p such that V ∗(p, θH , w
¯
) is strictly decreasing
in p.
The problem of finding the optimal allocation [Q, t] which maximizes ex-
pected welfare and satisfies equal cost sharing and, in addition, the C-RT
property is extensively discussed in Chapter 2.21 The main result is that an
optimal provision rule is characterized by pooling ; that is, there are several
ranges over which an optimal provision rule is constant.
To illustrate what such an optimal deviation from Q∗ in the presence of C-RT
constraints can look like, suppose that the parameters of the model satisfy
θLw¯ < θHw
¯
. This implies that
Q∗(0) < Q¯L < Q
¯
H < Q
∗(1) ,
where Q¯L is the most preferred provision level of an individual with effective
valuation θLw¯ under equal cost sharing, {Q¯L} := argmaxQ θLw¯Q − K(Q).
21Even though that paper is concerned voting mechanisms for the purpose of information
aggregation it arrives at the same characterization of implementable provision rules as
Theorem 3.3.
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Likewise, Q
¯
H is the most preferred provision level of an individual with ef-
fective valuation θHw
¯
. The image of provision rule Q∗ contains the intervals
[Q∗(0), Q¯L] and [Q
¯
H , Q
∗(1)]. However under properties i) and ii) in Propo-
sition 3.3 there can be at most one provision level below Q¯L.
22 Analogously,
there is at most one provision level exceeding Q
¯
H .
As shown in Chapter 2 the following can be an optimal response to these
restrictions:
Q(p) :=

Qs for 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ ,
Qsm for pˆ < p < pˆ′ ,
Q∗(p) for pˆ′ ≤ p ≤ p˜′ ,
Qlm for p˜′ < p < p˜ ,
Ql for p˜ ≤ p ≤ 1 .
This provision rule has four pooling levels Qs, Qsm, Qlm and Ql and, more-
over, over an intermediate range this provision rule coincides with Q∗. The
pooling levels Qs and Qsm are chosen such that Qs < Q¯L < Q
sm and an
individual with effective valuation θLw¯ is indifferent between these two pro-
vision levels; that is, θLw¯Q
s − K(Qs) = θLw¯Q
sm − K(Qsm).23 Similarly,
an individual with effective valuation θHw
¯
is indifferent between the pooling
levels Ql and Qlm.
It is shown in Chapter 2 that the shape of the optimal provision rule depends
on the parameters of the model. If heterogeneity in productivity parameters
is relatively small – this is the case if w
¯
is close to w¯ – then an optimal provi-
22To see this, suppose to the contrary, that there are p and p′ with Q(p) < Q(p′) < Q¯L.
Then, because of the fact that the function θLw¯Q−K(Q) is single peaked, an individuals
with effective valuation prefers Q(p′) over Q(p). However, this contradicts property ii) in
Proposition 3.3.
23Note that if there where p and p′ > p such that Q(p) = Qs and Q(p′) < Qsm, then
property ii) in Proposition 3.3 would be violated.
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sion rule has four pooling levels and is rather close to provision rule Q∗ which
would be optimal without C-RT constraints. If, however, heterogeneity with
respect to productivity levels is more pronounced one may even end up with
a constant provision that does not use any information on taste realizations.
These considerations show that the requirement of C-RT may have a drastic
impact on the optimal provision rule for a public good.
3.6 Appendix
Statement and Proof of Revelation Principle
An anonymous mechanism M is a game form consisting of a message space
R, a provision rule for the public good and a menu of consumption-income
combinations. To describe these functions denote by ∆R the set of cumulative
distribution functions (cdfs) on R and denote a typical element of ∆R by ρ.
An anonymous mechanism is defined by the mappings:
QM : ∆R → R+, ρ 7→ Q
M (ρ) ,
AM : ∆R ×R→ R
2
+, (ρ, r) 7→ A
M(ρ, r) .
A direct anonymous mechanism M¯ is an anonymous mechanism which sat-
isfies R = Γ and is summarized by the functions
QM¯ : ∆Γ → R+, D 7→ Q
M¯(D) ,
AM¯ : ∆Γ × Γ→ R
2
+, (D, γ) 7→ A
M¯ (D, γ) .
Note that the domain of a direct anonymous mechanism does not coincide
with the one of an anonymous allocation defined in the body of the text.
The reason is that an anonymous allocation specifies the level of public good
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provision Q and the menu of consumption-income pairs A only for cdfs which
belong to the feasible set D. By contrast, a direct anonymous mechanism
specifies an outcome of the game for each distinguishable action profile, that
is, for each distribution of announcements in ∆Γ.
Consider the game induced by an anonymous mechanismM . A strategy s for
an agent assigns a report to each possible value of individual characteristics.
Formally:
s : Γ→ R : r = s(γ) .
Denote the set of possible strategies by S.
The game induced by anonymous mechanism M has an equilibrium in dom-
inant strategies if there exists a mapping s∗ such that ∀γ, ∀ρ ∈ ∆R and
∀s ∈ S:
U(QM(ρ), AM(ρ, s∗(γ)), γ) ≥ U(QM (ρ), AM(ρ, s(γ)), γ) .
In words: Each type γ has a best response s∗(γ), which applies independently
of the behavior of others, i.e. which is optimal for all ρ ∈ ∆R.
An anonymous mechanism M implements an anonymous allocation in dom-
inant strategies if the game induced by M has an equilibrium in dominant
strategy s∗ which satisfies ∀γ and ∀D ∈ D:
Q(D) = QM(ρ∗(D)) and A(D, γ) = AM(ρ∗(D), s∗(γ)) ,
where ρ∗(D) is the distribution of reports generated by s∗ if the state of the
economy is D. Put differently ρ∗(D) is the distribution on R induced by
the message profile {s∗(γi)}i∈I if the cdf that corresponds to the profile of
characteristics in {γi}i∈I is D.
Consider the game induced by a direct anonymous mechanism M¯ . Truth-
telling is a strategy defined by s(γ) = γ for all γ ∈ Γ. Truth-telling by
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all agents is an equilibrium in dominant strategies provided that ∀γ, ∀γˆ and
∀D ∈ ∆Γ:
U(QM¯ (D), AM¯(D, γ), γ) ≥ U(QM¯ (D), AM¯(D, γˆ), γ) . (3.3)
An anonymous allocation is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies if
there exists a direct anonymous mechanism M¯ that implements it such that
truth-telling is a dominant strategy; i.e. truthful implementation requires
that truth-telling by all agents is an equilibrium in dominant strategies in
the game induced by M¯ , and in addition ∀γ and ∀D ∈ D:
Q(D) = QM¯(D) and A(D, γ) = AM¯(D, γ) . (3.4)
Lemma 3.3 An anonymous allocation rule is I-IC if and only if it is truth-
fully implementable.
Proof The if-part follows from substituting the equations in (3.4) into
the inequalities in (3.3), for D ∈ D. This yields the definition of an I-
IC allocation. To prove the only if-part, suppose that the pair [Q,A] is
an I-IC anonymous allocation rule. It has to be shown that there exists
a direct anonymous mechanism [QM¯ , AM¯ ] which implements [Q,A]. This
direct anonymous mechanism has to be such that the incentive structure
is preserved, i.e. such that truth-telling is a dominant strategy. It can for
instance be constructed as follows. For all γ ∈ Γ and all D ∈ D choose
[QM¯ , AM¯ ] such that (3.4) holds. For all D ∈ ∆Γ\D and γ ∈ Γ, let Q(D) =
constant and A(D, γ) = constant.
Proposition 3.4 (Revelation Principle) An anonymous allocation is im-
plementable if and only if it is truthfully implementable.
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Proof The if-part is trivial. Suppose [Q,A] is implementable by some
mechanism M . Then there exists a function s∗ such that ∀γ, ∀γˆ, ∀D ∈ D:
U(QM (ρ∗(D)), AM(ρ∗(D), s∗(γ)), γ) ≥ U(QM (ρ∗(D)), AM(ρ∗(D), s∗(γˆ)), γ) .
(In words: In a dominant strategy equilibrium, the following has to be true.
The actions prescribed by the equilibrium strategy s∗ are such that no type
wants to deviate to an action prescribed for another type, taking the distri-
bution over equilibrium actions as given.) and such that ∀γ, ∀D ∈ D:
Q(D) = QM(ρ∗(D)) and A(D, γ) = AM(ρ∗(D), s∗(γ)) .
Combining those statements yields the definition of truthful implementability
or equivalently of an I-IC anonymous allocation.
Proof of Taxation Principle in Example 3.2.
”⇐=”: Consider a feasible anonymous allocation. Suppose it is an income
tax but not I-IC. Then there exist γ, γˆ and D such that
U(Q(D), A(D, γ), γ) < U(Q(D), A(D, γˆ), γ) .
Using that for all γ, A(D, γ) = [Y (D, γ) − T (D, Y (D, γ)), Y (D, γ)], this is
equivalent to
U(Q(D), Y (D, γ)− T (D, Y (D, γ)), Y (D, γ), γ)
< U(Q(D), Y (D, γˆ)− T (D, Y (D, γˆ)), Y (D, γˆ), γ) .
But this contradicts that ∀D, ∀γ:
Y (D, γ) ∈ argmaxY U(Q(D), Y − T (D, Y ), Y, γ)
”=⇒”: Consider a feasible and I-IC allocation and construct T as follows:
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i) For any x such that there is D and γ with Y (D, γ) = x define T (D, x)
by the equation24
T (D, x) = Y (D, γ)− C(D, γ) .
Obviously, this choice ensures that under T , consumption equals after
tax income and that budget balance holds.
ii) For all other levels of Y set T (D, x) = x.25
Now suppose this function T does not satisfy the property that ∀D, ∀γ:
Y (D, γ) ∈ argmaxY U(Q(D), Y − T (D, Y ), Y, γ)
Then there exist γ, γˆ and D such that
U(Q(D), Y (D, γ)− T (D, Y (D, γ)), Y (D, γ), γ)
< U(Q(D), Y (D, γˆ)− T (D, Y (D, γˆ)), Y (D, γˆ), γ) .
or using that for all γ, A(D, γ) = [Y (D, γ)− T (D, Y (D, γ)), Y (D, γ)],
U(Q(D), A(D, γ), γ) < U [Q(D), A(D, γˆ), γ] .
This contradicts I-IC.
24Note that his equation uniquely determines T (D,x). If not, one had, for given D,
different consumption levels corresponding to the same income requirement; hence a con-
tradiction to individual incentive compatibility, assuming monotonicity of preferences.
25It is implicitly assumed that, for any agent, zero consumption implies a utility level of
−∞ and that hence the corresponding Y is never chosen, whenever there is an alternative
with positive consumption available.
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Proof of Lemma 3.1. To proof the only if-part note that, because prefer-
ences satisfy Assumption 3.1, the NDT-U property is an implication of I-IC.
Obviously I-RP is also an implication of I-IC. To prove the if-part, suppose
an allocation rule, such that the NDT-U and the I-RP property hold, is not
I-IC. Then there exist (θ, w) and (θˆ, wˆ) and D such that u(A(D, θ, w), w) <
u(A(D, θˆ, wˆ), w). Using NDT-U and I-RP one has:
u(A(D, θˆ, wˆ), w) = u(A(D, θ, wˆ), w) ≤ u(A(D, θ, w), w) .
Hence, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. It has to be shown that any partially implementable
utility allocation is implementable. Suppose to the contrary that there exists
a partially implementable utility allocation U˜ , which is not implementable.
i) Denote by [Q,A] the feasible, I-IC and C-RT allocation which partially
implements U˜ . By hypothesis U˜ is not implementable. Hence, there
must exist D and a coalition J and a manipulation γˆJ = [wˆJ , θˆJ ] with
wˆJ 6= wJ such that, by Undetectability, Dˆ(γˆJ , D) ∈ D and, ∀i ∈ J , by
Individual Stability and Unanimity
v(Q(Dˆ(γˆJ , D)), θi) + u(A(Dˆ(γˆJ , D), θˆi, wˆi), wi)
= v(Q(Dˆ(γˆJ , D)), θi) + u(A(Dˆ(γˆJ , D), θi, wi), wi)
> v(Q(D), θi) + u(A(D, θi, wi), wi)
(3.5)
and such that collective stability holds.
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ii) Claim. The coalition J can induce the announced distribution Dˆ(γˆJ , D)
also via some partial taste manipulation γˆpJ .
Proof. There is aggregate stability with respect to the marginal distri-
bution of skill parameters. Hence, any undetectable manipulation γˆJ
with wˆJ 6= wJ has to be consistent with the commonly known skill dis-
tribution F . The manipulation of J presumes that all individuals not
in J reveal their characteristics truthfully. Hence, to be undetectable,
γˆJ has to be such that the distribution of skill announcements within
coalition J is equal to the true skill distribution within coalition J . But
this implies that the outcome achieved via γˆJ is also induced if all mem-
bers of J reveal their skill parameter truthfully and choose a suitable
profile of announced taste parameters. I.e. for given γˆJ with wˆJ 6= wJ ,
there exists γˆpJ with wˆJ = wJ such that Dˆ(γˆJ , D) = Dˆ(γˆ
p
J , D).
iii) Claim. The partial taste manipulation γˆpJ defined with reference to γˆJ
in ii) satisfies Individual Stability and Unanimity.
Proof. γˆpJ is a partial taste manipulation. Under the separability as-
sumption 3.1, I-IC implies the NDT property. Hence, any partial
manipulation satisfies Individual Stability. Unanimity follows from
Dˆ(γˆJ , D) = Dˆ(γˆ
p
J , D) and the inequality in (3.5).
iv) If γˆpJ was collectively stable with respect to partial taste manipulations
by subcoalitions of J , then this would contradict, the C-RT property of
utility allocation U˜ . Hence, I assume in the following that γˆpJ is not col-
lectively stable with respect to partial taste manipulations by subcoali-
tions of J . I.e. if the true distribution of characteristics in the economy
is D and coalition J has induced the announced distribution Dˆ(γˆJ , D),
then there exists a subcoalition J ′ of J with a partial taste manipulation
Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems 110
γ˜pJ ′ 6= γˆ
p
J ′ which induces a state perception Dˆ(γ˜
p
J ′, γˆ
p
J\J ′, D) ∈ D (Unde-
tectability), which is strictly preferred by all members of J ′ relative to
Dˆ(γˆJ , D) (Unanimity), is individually stable and does not provoke par-
tial taste manipulations by further subcoalitions (collective stability).
v) Claim. It has to be true that the partial taste manipulation γ˜pJ ′ by
subcoalition J ′ characterized in iv) is not collectively stable with respect
to all manipulations γ¯J ′′ 6= γ˜J ′′ with w¯J 6= wJ by subcoalitions J
′′ of J ′.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then this partial taste manipulation γ˜pJ ′
could be used by the set J ′ to manipulate the initial manipulation of
allocation [Q,A] by coalition J via γˆJ in step i), thereby contradicting
the collective stability of this manipulation.
vi) The reasoning established so far has a recursive structure: The starting
point was in step i) an allocation [Q,A], which is not vulnerable by
partial taste manipulations but by a joint manipulations γˆJ of both
taste and skill parameters. In steps ii)-v) it has been shown that this
implies the existence of a subcoalition J ′ of J which possess a partial
taste manipulation γ˜pJ ′ which does not provoke further partial taste
manipulations by subcoalitions of J ′ but further joint manipulations of
both taste and skill parameters by subcoalitions of J ′.
Now the reasoning in steps i) - v) can be applied again to show that
this implies the existence of a subcoalition J ′′ of J ′ which possess a
partial taste manipulation but provokes further joint manipulations of
both taste and skill parameters by subcoalitions of J ′′ etc.
However, as a consequence of definition 3.3, any chain of successive
formation of subcoalitions has a finite length. Hence, after a finite
number of repeated applications of the reasoning in steps i) - v) one ends
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up with a situation in which a subcoalition Jx of minimal size – that is,
Jx possesses no further subcoalitions – possess a joint manipulations of
both taste and skill parameters but not a partial taste manipulation.
A last application of steps ii) and iii) then yields a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. If (3.2) holds, then there is no coalition which
is willing to affect the average taste level on all subintervals of W . Any
coalition which affects the average taste level only on some subintervals of
W is detected.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. The proof follows from Lemmas 3.4 – 3.7 below.
Lemma 3.4 Suppose that assumption 3.6 applies. Let the minimal coalition
size ǫ be close to zero. If an allocation [Q, t] with equal cost sharing satisfies
the C-RT property, then Q(p′) ≥ Q(p) for any pair p′, p ∈ (0, 1) with ǫ <
p′ − p ≤ 2ǫ.
Proof Consider a pair p′, p ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies ǫ < p′ − p ≤ 2ǫ. If ǫ is
sufficiently small, then there exists some skill interval [w1, w2] ⊂ W , with
θHw1 > θLw2 and the following property: under assumption 3.5, for all p,
almost surly, there exist coalitions JL ⊂ I and JH ⊂ I such that:
i) All members of JL and JH have a skill parameter within [w1, w2]. More-
over, for all i ∈ JL, θi = θL and for all i ∈ JH , θi = θH .
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ii) Both coalitions are of equal size, possess no subcoalitions and satisfy
p′ − p = µ(JL) = µ(JH) .
Suppose first that the true average taste parameter is given by p. As [Q, t]
is C-RT there exists i ∈ JL such that
θLQ(p)−
K(Q(p))
wi
≥ θLQ(p
′)−
K(Q(p′))
wi
. (3.6)
Suppose to the contrary that there does not exist such an i ∈ JL. Then if all
individuals in JL announce a high taste parameter this yields a partial taste
manipulation which satisfies weak undetectability, unanimity, individual sta-
bility, because due to the NDT property individuals are willing to announce
any taste parameter, and collective stability, as JL has no subcoalition. Now
suppose that the true aggregate taste level is given by p′. Analogously, there
exists j ∈ JH such that
θHQ(p
′)−
K(Q(p′))
wj
≥ θHQ(p)−
K(Q(p))
wj
. (3.7)
Combining the inequalities (3.6) and (3.7) yields:
(θHwj − θLwi)(Q(p
′)−Q(p)) ≥ 0 .
By construction, for all wi, wj ∈ [w1, w2], θHwj − θLwi > 0. Hence, it has to
be true that Q(p′) ≥ Q(p).
Lemma 3.5 Suppose that assumption 3.6 applies. Let the minimal coalition
size ǫ be close to zero. If an allocation [Q, t] with equal cost sharing satisfies
C-RT, then: for all w ∈W , and for any pair p′, p ∈ (0, 1) with ǫ < p′−p ≤ 2ǫ,
V (p′, θL, w) ≤ V (p, θL, w) and V (p
′, θH , w) ≥ V (p, θH , w).
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Proof Without loss of generality, suppose that there exist p′ and p with
ǫ < p′ − p ≤ 2ǫ and w ∈ W such that V (p, θH , w) > V (p
′, θH , w). As
ǫ is small, there exists an interval [w1, w2] ⊂ W with w1 ≤ w ≤ w2 and
w1 < w2 and a coalition JH with the following properties: For all i ∈ JH ,
wi ∈ [w1, w2] and θ
i = θH and, moreover, µ(JH) = p
′ − p. Obviously, if the
true average taste parameter equals p, this coalition possesses a partial taste
manipulation. This contradicts the C-RT property of [Q, t].
As a consequence of Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5, whenever the provision rule Q
is such that for some pair p′, p with p < p′ one has Q(p) > Q(p′) or,
V (p′, θL, w¯) > V (p, θL, w¯) or V (p
′, θH , w
¯
) < V (p, θH , w
¯
), then there exists
a value for the minimal coalition size ǫ such that the C-RT property is vio-
lated.
Lemma 3.6 If for any w ∈W , V (p, θL, w) is non-increasing and V (p, θL, w)
is non-decreasing in p then the C-RT property is implied, for any minimal
coalition size ǫ > 0.
Proof Suppose that [Q, t] does not have the C-RT property. Then there
exists a level of the true aggregate taste parameter p and a coalition J with
a partial taste manipulation which induces an announced aggregate taste
level of p′ 6= p. Without loss of generality, assume that p′ > p. Suppose
that J contains an individual with a low taste parameter. Due to the una-
nimity property, this individual is made strictly better off by this partial
taste manipulation. This contradicts the assumption that V (p, θL, w¯) is non-
increasing in p. Now suppose that J contains only of individuals with a high
taste parameter. If the true aggregate taste level is p and individuals in J
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misreport their taste parameter, this cannot induce an announced aggregate
taste level exceeding p.
Lemma 3.7 Suppose that assumption 3.6 applies. Consider an allocation
[Q, t] with equal cost sharing. Let Q be a non-decreasing function of p. Then,
the C-RT property holds if V (p, θL, w¯) is non-increasing in p, and V (p, θH , w
¯
)
is non-decreasing in p.
Proof If V (p, θL, w¯) is non-increasing in p, one has for all p and all p
′ with
p′ ≥ p that
θLw¯(Q(p
′)−Q(p)) ≤ K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p)) .
As Q is non-decreasing in p, this implies that ∀w ∈W ,
θLw(Q(p
′)−Q(p)) ≤ K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p)) .
Hence, for all w, V (p, θL, w) is non-increasing in p. Analogously one shows
that if V (p, θH , w
¯
) is non-decreasing in p, this implies that, for allw V (p, θH , w)
is non-decreasing in p. Using Lemma 3.6 this establishes the C-RT property.
Chapter 4
Optimal Income Taxation and
Public Good Provision in a
Two-Class Economy
4.1 Introduction
This paper combines the problem of optimal income taxation with the free-
rider problem in public good provision. An optimal income tax is based on
the utilitarian desire to redistribute resources in favor of the less able. An op-
timal solution of the free-rider problem has the property that a public good is
installed if and only if the aggregate valuation in the economy is sufficiently
high. The present paper studies the interaction between these problems.
It arises because expenditures on public goods and on income transfers are
linked through a public sector budget constraint. That is, they compete for
the same funds. Consequently, an individual’s view on the desirability of
public good provision will depend on the way he is treated by the transfer
system.
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To illustrate this, consider a “welfare state”, which allocates a lot of re-
sources to a transfer system. Obviously, the beneficiaries of this system are
individuals with a rather low level of income. Suppose that the magnitude
of the transfer system depends on the level of public good provision. That
is, whenever tax revenues are used for a public good, there are less funds left
for transfers. Now consider asking a person with a high income about her
views on using public money for a certain project, say a highway or an opera
building. As she has a high income and does not receive transfers, she will
be inclined to exaggerate when asked about the desirability of public good
provision. Likewise, an individual with a low level of income tends to under-
state the desirability of public good provision because he fears a reduction
of income transfers.
The difficulty in finding an optimal mechanism for both redistribution and
public good provision is that there are two incentive problems simultaneously.
The first one is familiar from the theory of optimal income taxation and is
due to the fact that individuals have private information on their earning
abilities. This imposes incentive constraints on redistribution which give rise
to what is known as the equity-efficiency tradeoff.1 The second problem is
the classical free-rider problem, which arises because individuals have private
information on their valuation of a non-excludable public good.
The main insight from the joint analysis of these two incentive problems is
that the equity-efficiency tradeoff and the free-rider problem interact in a
systematic fashion. More able individuals can have an excessive desire for
public good provision, which they value as an instrument to limit the extent
of redistribution. Likewise, less able individuals may tend to understate the
desirability of provision in order to avoid a cut of transfers. Hence, a deci-
1This literature starts with Mirrlees (1971). See Hellwig (2005a) for a recent treatment.
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sion on provision that reflects the “true” aggregate valuation of the public
good necessitates an adjustment of the transfer system that corrects these
biases. This requires a complementarity between the level of redistribution
and the decision on public good provision, relative to an equity-efficiency
tradeoff without a free-rider problem: To prevent the more productive class
from exaggerating, public good provision has to be accompanied by an in-
creased level of redistribution. Similarly, the less productive are prevented
from understating their valuation of the public good by a reduced level of
redistribution if there is no public good provision.
The model that is used to arrive at these results combines a screening prob-
lem with a problem of information aggregation and involves two dimensions
of individual heterogeneity, earning abilities as well as preferences for the
public good. More precisely, the following assumptions are made. Individu-
als either have a low or a high level of earning ability.2 Likewise, valuations
of the public good are either high or low. Moreover, public goods preferences
are assumed to be perfectly correlated with earning ability. That is, all in-
dividuals with the same level of earning ability also have the same valuation
of the public good. With this specific information structure, the screening
problem is to identify which individual has been assigned which level of earn-
ing ability. The problem of information aggregation is the elicitation of the
public goods preferences of high and low ability individuals, respectively.3
2This two-class economy is a special case that has received some attention in the lit-
erature on optimal taxation. See e.g. Mirrlees (1975), Stiglitz (1982, 1987), Boadway and
Keen (1993), Nava et al. (1996) or Gaube (2005).
3Consequently, the screening problem is based on only one dimension of individual
heterogeneity. There cannot be a discrimination between individuals with the same earning
ability but different public goods preferences, as in Hellwig (2004). This author however
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As is standard in the literature on optimal income taxation, the present pa-
per assumes that there is a continuum of agents. While this assumption
has a variety of convenient implications, it creates a difficulty when trying
to discuss problems of information aggregation under incentive constraints.
One might argue that, in a large economy, free-rider problems do not arise
as a single individual has no impact on public good provision and hence no
reason to hide his true valuation. However, the present paper takes a differ-
ent view, based on the observation that, in a continuum economy, collective
behavior of individuals has an impact on the perceived aggregate valuation
of the public good. Indeed as will be shown below, allocation rules based on
income tax schedules are vulnerable to coordinated manipulations by large
groups of agents. The notion of a collectively incentive compatible income tax
is introduced to deal with this issue. It specifies collective incentive condi-
tions that ensure that information aggregation may proceed even under the
threat of manipulative collective behavior.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 defines the
environment. As a benchmark, Section 4.3 derives the optimal income tax-
ation without a free-rider problem. Section 4.4 contains the definition of a
collectively incentive compatible income tax. In section 4.5 the optimal col-
lectively incentive compatible income tax is characterized. The last section
contains concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
assumes that there is no problem of information aggregation.
4This solution concept has been inspired by the literature on mechanism design prob-
lems under a threat of collusion among agents, most notably Bernheim and Whinston
(1986), Laffont and Martimort (1997, 1999) and Demange and Guesnerie (2001).
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4.2 The environment
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals j ∈ I := [0, 1]. An
individual has a pair of characteristics (wj, θj), where wj is a productivity
parameter and θj is a taste parameter for a public good. wj and θj are taken
to be the realizations of the binary random variables w˜j and θ˜j , respectively.
The possible values w1, w2 of w˜
j and θL, θH of θ˜
j are taken to be the same
for all j. Without loss of generality, w1 < w2 and θL < θH .
The random variables w˜j, j ∈ I, are assumed to satisfy a Law of Large Num-
bers for large economies:5 while each individual has probability 1/2 for a
high or a low productivity realization, this uncertainty about productivity
parameters disappears in the aggregate. Ex post, after the realization of
individual uncertainty, there are equal shares of more and less productive in-
dividuals in the population. For brevity, I refer to those individuals, who end
up with the low productivity parameter w1, as class 1 individuals. Likewise,
the individuals with productivity parameter w2 are called class 2 individuals.
The random variables θ˜j , j ∈ I, are assumed to be perfectly correlated among
all individuals with the same productivity parameter, i.e. ex post all indi-
viduals of class t, t ∈ {1, 2}, have the same taste parameter. Let θt be the
common value of the taste parameter θ˜j for all individuals j with w˜j = wt.
The taste parameters θ1 and θ2 are the realizations of random variables θ˜1
and θ˜2. The economy as a whole is subject to uncertainty about these random
variables. There are four possibilities, or states, denoted by sLL , sLH ,sHL
and sHH , where, e.g. sLL indicates that θ˜1 = θL and θ˜2 = θL. Analogously,
sLH indicates that θ˜1 = θL and θ˜2 = θH , etc. The set of states is written as
S = {sLL, sLH , sHL, sHH}.
5For a formal discussion, see Judd (1985) or Al-Najjar (2004).
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All individuals of type t have the same utility function, which takes the form
Ut = θtQ+ u(C)− v
(
Y
wt
)
. (4.1)
C denotes consumption of private goods and Y = Lwt denotes effective labor
or income. That is, wt can be interpreted as a wage rate and L denotes hours
worked to generate income Y . Obviously, to achieve a given income Y indi-
viduals with a lower wage have to work more. Q ∈ {0, 1} stands for a public
project, which is either installed or not. The functions u and v are strictly
increasing and twice continuously differentiable. Moreover, u is concave and
v is convex. In addition, those functions satisfy the following boundary con-
dition, which ensures interior solutions to optimization problems: for all wt
and all C > 0, there exists Y > 0, such that
u′(C)−
1
wt
v′
(
Y
wt
)
= 0 .
Finally, note that preferences satisfy the single crossing condition with re-
spect to the productivity parameter. Accordingly, at any point in the Y-C
plane, the indifference curve of a less productive individual is steeper.
Information Structures
Throughout the analysis, I assume that the parameter values w1, w2, θL and
θH are common knowledge. In contrast, the assignment of any one individual
to the more or less productive class is that individual’s private information.
This privacy of information gives rise to assignment uncertainty.
Further, I distinguish between two model specifications according to whether
the realizations of θ˜1 and θ˜2 are common knowledge. The model has pure
assignment uncertainty if these realizations, and hence the state of the world
s ∈ S, are commonly known. The model exhibits private information on taste
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parameters if only individuals of class t observe wether θ˜t = θL or θ˜t = θH .
In the latter case, in addition to the uncertainty regarding individuals’ class
assignments, there is aggregate uncertainty with respect to unknown class
characteristics.
Anonymous Allocations and Income Tax Mechanisms
The analysis of admissible allocations is treated as a problem of mechanism
design. Attention is restricted to the class of anonymous allocation mecha-
nisms which are individually incentive compatible and feasible. In particular,
this class of allocation mechanisms is flexible enough to deal with both in-
formation structures.
An anonymous allocation mechanism specifies for each state s ∈ S a pub-
lic good provision level Q(s) and for each characteristic in (w, θ) ∈ Γ :=
{w1, w2} × {θL, θH} a consumption level C(w, θ, s) and an output require-
ment Y (w, θ, s). An anonymous allocation mechanism is individually incen-
tive compatible (I-IC) if ∀s ∈ S, ∀(w, θ) ∈ Γ and ∀(wˆ, θˆ) ∈ Γ,
u(C(w, θ, s))− v
(
Y (w, θ, s)
w
)
≥ u(C(wˆ, θˆ, s))− v
(
Y (wˆ, θˆ, s)
w
)
.
An anonymous allocation mechanism is feasible if ∀s ∈ S, ∀(w, θ) ∈ Γr(s),
Y (w1, θ1, s)− C(w1, θ1, s) + Y (w2, θ2, s)− C(w2, θ2, s) ≥ kQ(s) ,
where k denotes the cost of public good provision and Γr(s) the set of individ-
ual characteristics supported in state s, e.g. Γr(sLH) = {(w1, θL), (w2, θH)}.
Some explanatory remarks are in order. The I-IC constraints specify incen-
tives on the individual level. As the economy is large, those constraints are
stated for a given state s. This reflects the fact that, in a large economy, no
single individual is able to influence the state of the world as perceived by
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the mechanism designer. In particular, no individual has a noticeable impact
on public good provision.
If the information structure exhibits private information on taste parame-
ters, then the tax setting institution has to deduce the actual state from
individual reports. That is, the mechanism designer receives from each in-
dividual a statement which consists of an announced earning ability level
and an announced taste parameter. An evaluation of all individual reports
makes it possible to observe whether the less (more) able individuals have
a low or a high taste parameter. The fact that s can not be taken as given
explains why the message set in the revelation game equals Γ. However, if
the analysis is concerned with pure assignment uncertainty, the message set
Γr(s) is sufficient.
6
The I-IC conditions require that truth-telling constitutes an equilibrium in
weakly dominant strategies.7 That is, truth-telling has to be a best-response
from an individual’s perspective, irrespective of the announcements of others
and irrespective of the actual state of the world. However, the I-IC condi-
tions specify individual incentives only in response to message profiles that
indicate a feasible state of the economy. A complete description of the reve-
lation game also requires a specification of what happens if this distribution
is incompatible with what is commonly known about the set S. These out-
off-equilibrium payoffs have to preserve the incentive structure, i.e. they have
to be such that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy. This is, for in-
stance, achieved by choosing Q = 0 and a degenerate consumption-income
6The revelation principle implies that any further element of the message set would be
superfluous.
7The advantage of implementation in dominant strategies – relative to other solution
concepts – is that individual behavior neither depends on a common prior assumption nor
on a specific form of strategic reasoning in case of multiple equilibria.
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menu that contains only one C-Y -combination.
The final remark clarifies why the set of anonymous, feasible and I-IC allo-
cation mechanisms is of relevance for an analysis of income tax systems. To
this end, call an anonymous allocation mechanism an income tax mechanism
if there exists a function T : R+ × S → R such that ∀(w, θ) ∈ Γ, ∀s ∈ S:
i) C(w, θ, s) = Y (w, θ, s)− T (Y (w, θ, s), s)
ii) Y (w, θ, s) ∈ argmaxY u(Y − T (Y, s))− v
(
Y
w
)
.
and, moreover, such that ∀s ∈ S and (w1, θ1), (w2, θ2) ∈ Γr(s),
T (Y (w1, θ1, s)) + T (Y (w2, θ2, s)) ≥ kQ(s) .
As has been shown by Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995), the set of
income tax mechanisms can be equivalently analyzed via the set of I-IC and
feasible allocation mechanisms. Formally, one has the following result: An
anonymous allocation mechanism is I-IC and feasible if and only if it is an
income tax mechanism.
The following lemma provides an alternative characterization of income tax
mechanisms which proves helpful in subsequent sections.
Lemma 4.1 An anonymous allocation mechanism is an income tax mecha-
nism if and only if it is feasible and possesses the following properties:
i) No discrimination of taste in terms of utility (NDT-U): ∀s ∈ S, ∀w ∈
{w1, w2}, ∀θ ∈ {θL, θH} and ∀θ
′ ∈ {θL, θH},
u(C(w, θ, s))− v
(
Y (w, θ, s)
w
)
= u(C(w, θ′, s))− v
(
Y (w, θ′, s)
w
)
.
ii) Individual revelation of productivity (I-RP): ∀s ∈ S, ∀θ ∈ {θL, θH},
∀t ∈ {1, 2} and t 6= t′,
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u(C(wt, θ, s))− v
(
Y (wt, θ, s)
wt
)
≥ u(C(wt′, θ, s))− v
(
Y (wt′ , θ, s)
wt
)
.
The lemma follows from the fact that individuals take the state s and hence
the level of public good provision as given. Due to the additive separability
of preferences, this implies that individual incentive conditions become inde-
pendent of taste parameters. Consequently, an income tax mechanism can
use only individual differences in productivity as a screening device.
4.3 Pure assignment uncertainty
Contributions to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation are typ-
ically concerned with the case of pure assignment uncertainty. This section
recalls results from this literature for the special setup of a two-class economy
and derives a further comparative statics property. This provides a bench-
mark case, that proves helpful for the analysis of an information structure
with private information on taste parameters in later sections.
4.3.1 The optimization problem
Under pure assignment uncertainty the state s of the economy is commonly
known. Equivalently, for each taste parameter θ˜t, t ∈ {1, 2}, it is commonly
known whether the realization θt equals θL or θH . Consequently, assignment
uncertainty stems only from the fact that each individual i has private infor-
mation on whether her productivity parameter equals w1 or w2. This con-
siderably simplifies the analysis of anonymous allocation mechanisms. Once
individual productivity is revealed, an individual’s class assignment is known,
and so is the individual’s taste parameter. Hence, there is no need to specify
C-Y pairs that depend on declared taste parameters. For the remainder of
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this section, I may thus suppress the dependence on taste parameters and
write Ct(s) and Yt(s) instead of C(wt, θt, s) and Y (wt, θt, s).
Under pure assignment uncertainty, an income tax mechanism is a collection
{Q(s), Y1(s), C1(s), Y2(s), C2(s)}s∈S, which satisfies, for all s, the feasibility
constraints
Y1(s)− C1(s) + Y2(s)− C2(s) ≥ kQ(s), Q(s) ∈ {0, 1} , (4.2)
and the I-RP constraints
u(C1(s))− v
(
Y1(s)
w1
)
≥ u(C2(s))− v
(
Y2(s)
w1
)
,
u(C2(s))− v
(
Y2(s)
w2
)
≥ u(C1(s))− v
(
Y1(s)
w2
)
.
(4.3)
Note that, under pure assignment uncertainty, the NDT-U property is moot.
There is no need to specify a C-Y pair for individuals who claim a “wrong”
taste parameter. The “true” taste parameter is known anyway once an indi-
vidual’s productivity level is revealed.
In state s, an income tax mechanism generates a utilitarian welfare level,
which is, in the following, written as
W (s) :=
(θ1 + θ2)Q(s) + u(C1(s))− v
(
Y1(s)
w1
)
+ u(C2(s))− v
(
Y2(s)
w2
)
.
Under pure assignment uncertainty, the state s is commonly known. Hence,
it might seem natural to define an optimal utilitarian income tax mechanism
such that, for given s,W (s) is maximized subject to the feasibility constraints
in (4.2) and the I-RP constraints in (4.3). I will, however, proceed differently.
Below a definition is stated which yields trivially the same set of optimal
allocations, but facilitates a comparison to the case of private information
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on taste parameters discussed in later sections.
An income tax mechanism is evaluated from an ex ante perspective, which
is defined as a hypothetical situation where the actual state s is not yet
known. That is, the objective function is a weighted average of the welfare
levels in {W (s)}s∈S, with a probability weight attached to each state s. These
probability weights are taken to be the prior beliefs of the tax setting planner
who perceives the actual state s of the economy as the realization of a random
variable s˜. The prior beliefs are denoted p := (pLL, pLH , pHL, pHH), where
pLL := prob(s˜ = sLL), pLH := prob(s˜ = sLH), etc. Expected welfare from
the planner’s ex ante perspective is accordingly given by
EW := pLLW (sLL) + pLHW (sLH) + pHLW (sHL) + pHHW (sHH) .
Definition 4.1 Under pure assignment uncertainty, an optimal income tax
mechanism chooses {Q(s), Y1(s), C1(s), Y2(s), C2(s)}s∈S in order to maximize
EW subject to the feasibility constraints in (4.2) and the I-RP constraints
in (4.3).
For brevity, I refer to this optimal income tax problem under pure assignment
uncertainty as the informed problem and to its solution as the informed
optimum.
Characterizing the informed optimum
For a characterization of the informed optimum, it is helpful to introduce
the following auxiliary problem, which does not include a public good but
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instead an exogenous revenue requirement r ≥ 0 in the budget constraint.
maxC1,Y1,C2,Y2 u(C1)− v
(
Y1
w1
)
+ u(C2)− v
(
Y2
w2
)
s.t. Y1 − C1 + Y2 − C2 ≥ r ,
u(C1)− v
(
Y1
w1
)
≥ u(C2)− v
(
Y2
w1
)
,
u(C2)− v
(
Y2
w2
)
≥ u(C1)− v
(
Y1
w2
)
.
(4.4)
A solution to problem (4.4) is parameterized by the revenue requirement r
and denoted (Y ∗1 (r), C
∗
1(r), Y
∗
2 (r), C
∗
2(r)). The following result is well known
(see e.g. Stiglitz (1982)).
Lemma 4.2 At a solution to problem (4.4) the feasibility constraint and
only the I-RP constraint for t = 2 are binding, implying that there is a
distortion at the bottom and no distortion at the top:
MRS∗1 :=
1
w1
v′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w1
)
u′(C∗1 (r))
< 1 and MRS∗2 :=
1
w2
v′
(
Y ∗
2
(r)
w2
)
u′(C∗2 (r))
= 1 .
Intuitively, problem (4.4) is essentially a problem of redistribution under
incentive constraints. As the more productive suffer less from the necessity
to generate income, a utilitarian planner wants them to work harder. This
implies a binding I-RP constraint for this class of individuals at the informed
optimum.
The informed optimum is now characterized with reference to problem (4.4).
I use a shorthand notation for the utility level at a solution to problem (4.4)
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induces for type t individuals:8
Rt(r) := u(C
∗
t (r))− v
(
Y ∗t (r)
wt
)
.
Obviously, the informed utilitarian planner decides on public good provision
according to the following criterion: Q(s) = 1 if and only if
θ1 + θ2 ≥ R1(0) +R2(0)−
(
R1(k) +R2(k)
)
.
Under this criterion, the provision rule chosen by an informed planner de-
pends on the parameter values θL and θH . E.g. if
2θL > R1(0) +R2(0)−
(
R1(k) +R2(k)
)
,
then an informed planner chooses Q(s) = 1 for all s. To avoid a lengthy
discussion of each conceivable parameter constellation, I focus on a particular
case.
Assumption 4.1 An informed planner chooses to install the public good in
all states except state sLL:
9
θH + θL ≥ R1(0) +R2(0)−
(
R1(k) +R2(k)
)
≥ 2θL .
For ease of reference, I denote by Qi : Q = 0⇐⇒ s = sLL the provision rule
chosen by an informed planner. To complete the description of the informed
8I use the letter R to indicate that I refer to a utility level which is generated by a
solution to an optimization problem with an exogenous Revenue Requirement.
9Obviously, a parameter constellation such that Q = 1 is desired in every (no) state
of the world is not very interesting. Hence, the only alternative of interest is that Q = 0
is preferred in states sLH and sHL. An investigation of this case gives rise to an analysis
which is analogous to the one presented below.
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optimum, I denote by U i1(s) and U
i
2(s) the realized utility levels of class 1
and class 2 individuals. Obviously,
U i1(s) =

R1(0), if s = sLL,
θL +R1(k), if s = sLH ,
θH +R1(k), if s = sHL,
θH +R1(k), if s = sHH
and
U i2(s) =

R2(0), if s = sLL,
θH +R2(k), if s = sLH ,
θL +R2(k), if s = sHL,
θH +R2(k), if s = sHH .
I refer to the expression Rt(0)−Rt(k) as the utility loss of class t from paying
for public good provision at the informed optimum. Moreover, I say that
for class t individuals, the willingness to pay for the public good is positive
(negative) if the utility gain θt exceeds (falls short of) this utility loss, i.e. if
θt − (Rt(0)−Rt(k)) is positive (negative).
4.3.2 Conflicting interests at the informed optimum
Even though an optimal utilitarian income tax attaches equal weight to the
utility levels realized by the more and the less able class of individuals, the
informed optimum may give rise to conflicting views on the desirability of
public good provision. To illustrate this, suppose for the sake of concreteness
that
R1(0)−R1(k) > θH > θL > R2(0)− R2(k) . (4.5)
In this scenario, for the more productive individuals, the utility loss is so
small that their willingness to pay for the public good is positive in all states
s. By contrast, the less productive suffer so severely from the increased rev-
enue requirement if the public good is installed that they oppose provision
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in every state of the world.
A clarification of the possible patterns of conflicting interests will be impor-
tant for an understanding of the additional incentive problems that come
into play under an information structure with private information on taste
parameters. Intuitively, if the scenario characterized by the inequalities in
(4.5) arises, less productive individuals want to prevent the public good from
being installed in every state s, and hence they have an incentive to report
a low taste realization even if in fact their taste parameter is high. Likewise,
the more able class wants to get the public good in every state and might be
tempted to report a high taste in case of a low taste realization.
The following lemma is important for an understanding of possible scenarios
of conflicting interests. It shows that for the less productive class of individ-
uals the utility loss is larger if in problem (4.4) the revenue requirement r is
increased. In more technical terms, the lemma establishes a property of de-
creasing differences according to which a lower productivity level translates
into a larger utility loss. The proof relies on the following assumption:
Assumption 4.2 The function v is strictly convex and satisfies10
∀x ≥ 0 :
1
w21
v′′
(
x
w1
)
≥
1
w22
v′′
(
x
w2
)
.
Lemma 4.3 Let v(·) satisfy Assumption 4.2. Let r′ > r. Then:
R1(r)− R1(r
′) > R2(r)− R2(r
′) > 0 .
10Note that a sufficient condition for Assumption 4.2 is v′′′ ≥ 0. An alternative assump-
tion, which would also yield the result of Lemma 4.3, is that the function v is linear. For
a discussion of this quasi-linear case, see Weymark (1986) or Boadway et al. (2000).
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The intuition behind this observation is as follows: Consider a solution to
problem (4.4) and suppose the revenue requirement is slightly increased.
The more productive cannot be forced to cover the resulting small budget
deficit, as this would violate their I-RP constraint. To the contrary, less
able individuals can be made worse off without violating any constraint.
Consequently, the planner has to make them worse off if there is a need to
extract larger revenues.
Possible scenarios of conflicting interests
If combined with the observation that the utility loss is larger for less able
individuals, as shown in lemma 4.3, assumption 4.1 implies that the willing-
ness of less able individuals to pay is negative if θ1 = θL. Analogously, for
the more productive class, the willingness to pay is positive if θ2 = θH ,
R1(0)−R1(k) > θL and θH > R2(0)− R2(k) . (4.6)
These inequalities in conjunction with assumption 4.1 reduce the set of pos-
sible parameter constellations. The following three scenarios may arise.
Sc.1: θH ≥ R1(0)− R1(k) > R2(0)−R2(k) ≥ θL ,
Sc.2: θH ≥ R1(0)− R1(k) ≥ θL > R2(0)−R2(k) ,
Sc.3: R1(0)− R1(k) > θH > θL > R2(0)− R2(k) .
These inequalities are interpreted as follows.
Scenario 1: For individuals of any class t, willingness to pay for the public
good is positive if the taste realization is high, θ˜t = θH , and is negative if the
taste realization is low, θ˜t = θL. Scenario 1 hence gives rise to the statement
that, at the informed optimum, willingness to pay for the public good is in-
dependent of earning ability.
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Scenario 2: For the less productive class, as under Scenario 1, the willing-
ness to pay for the public good is positive only if the utility gain is high. In
contrast, more productive individuals, whose utility loss is smaller, have a
positive willingness to pay in any state s.
Scenario 3: For more productive individuals, as under Scenario 2, the will-
ingness to pay for the public good is always positive. In addition, less able
individuals suffer from such a heavy utility loss that their willingness to pay
is negative in any state s.
4.4 Private information on taste parameters
From now on, I consider an information structure with private information
on taste parameters. Consequently, a utilitarian planner faces the problem of
information aggregation simultaneously with the screening problem of iden-
tifying which individual belongs to which class. This necessity of information
aggregation will in general cause additional incentive problems, on top of the
I-RP requirement.
To illustrate this, suppose Scenario 2 applies and ask whether the informed
optimum is implementable. If one takes the view that individual incentives
are enough, the answer is yes. As all individuals take the mechanism de-
signer’s perception of the actual state as outside their influence, no isolated
individual has a reason to misreport her own taste parameter. However, if
the informed optimum is implemented, the more productive individuals want
to have the public good in all states of the world, that is, even if θ˜2 = θL.
And moreover, if class 2 individuals are able to convince the utilitarian plan-
ner that their taste parameter is in fact high, they can ensure the provision
of the public good. As the decision on provision is based on a revelation
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game, there is an obvious way to achieve this: a collective lie of all class 2
individuals on their taste parameter.
These considerations highlight the following issues: First, with private in-
formation on taste parameters, a mechanism designer may not be able to
detect a deviation from the truth by a subset of agents. If all class 2 indi-
viduals make the same announcement θˆ2, it is not possible to tell whether
those individuals are jointly lying or are jointly telling the truth. Second,
such a deviation may be beneficial for such a subset of agents. Third, it
is not prevented by individual incentive compatibility. Given that all class
2 individuals lie about their taste parameter, there is no incentive for an
isolated class 2 individual to reveal the realization of θ˜2 truthfully. Due to
the NDT-U property of income tax mechanisms, this is a systematic fea-
ture. A collective deviation involving taste parameters is not undermined by
individual incentives.
4.4.1 Collective Incentive Compatibility
In the following a collectively incentive compatible (C-IC) income tax mecha-
nism is defined. Such a mechanism ensures that truth-telling is an equilibrium
outcome even under the threat of collective manipulations.
Denote by J the set of measurable subsets of the set of agents, I = [0, 1],
with positive length. A typical element is denoted J . Denote the true profile
of characteristics in J by γJ := {(w
j, θj)}j∈J . Denote the reported profile by
γˆJ := {(wˆ
j, θˆj)}j∈J .
Denote the cross-section distribution of announcements induced by γˆJ if the
true state of the economy is s ∈ S and all individuals not in J report truth-
fully by δ(γˆJ , s). Note that any such distribution belongs to the set ∆(Γ) of
probability distributions on Γ = {w1, w2} × {θL, θH}, i.e. it assigns a proba-
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bility weight to each of the four elements of Γ.
Denote by D := {dLL, dLH , dHL, dHH} the set of cross-section distributions of
characteristics which correspond in an obvious way to the possible states of
the world, e.g. dLH is a distribution which assigns equal mass to the elements
of Γr(sLH) = {(w1, θL), (w2, θH)}. For δ(γˆJ , s) ∈ D, denote by sˆ(γˆJ , s) ∈ S,
the perceived state of the world, e.g. if δ(γˆJ , s) = dLH , then sˆ(γˆJ , s) = sLH .
Definition 4.2 A coalition J is said tomanipulate an income tax mechanism
if there exists s ∈ S and γˆJ 6= γJ with the following properties:
i) Undetectability. The induced distribution is feasible: δ(γˆJ , s) ∈ D.
ii) Unanimity. All coalition members are strictly better off when choosing
to report according to γˆJ instead of γJ . ∀j ∈ J :
θjQ(sˆ(γˆJ , s)) + u(C(wˆ
j, θˆj, sˆ(γˆJ , s)))− v
(
Y (wˆj , θˆj , sˆ(γˆJ , s))
wj
)
> θjQ(s) + u(C(wj, θj , s))− v
(
Y (wj , θj , s)
wj
)
.
iii) Individual Stability. No coalition member departs – unilaterally – from
coalitional behavior. Given the I-IC -constraints, this requires, ∀j ∈ J :
θjQ(sˆ(γˆJ , s)) + u(C(wˆ
j, θˆj , sˆ(γˆJ , s)))− v
(
Y (wˆj , θˆj , sˆ(γˆJ , s))
wj
)
= θjQ(sˆ(γˆJ , s)) + u(C(w
j, θj, sˆ(γˆJ , s)))− v
(
Y (wj , θj , sˆ(γˆJ , s))
wj
)
.
iv) Collective Stability. There does not exist a subcoalition K ⊂ J , with
an undetectable collective deviation γ˜K 6= γˆK that induces a state per-
ception sˆ(γ˜K , γˆJ\K, s) that makes all members of K strictly better off
relative to sˆ(γˆJ , s) (unanimity), prescribes for all its members individu-
ally best responses given the state perception sˆ(γ˜K , γˆJ\K , s) (individual
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stability) and is not threatened by further collective manipulations,
which satisfy all these requirements (collective stability).
An income tax mechanism is said to be collectively incentive compatible (C-
IC) if there exists no manipulating coalition.
According to this definition, a coalition considers a collective deviation in
response to truth-telling of all other individuals. The scope for manipulation
is limited by the requirement that it must not be detectable, i.e. the relevant
coalitional plans are only those for which it does not become apparent that
a manipulation has occurred. Moreover, coalition members have to agree
unanimously on a deviation and may not use side payments to reach such
an agreement. Finally, a coalition has to meet two stability requirements.
The incentives coalition members face individually must not conflict with
the message profile used by the coalition; that is, collective manipulations
are a concern only in so far as they do not conflict with I-IC. In addition,
a conceivable collective manipulation must not provoke the formation of a
subcoalition which departs from the original coalitional plan. These stability
requirements have been introduced by Bernheim et al. (1986) in their defin-
ition of a coalition-proof Nash-equilibrium.
A peculiarity of Definition 4.2 is that the collective stability of a coalition J
is defined with reference to the collective stability of a coalition K ⊂ J . Ob-
viously, in a continuum economy, there is no chance of tracing these notions
back to the collective stability of some “smallest” coalitions. As will become
clear (see Proposition 4.1), for the purposes of this paper, this does not cre-
ate a problem. The structure of a two-class economy is sufficiently simple to
arrive at a complete characterization of C-IC income tax mechanisms.
With reference to the literature, different interpretations of the implicit as-
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sumptions on coalition formation can be given. First, suppose that pre-play
communication resolves the uncertainty among individuals about the actual
state of the economy.11 The above definition then requires that truth-telling
is a best response from the perspective of a coalition whose members know
the true state of the world and presume that all individuals outside the
coalition tell the truth. Alternatively, C-IC can be framed as a robustness-
requirement.12 It implies that ex post, after the state of the world has become
commonly known, no subset of individuals would jointly want to revise their
announcements if they were, hypothetically, given the opportunity to do so.
4.4.2 C-IC in the two-class economy
The definition of C-IC stated above is rather abstract in the sense that it
excludes any kind of coalitional manipulation. This concern can be simplified
by making use of the specific features of a two-class economy. As developed
below, it suffices to exclude manipulative threats of coalitions, which consist
of all individuals of one class. Moreover, individual and collective incentive
concerns can be separated: the latter require that individuals belonging to
the same class are prevented from a collective lie on their taste parameter,
while the former ensure a revelation of productivity parameters.
Definition 4.3 A utility allocation specifies for every state s ∈ S, utility
levels U˜1(s) and U˜2(s) for type 1 and type 2 individuals, respectively. A
utility allocation is said to be implementable if there exists a C-IC income
11Such pre-play communication works if one assumes that individuals are able to solve
pure coordination problems by cheap talk, Farrell and Rabin (1996).
12Robustness requires that the set of implementable allocations does not depend on
assumptions about the prior beliefs of individuals. For a more extensive discussion, see,
e.g. Bergemann and Morris (2005); Chung and Ely (2004) or Kalai (2004).
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tax mechanism such that ∀s ∈ S, and for all (wt, θt) ∈ Γr(s),
U˜t(s) = θtQ(s) + u(C(wt, θt, s))− v
(
Y (wt, θt, s)
w
)
=: θtQ(s) + Vt(s) ,
where Vt(s) is a shorthand for the utility class t individuals derive in state s
from their consumption-income combination.
A utility allocation {U˜1(s), U˜2(s)}s∈S is said to be Pareto-optimal if it is
implementable and there does not exist some other implementable utility
allocation {U˜ ′1(s), U˜
′
2(s)}s∈S which yields, in all states s and for all t ∈ {1, 2},
a weakly larger utility level, U˜ ′t(s) ≥ U˜t(s), and in some state s and for some
class t a strictly larger utility level, U˜ ′t(s) > U˜t(s).
Proposition 4.1 Suppose there is no pooling of earning ability, that is, ∀s ∈
S, ∀(wt, θt) ∈ Γr(s), (C(w1, θ1, s), Y (w1, θ1, s)) 6= (C(w2, θ2, s), Y (w2, θ2, s)).
13
Then, a utility allocation is Pareto-optimal if and only if it is implementable
by a feasible allocation mechanism which satisfies I-RP and the following
properties:
i) Collective revelation of taste on the class level (C-RT-C): ∀x ∈ {L,H},
∀xˆ ∈ {L,H}, ∀y ∈ {L,H} and ∀yˆ ∈ {L,H}:
θxQ(sxy) + V1(sxy) ≥ θxQ(sxˆy) + V1(sxˆy) ,
θyQ(sxy) + V2(sxy) ≥ θyQ(sxyˆ) + V2(sxyˆ) .
13Absence of pooling is required only to make the presentation more accessible. In
subsequent sections, optimal tax mechanisms are characterized without imposing this as-
sumption. It will turn out that an optimum does not involve pooling.
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ii) No discrimination of taste in terms of consumption and income (NDT-
CY): ∀s ∈ S, ∀w ∈ {w1, w2}, ∀θ ∈ {θL, θH} and ∀θ
′ ∈ {θL, θH},
(C(w, θ, s), Y (w, θ, s)) = (C(w, θ′, s), Y (w, θ′, s)) .
The NDT-CY property requires that, for a given distribution of character-
istics in the economy, the allocation of private goods is independent of taste
parameters. This is a slightly stronger property as relative to NDT-U. Ac-
cording to the C-RT-C -property, manipulations of coalitions consisting only
of individuals with the same type and which misreport only the taste parame-
ter are ruled out. Obviously, this condition is necessary for C-IC. Proposition
4.1 states that it is also sufficient if one restricts attention to Pareto-optimal
allocations.
The proof proceeds as follows. First it is shown that there cannot be an
undetectable collective manipulation that involves productivity parameters.
This would require some type 1 individuals to be willing to claim a high
productivity and some type 2 individuals to be willing to claim a low pro-
ductivity. Due to the single-crossing property, this is not compatible with
I-IC unless there is pooling. Then, it is observed that undetectability in a
two-class economy requires all individuals who report the same productivity
parameter to agree on the reported taste parameter as well. Hence, there
remain only two kinds of collective manipulations: those where only the indi-
viduals of one class lie on their taste parameter and those where individuals
of both classes jointly lie on their taste parameter. The former kind of col-
lective manipulation is ruled out by the C-RT-C property. The latter would
require that both classes prefer a different state perception. It is shown that
this situation can not arise under a Pareto-optimal utility allocation.
Proposition 4.1 justifies the restriction to allocation rules with the NDT-CY
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property. This implies that a more concise notation can be used. In the fol-
lowing, the consumption and income for an individual of type t, given that the
state of the world is s, is written as (Ct(s), Yt(s)), with the understanding that
this pair equals both (C(wt, θL, s), Y (wt, θL, s)) and (C(wt, θH , s), Y (wt, θH , s)).
The I-RP property is hence written in the following as ∀s ∈ S, ∀t, ∀t′ 6= t,
u(Ct(s))− v
(
Yt(s)
wt
)
≥ u(Ct′(s))− v
(
Yt′(s)
wt
)
. (4.7)
The budget constraints now read as ∀s ∈ S,
Y1(s)− C1(s) + Y2(s)− C2(s) ≥ kQ(s) . (4.8)
The set of implementable allocation rules is represented in the remainder
of the paper by the collections {Q(s), Y1(s), C1(s), Y2(s), C2(s)}s∈S, which
satisfy the C-RT-C property, as well as the inequalities in (4.7) and (4.8).
The optimal utilitarian income tax mechanism is now defined as follows.
Definition 4.4 With private information on taste parameters, the optimal
C-IC income tax solves the problem of choosing {Q(s), Y1(s), C1(s), Y2(s),
C2(s)}s∈S, subject to the C-RT-C constraint, the I-RP constraints in (4.7)
and the feasibility constraints in (4.8), in order to maximize EW .
This optimization problem differs from the one analyzed in the previous
section by the presence of the C-RT-C constraints. Under pure assignment
uncertainty, there is no need to take collective incentives into account.
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4.5 Optimality under Collective Incentives
In this section, the properties of an optimal C-IC income tax are derived
for each scenario. This is achieved via a two step procedure. The first step
solves for an optimal C-IC income tax, taking the provision rule for the public
good as given. The second step determines the optimal provision rule. This
approach is tractable because of the fact that the C-RT-C constraints limit
the number of admissible provision rules.
Lemma 4.4 Under C-RT-C, provision rules are increasing in both argu-
ments, ∀x ∈ {L,H} : Q(sxL) ≤ Q(sxH) and ∀y ∈ {L,H} : Q(sLy) ≤ Q(sHy).
The monotonicity constraints stated in the lemma imply that there are only
six candidate provision rules.14 The provision rule Qi : Q = 0 ⇐⇒ s = sLL,
which is part of the informed optimum, satisfies these constraints. The same
is true for provision rule Qi
′
, defined by Q = 1 ⇐⇒ s = sHH , provision rule
Q1, which calls for public good provision if and only if class 1 individuals
have a high taste parameter Q1 : Q = 1 ⇐⇒ s ∈ {sHL, sHH}, and the
analogously defined provision rule Q2 : Q = 1⇐⇒ s ∈ {sLH, sHH}. Finally,
the monotonicity constraints are trivially satisfied by the constant provision
rules Q ≡ 0 and Q ≡ 1.
One of these six candidate provision rules is taken as given when undertaking
the first step. The subsequent analysis focuses on the problem of finding an
optimal C-IC income tax that implements the informed planner’s provision
rule Qi. Formally, this problem is denoted Problem P i and defined as follows.
14The lemma follows from standard arguments. See the appendix.
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The optimal C-IC income tax under Qi: Problem P i
An optimal C-IC income tax which implements provision rule Qi solves the
problem of choosing {Y1(s), C1(s), Y2(s), C2(s)}s∈S in order to maximize the
expected welfare contribution from consumption and income requirements
EWV := pLL[V1(sLL) + V2(sLL)] + pLH [V1(sLH) + V2(sLH)]
+pHL[V1(sHL) + V2(sHL)] + pHH [V1(sHH) + V2(sHH)]
subject to the C-RT-C constraints,15
V1(sLH) = V1(sHH) , θH ≥ V1(sLL)− V1(sHL) ≥ θL ,
V2(sHL) = V2(sHH) , θH ≥ V2(sLL)− V2(sLH) ≥ θL ,
(4.9)
the I-RP constraints in (4.7) and the feasibility constraints
Y1(s)− C1(s) + Y2(s)− C2(s) ≥ 0, for s = sLL ,
Y1(s)− C1(s) + Y2(s)− C2(s) ≥ k, otherwise .
(4.10)
4.5.1 When does collective incentive compatibility mat-
ter?
With reference to problem P i, the Scenarios for which the informed opti-
mum survives the introduction of collective incentive requirements are easily
clarified. Recall that the informed optimum is obtained by maximizing EWV
subject to I-RP and feasibility, without taking C-RT-C into account. Obvi-
ously, the informed optimum satisfies C-RT-C if and only if the statements
in (4.9) remain true as one replaces Vt(s) by Rt(0) if s = sLL and by Rt(k) if
15One arrives at the inequalities in (4.9) by plugging Qi into the C-RT-C constraints.
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s 6= sLL. That is, the informed optimum satisfies C-RT-C if and only if
θH ≥ R1(0)− R1(k) ≥ θL and θH ≥ R2(0)−R2(k) ≥ θL . (4.11)
This statement coincides with the definition of Scenario 1, i.e. with a para-
meter constellation such that, at the informed optimum, “willingness to pay
for the public good is independent of earning ability.” These observations are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 The informed optimum has the C-RT-C property if and
only if Scenario 1 holds.
The informed optimum satisfies C-RT-C under Scenario 1 even though, for
s = sLH and s = sHL, there are conflicting interests. One class of individuals
– the one with the high taste parameter – wants to have the public good,
while the other class opposes provision. However, this conflict does not cause
collective incentive problems. The class with a high taste parameter behaves
truthfully in order to ensure provision. Likewise, the class with a low taste
wants to avoid provision and hence does not deviate from the truth. Under
Scenarios 2 and 3, at least one of these properties is violated.
4.5.2 How to deviate from the informed optimum?
According to Proposition 4.2, under Scenarios 2 and 3 collective incen-
tive problems force a deviation from the informed optimum. To understand
the planner’s assessment of conceivable deviations, a characterization of the
I-RP constrained Pareto-frontier in a neighborhood of the informed opti-
mum is needed. To this end, the following problem is considered. Choose
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C1, Y1, C2, Y2 in order to maximze u(C1)− v
(
Y1
w1
)
subject to
Y1 − C1 + Y2 − C2 ≥ r (BC) ,
u(C1)− v
(
Y1
w2
)
≤ V¯2 (I-RP2) ,
u(C2)− v
(
Y2
w2
)
= V¯2 .
(4.12)
I denote by P (V¯2, r) the utility level of class 1 individuals that is induced by
solution to problem (4.12).
Lemma 4.5 Let v(·) satisfy Assumption 4.2.
i) For all V¯2 and all r, Problem (4.12) has a unique solution. This solution
is such that (BC) is binding and there is no distortion at the top.
ii) For all r, P is a continuous and strictly concave function of V¯2 with a
unique maximum. For V¯2 = R2(r) – i.e. at the informed optimum – P
is strictly decreasing in V¯2.
iii) For all r, there is a maximal value Rˆ2(r) such that for V¯2 < Rˆ2(r),
(I-RP2) is binding, implying a distortion at the bottom. For V¯2 > Rˆ2(r),
(I-RP2) is not binding, and there is no distortion at the bottom.
Part ii) of Lemma 4.5 shows that there is a well defined range of parameters
such that there is indeed a tradeoff between the utility of the “rich” and the
utility of the “poor”.16 Moreover the informed utilitarian optimum does not
16This is not trivial as there is a region where both classes can be made better off if V¯2
is increased. In that region, the potential utility gain from the fact that less resources are
needed to generate a utility level of V¯2 is overcompensated by the utility loss from a more
severe distortion at the bottom. See the appendix for a mathematical formulation.
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lie at the boundary of the region where the tradeoff prevails. That is, while
the utilitarian planner expands redistribution up to a level that gives rise to
incentive problems – recall that the informed optimum has a binding I-RP
constraint for class 2 – she does not aim at the maximal level of incentive
compatible redistribution.
4.5.3 Scenario 2
In the following, the optimal C-IC income tax for Scenario 2 is analyzed.
First, Problem P i is solved. Then, the circumstances under which a util-
itarian planner indeed wants to stick to provision rule Qi under C-RT-C
constraints are clarified.
Problem P i under Scenario 2
Under Scenario 2, C-RT-C of the informed optimum fails as the more produc-
tive want to induce public good provision even if θ2 = θL, i.e. the preferences
of class 2 individuals cause a violation of the independence condition (4.11),
and one may thus think of class 2 as the source of collective incentive prob-
lems. Proposition 4.3 characterizes the optimal utilitarian reaction to this
problem.
Proposition 4.3 Let v(·) satisfy Assumption 4.2. Let the parameters θL
and θH be such that Scenario 2 arises. There exists θ¯L such that if θL ≤ θ¯L,
then a solution to Problem P i has the following properties:
V1(sLL) < R1(0) and V2(sLL) > R2(0) ;
V1(sLH) = V1(sHL) = V1(sHH) > R1(k) and
V2(sLH) = V2(sHL) = V2(sHH) < R2(k) .
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Moreover, for all s, V1(s) = P (V2(s), kQ
i(s)), and there is a distortion at
the bottom. The C-RT-C constraint V2(sLL) − V2(sLH) ≥ θL for class 2 is
binding, and the C-RT-C constraints θH ≥ V1(sLL)− V1(sHL) ≥ θL for class
1 are not binding.
Under Scenario 2, the informed optimum is not achievable, as class 2 indi-
viduals have a positive willingness to pay for the public good in any state s.
As the utility loss from public good provision is not large enough, class two
individuals will never admit a low taste realization. To prevent a collective
deviation from truth-telling, the planner has to deviate from the informed
optimum such that, from the perspective of the “rich” class, the utility loss
from public good provision goes up. This requires an increase in the level
of redistribution as compared to the informed optimum in states with public
good provision and a reduction in the level of redistribution in states with
non-provision. Hence, in state sLL, in which the public good is not installed,
class 2 individuals receive a C-Y pair that generates a utility level above
R2(0). In all other states, the public good is installed and class 2 gets a
C-Y pair that implies a utility level below R2(k). These incentive correc-
tions are chosen such that the deviation from the informed optimum is as
small as possible in welfare terms. Consequently, the C-RT-C constraint
V2(sLL)− V2(sLH) ≥ θL for class 2 is binding.
The deviations from the informed optimum proceed along the I-RP con-
strained Pareto frontier; that is, class 1 individuals are made as well off as
possible, given the need to fix the collective incentive problem that stems
from class 2 individuals. In particular, this implies that the less productive
can be made better off relative to the informed optimum in states with public
good provision. As class 2 individuals receive a utility level below R2(k), this
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leaves room to raise the utility of class 1 individuals above R1(k). Analo-
gously, in states without public good provision, class 1 individuals are worse
off. As the utility level of the “rich” class exceeds R2(0), a utility level of
R1(0) is out of reach for the “poor” class.
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Figure 1: The graph shows the I-RP constrained Pareto frontiers for the revenue
requirements 0 and k, respectively. Under Sc. 2, the difference R2(0) − R2(k) is
too small to satisfy C-RT-C for class 2. Under a modest incentive problem, the
planner deviates to points A and B. Under a severe incentive problem, the vertical
distance between these points is smaller than θL.
The main reason why Proposition 4.3 requires θL not to exceed some upper
bound θ¯L, is the requirement that the C-RT-C constraints of the less produc-
tive individuals are not binding.17 The correction of redistribution claimed by
17There is also a more subtle reason. Proposition 4.3 claims that the I-RP constraints
for class 2 are binding in all states. As is shown in the appendix, this is ensured if θL is
sufficiently small. However, the logic of the proof does not rely on binding I-RP constraints
of class 2 individuals, but on the shape of the Parteo frontier. As follows from Lemma 4.5,
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Proposition 4.3 implies that the utility difference V1(sLL)− V1(sHL) shrinks
relative to the informed optimum. If the parameter θL is small, then there
is enough room for such an adjustment. That is, the incentive corrections
required to solve P i do not induce the less productive to prefer Q = 1 just
in order to prevent the reduction of transfers that accompanies Q = 0.
These considerations suggest the following terminology for a characterization
of collective incentive problems. If θL ≤ θ¯L, incentive problems are modest in
the sense that it is possible to correct for the “original” collective incentive
problem which stems from class 2 individuals, without creating a new one
resulting from class 1 individuals. By contrast, collective incentive problems
are called severe if a solution to P i has two binding C-RT-C constraints.
Here, severity refers to the fact that the attempt to restore C-RT-C for one
class of individuals, renders collective manipulations attractive for the other
class.
Definition 4.5 Denote by {V ∗∗1 (s)}s∈S the utility levels realized by class 1
individuals at a solution to problem P i. Collective incentive problems under
Scenario 2 are called modest if
V ∗∗1 (sLL)− V
∗∗
1 (sHL) > θL .
Otherwise collective incentive problems under Scenario 2 are called severe.
Is Qi the optimal provision rule under C-RT-C constraints?
I now turn to the question whether a utilitarian planner who faces C-RT-
C constraints indeed wants to implement provision rule Qi. Possibly, the
welfare burden of having to adjust the transfer system if Qi is chosen is such
this shape is not affected as one enters the region where (I-RP2) ceases to be binding.
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that a different provision rule turns out to be superior, e.g. one alternative
scheme is to install the public good in every state of the world Q(s) = 1
for all s ∈ S. While this provision rule has the disadvantage that resources
are used to cover the cost of provision even if s = sLL, there is no need
to ask individuals about their taste parameters. Hence, there is no need
to deviate from the utility levels R1(k) and R2(k), which result from the
informed optimum if the revenue requirement equals k.
In case of a modest incentive problem, it depends on the planner’s prior
whether or not provision rule Qi is chosen. To see this, suppose first that pLL
is very small. Then the provision rule Q ≡ 1 seems attractive, as the state in
which a deviation from the informed optimum occurs is very unlikely, i.e. the
smaller pLL, the more attractive provision rule Q ≡ 1 becomes in comparison
to Qi. As the welfare assessment EW is continuous in the prior probabilities,
there must exist prior probabilities for which Q ≡ 1 is superior.
Now suppose that the parameters θL and θH are such that only a “small”
deviation from the informed optimum is needed to achieve collective incentive
compatibility – in terms of Figure 1, the points A and B are very close to the
informed optimum. In such a case, the adjustments of the transfer system,
required under Qi, are negligible in welfare terms. Consequently, one may
find priors such that this provision rule remains the optimal one.
In contrast, under a severe incentive problem, Qi will not be chosen. To see
this, suppose that the C-RT-C constraints
θL ≤ V1(sLL)− V1(sHL) and θL ≤ V2(sLL)− V2(sLH)
are both binding. The two binding incentive constraints imply that all in-
dividuals are indifferent between public good provision and non-provision if
s = sLL, i.e. given {V1(s), V2(s)}s∈S, all individuals are indifferent between
the provision rules Qi and Q ≡ 1. However, Q ≡ 1 avoids any departure
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from R1(k) and R2(k), implying that utilitarian welfare is higher in every
state of the world. These considerations are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.4 Let v(·) satisfy Assumption 4.2. Let the parameters θL
and θH be such that Scenario 2 arises.
i) If collective incentive problems are modest, then there exist prior beliefs
p such that Qi is part of an optimal C-IC income tax mechanism.
ii) If collective incentive problems are severe, then there do not exist prior
beliefs such that Qi is part of an optimal C-IC income tax mechanism.
I do not discuss in more detail which of the six candidate provision rules
may be supported by some prior beliefs as part of an optimal income tax
mechanism. This would require for each of these candidate provision rules
an analysis similar to the one conducted for Qi; that is, one would have to
determine, for each of them, the pattern of binding C-RT-C constraints and
the welfare implications of those binding constraints.
The main results are summarized as follows: if provision rule Qi – or any
other rule that makes the decision on provision dependent on the preferences
of class 2 individuals – is chosen for implementation, the planner has to accept
the necessity of excessive redistribution if the public good is installed, and
suboptimal redistribution if not. This may imply that the planner prefers a
different provision rule in order to limit the deviations from the allocation of
private goods prescribed by the informed optimum.
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4.5.4 Discussion of Scenario 3
For the sake of completeness, I briefly discuss how these considerations have
to be modified under Scenario 3. Under this parameter constellation, at the
informed optimum, class 1 individuals oppose public good provision in any
state s and class 2 individuals desire provision in any state s, i.e. there are
two sources of collective incentive problems. In order to ensure collective
truth-telling of class 1, at a solution to Problem P i, the attractiveness of
public good provision has to be increased relative to the informed optimum.
Simultaneously for class 2, the attractiveness of public good provision has to
be decreased.
Fortunately, these incentive corrections tend to complement each other. To
see this, recall the properties of a solution to Problem P i under Scenario 2,
which was dealing only with the collective incentive problem for class 2 in-
dividuals. This solution deviates from the I-RP constrained Pareto frontiers
for revenue requirements 0 and k, respectively, such that that the utility dif-
ference between provision and non-provision shrinks for class 1 individuals
relative to the informed optimum, i.e. this incentive correction points in the
right direction as it makes public good provision more attractive from the
perspective of class 1. Hence, under Scenario 3 the solution of Problem P i
may be such that the C-RT-C constraint for class 1 is not binding. In this
case, the solution of Problem P i is again characterized by Proposition 4.3.
More generally, one has to distinguish between modest and severe incentive
problems. Collective incentive problems are modest if, at a solution to Prob-
lem P i, only the C-RT-C constraint for one class is binding. Otherwise they
are called severe. These collective incentive problems may imply that Qi is
not part of an optimal C-IC income tax mechanism.
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
The analysis has shown that an optimal utilitarian income tax is robust to
the introduction of a free-rider problem on public good provision if and only
if “willingness to pay for the public good” is independent of earning ability.
Otherwise, collective incentive considerations force a deviation from the op-
timal tax scheme. Such a deviation can take different forms, a modification
of the provision rule, an adjustment of the private goods allocation accom-
panying a given provision rule or both. The exact pattern depends on the
interaction of prior probabilities and the intensity of the collective incentive
problem.
This raises the question how to assess these deviations from a welfare per-
spective. As the analysis has shown, it is possible that those deviations make
one class better off while hurting the other class, i.e. that they do not cause
a departure from constrained efficiency. However, they place an additional
welfare cost on redistribution if the allocation mechanism in addition has to
achieve a surplus maximizing decision on public good provision. If the latter
requires that, say, the “rich” admit a low valuation of public goods, then one
can not simultaneously have an excessive level of redistribution in response
to such a low valuation. Consequently, one has to tradeoff the utilitarian
welfare gains from a more favorable solution of the equity-efficiency tradeoff
with those from a more favorable solution of the free-rider problem. This
tradeoff is solved such that a deviation from an optimal income tax, as typi-
cally defined in the literature, is desirable in order to improve the possibility
to aggregate information on the willingness to pay for public goods.
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4.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1: To proof the only if-part, note that, because pref-
erences satisfy the separability property stated in equation (4.1), the NDT-
U -property is an implication of I-IC. Obviously I-RP is also an implication
of I-IC. To prove the if-part, suppose an NDT-U and I-RP allocation rule is
not I-IC. Then there exist (w, θ) and (wˆ, θˆ) and s such that
u(C(w, θ, s))− v
(
Y (w, θ, s)
w
)
< u(C(wˆ, θˆ, s))− v
(
Y (wˆ, θˆ, s)
w
)
.
Using NDT-U and I-RP one has:
u(C(wˆ, θˆ, s))− v
(
Y (wˆ, θˆ, s)
w
)
= u(C(wˆ, θ, s))− v
(
Y (wˆ, θ, s)
w
)
≤ u(C(w, θ, s))− v
(
Y (w, θ, s)
w
)
.
Hence, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4.3:
Claim 1.
dY ∗2 (r)
dr
> 0 ;
dC∗2 (r)
dr
< 0 .
Proof. These comparative statics are derived as follows: knowing that, at a
solution to problem (4.4), the I-RP -constraint for type 2, as well as the bud-
get constraint is binding allows us to setup the Lagrangean for the planner’s
problem. The first order conditions imply the following system of equations:
u′(C∗1 (r))
u′(C∗2 (r))
=
(1−MRS∗1) + (1− M̂RS
∗
)
MRS∗1 − M̂RS
∗ , (4.13)
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where M̂RS
∗
:= 1
w2
v′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w2
)
/u′(C∗1(r));
Y ∗1 (r)− C
∗
1(r) + Y
∗
2 (r)− C
∗
2(r) = r , (4.14)
u′(C∗2 (r)) =
1
w2
v′
(
Y ∗2 (r)
w2
)
, (4.15)
u(C∗1(r))− v
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w2
)
= u(C∗2(r))− v
(
Y ∗
2
(r)
w2
)
. (4.16)
Differentiating these equations with respect to r yields a system of equations
that can be used to solve for the derivatives of Y ∗1 (r), C
∗
1(r), Y
∗
2 (r) and C
∗
2 (r))
with respect to r. After some lengthy calculations, one finds that
dC∗2 (r)
dr
=
(α− δ) + ǫ(1− δ)
(α− δ)(γ − 1) + β(1 − δ)
,
dY ∗2 (r)
dr
= γ
(α− δ) + ǫ(1− δ)
(α− δ)(γ − 1) + β(1 − δ)
,
where α :=
u′′(C∗1 (r))
[
2u′(C∗2 (r)) +
1
w2
v′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w2
)
− 1
w1
v′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w1
)]
1
w2
1
v′′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w1
)
[u′(C∗1 (r)) + u
′(C∗2 (r))] −
1
w2
2
v′′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w2
)
[u′(C∗1 (r)) − u
′(C∗2 (r))]
and β :=
u′′(C∗2 (r))
[
2u′(C∗1 (r)) −
1
w2
v′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w2
)
− 1
w1
v′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w1
)]
1
w2
1
v′′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w1
)
[u′(C∗1 (r)) + u
′(C∗2 (r))] −
1
w2
2
v′′
(
Y ∗
1
(r)
w2
)
[u′(C∗1 (r)) − u
′(C∗2 (r))]
.
Note that, by Assumption 4.2, the common denominator of α and β is
strictly positive. The numerator of β is negative because of the distortion at
the bottom and the single crossing property, which imply that:
1
w2
v′
(
Y ∗1 (r)
w2
)
<
1
w1
v′
(
Y ∗1 (r)
w1
)
< u′(C∗1(r)) .
To see that the numerator of α is negative as well, note that equation (4.13)
implies:
2u′(C∗2(r)) +
1
w2
v′
(
Y ∗1 (r)
w2
)
−
1
w1
v′
(
Y ∗1 (r)
w1
)
=
[
1
w1
v′
(
Y ∗1 (r)
w1
)]2
−
[
1
w2
v′
(
Y ∗1 (r)
w2
)]2
2u′(C∗1 (r)) −
1
w2
v′
(
Y ∗1 (r)
w2
)
−
1
w1
v′
(
Y ∗1 (r)
w1
) > 0 .
